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JURISDICTION OF THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-103(2)(h).

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES
Respondent/Appellee Debra J. Robinson ("Debra") has determined that she will
not be appealing any issue on a cross appeal. Accordingly, the only issues on appeal are
those raised by Petitioner/Appellant Michael S. Robinson ("Michael").

DETERMINATIVE LAW
U.C.A. Section 38-9-1-4. (Addendum, Ex. Q).
U.C.A. Section 78B-6-1304. (Addendum, Ex. R).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Nature of the Case
Since being remitted back to the trial court, this case has resulted in protracted
litigation caused by Michael's attempts to prevent enforcement by Debra of the terms of a
Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement dated November 2, 2007 (the
"Stipulation") (Addendum, Ex. A) entered into by the parties to settle their divorce
(j

action. The trial court and this Court have previously held that the terms of the
Stipulation, as incorporated into the Decree of Divorce entered December 31, 2008 (the
"Decree") (Addendum, Ex. B), were equitable and that Michael was attempting to
rescind the Stipulation and have the Decree vacated because he believed, in hindsight,
that the terms of the Stipulation were not equitable. Robinson v. Robinson, 2010 UT App_

~

96, iJ13, 2 11 \s "WSFTA_12c935dd61ea451e820de4b92b0b69b6" \c 3 Robinson v. Robinson, 2010

UT App 96, iJ13, 232 P.3d 1081 (hereinafter "Robinson I") (Addendum, Ex. C.)
{00636033-l }
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Since the decision in Robinson I was issued, Debra has taken steps to collect the
amounts due her under the terms of the Stipulation and the Decree of Divorce. Michael
has taken steps to obstruct, delay and frustrate Debra. Over 7,_500 pages of motions,
memoranda, affidavits, declarations, orders and other papers now constitute the record in
this case. There have been over 15 hearings conducted, culminating in a three-day
evidentiary hearing in April 2013. Debra has had to request injunctive relief because of
Michael's interference with the sale of properties. Michael has filed two bankruptcy
actions, both of which were dismissed. There have been protective order hearings.
Michael has been held in contempt on three occasions. All of this could have been
avoided had Michael merely performed his obligations under the terms of the Stipulation
and the Decree of Divorce.
Course of Proceedings and Disposition at Trial
The Decree was entered by the trial court on December 31, 2008. Michael
appealed and this Court rendered its decision on April 22, 2010 in Robinson I. Numerous
motions were filed and hearings conducted between April 2010 and April 2013 relative to
Debra's efforts to collect amounts due her. On May 29, 2013, the trial court entered
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (Addendum, Ex. M) and also a Final Order and
Judgment. (Addendum, Ex. N) Post-trial motions were filed by both p~ies and denied
by the trial court on July 11 and 12, 2012. Michael filed his Notice of Appeal on July 19,
2013, and Debra filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal on August 1, 2013. As stated above,
Debra has decided to withdraw her notice of cross-appeal.
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Statement of the Facts
1.

The parties were married on October 4, 1992. (R. 661.) On February 2,

2007, Michael filed a Petition for Divorce. (R. 1-5.) On November 2, 2007, after months
@

of negotiations and mediation, during which each party was represented by independent
counsel, Michael and Debra entered into the Stipulation to resolve all issues of their
divorce action. (R. 14-28, 114-15, 197.)

~

2.

Over the course of the next year, Michael filed motions in an attempt to

have the Stipulation set aside. (R. 86-88, 95-97.) The grounds to have the Stipulation set
aside included, among others, alleged impossibility of performance, mutual mistake, and
Debra's fraud in inducing Michael to enter into the Stipulation and in providing Michael
with fraudulent information. (R. 38-85, 98-111.)
3.

On December 31, 2008, the trial court entered the Decree after (i) denying

Michael's motions to set aside the Stipulation and (ii) finding that Debra had not engaged

'"

in any fraudulent or deceptive behavior or acted in bad faith. (R. 676-89, 487-92.) The
Decree awarded the parties certain real and personal property including, among others,

~

the real properties commonly referred to as the Sandy Retail Center, Phoenix Plaza, Deer
Valley Condominium, St. George Condominium, and Arizona Parcel. (R. 677-89.)
Michael was awarded the St. George Condominiwn with its accompanying debt. (R. 67778.) Debra was awarded the Arizona Parcel and the Deer Valley Condominium with its
accompanying debt..(R. 677-78.) The Sandy Retail Center was to be immediately listed

~

for sale with Debra being awarded the sales proceeds with a potential adjustment to the
cash to be-awarded to Debra dependent on the actual sales price. (R. 678-79.) Michael
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was awarded the Phoenix Plaza and the adjoining parking lot parcel. (R. 679-81.)
Michael was required to file an application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza mortgage
within fifteen (15) days from the date the parties signed the Stipulation. (R. 679-80.) The
loan proceeds were to be used to pay Debra a cash amount of $1,912,696 for her share of
the marital estate. (R. 679-82.)
4.

On January 23, 2009, Michael filed a Notice of Appeal. (R. 692-94.) On

appeal, Michael argued, among other issues, that the Decree should be vacated based on
alleged impossibility of performance and mistake. (R. 706.) Although Michael argued
extensively to the trial court that the Stipulation should be set aside based on Debra's
alleged fraud, he did not raise or argue the issue of fraud on appeal before this Court. (R.
705-22.) This Court issued its Opinion affirming the Decree on April 22, 2010. (R. 70522.) Michael filed a Petition for Writ of Certiorari with the Utah Supreme Court, which
~as denied on September 1, 2010. (R. 723-26.)
5.

Having not received any payment from Michael to satisfy his obligation

under the Stipulation and the Decree, two Orders to Show Cause were issued against
Michael on October 8, 2010 and November 12, 2010, seeking (i) a judgment against
Michael for amounts he owed and had not paid to her, (ii) an order requiring Michael to
sign the listing agreement for the sale of Sandy Retail Center, and (iii) and certification of
Michael's contempt. (R. 73 7, 779-83.)
6.

On January 13, 2011, Debra's Motiot;i for Order to Show Cause was heard

by Commissioner Michael S. Evans. (R. 940.) At the hearing, the parties stipulated to (i)
the immediate listing of the Sandy Retail Center and to the appointment of Michael

{00636033-1 }
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"'

'

Carroll as the listing. agent, who had authority to set the initial listing price and (ii) the
~

sale of the Phoenix Plaza with a mutually acceptable agent at a price of $3,000,000. (R.
940, 1213-22.) On February 25, 2011, the trial court entered a Judgment and Order

viJ

incorporating the stipulations of the parties and also ordering that Debra have sole
management of the Phoenix Plaza and the Sandy Retail Center. (Addendum, Ex. D) (R.
940, 1214.)
7.

On or about March 11, 2011, Debra discovered that Michael had already

listed the Phoenix Plaza for sale with real estate agent Travis Parry for $3,750,000, a fact
that was not disclosed to Debra by Michael at the hearing on January 13,2011. (R. 1550,
1557-58, 1561-62.)
8.

Despite the clear direction in the Decree that the Sandy Retail Center was to

be sold, his own stipulation relative to the sale of the Sandy Retail Center and Phoenix
Plaza, and the trial court's order, Michael opposed and made attempts to frustrate the sale
of the Sandy Retail Center as well as the Phoenix Plaza by refusing to sign the listing
agreements and to otherwise accept or respond to offers received by the parties. (R. 1478xi)

80, 1486-1503, 1550-52, 1580-1639.) Due to his ongoing refusal to accept the various
offers and his blatant interference with the sale of the Sandy Retail Center and the
Phoenix Plaza, Debra filed a Verified Motion to Enforce Sale of Sandy Retail Center on
May 20, 2011, and a Verified Motion to Enforce Sale of Phoenix Plaza on June 7, 2011
(collectively referred to as "Verified Motions to Enforce Sale of Property"). (R. 14761513, 1548-1639.)

{00636033-1 }
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9.

On June 21, 2011, both Verified Motions to Enforce Sale of Property filed

by Debra were heard by Commissioner Michael S. Evans and were granted. (R. 182428.) On June 22, 2011, the trial court entered an Order (Addendum, Ex. E) which
divested Michael of all title in the Sandy Retail Center and granted Debra authority to
sign all documents necessary to list the Sandy Retail Center and to close its sale. (R.
1825-26.) The trial court further ordered Michael to sign an addendum accepting a
pending offer on the Phoenix Plaza, and authorized the court clerk to sign the addendum
if Michael refused. (R. 1826.) Michael refused to sign the addendum so the court clerk
signed the addendum. (R. 4247.)
10.

At an evidentiary hearing before Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki on July 26, 2011,

Michael was found to have breached the terms of the Decree and was found in contempt
for his failure to abide by and p~rform his obligations under the Stipulation and Decree,
including his failure to pay property settlement to Debra and his failure to submit an
application to refinance the Phoenix Plaza mortgage. (R. 1962, 2791-2844, 4360-67.)
The trial court also ruled that Michael's asserted defenses of impossibility, mistake, and
fraud were barred by claim preclusion. (R. 2816, 4362, 4371-75.) The Findings, Order,
and Judgment with respect to the hearing on July 26, 2011, was finally entered by Judge
Todd M. Shaughnessy on March 1, 2012. (Addendum, Ex. F) (R. 4360-67.)
11.

Having lost another offer on the Sandy Retail Center, Debra filed a Motion

for Approval of Reduced Listing Price for Sandy Retail Center ("Motion to Reduce
Listing Price") on August 25, 2011, requesting a reduction of the listing price to
$599,000 as recommended by Michael Carroll because (a) the property had not sold and
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(b) Michael continued to thwart the sale of the property by refusing to reduce the listing
~

price. (R. 2178-80.) In support of the Motion to Reduce Listing Price, Debra filed the
. Affidavit of Mike Carroll ("Affidavit") wherein Mr. Carroll asserted that based on a
.:,;;

listing price of $599,000, the parties should expect to receive offers ranging from
$575,000 to $599,000. (R. 2181-84.)
12.

On September 7, 2011, unbeknownst to Debra or her counsel, and despite

the claim preclusion found by Judge Iwasaki to Michael's fraud claims at the hearing on
July 26, 2011, Michael filed a prose fraud action in the Third District Court, West Jordan
Division, against Debra and her children, parents and a friend ("Fraud Action"). (R.
2894-2912.) Michael's complaint in the Fraud Action did not contain any allegations that
supplanted the trial court orders in the divorce action. (R. 2894-2912.)
13.

One day later, on September 8, 2011, and just minutes before a scheduled

hearing in the divorce action, Michael also filed a petition for chapter 11 bankruptcy,
..J

thereby invoking the automatic stay. (R. 2495-99.) Michael's bankruptcy case was later
dismissed by order of the bankruptcy court on November 16, 2011. (R. 2725.)
14.

On October 4, 2011, as a result of the delay caused by Michael filing a

chapter 11 petition for bankruptcy, another offer by a potential buyer of the Phoenix
Plaza was withdrawn. (R. 2555-56, 2570.)
15.

On October 28, 2011, the parties received an offer from Harris Air, Inc. to

purchase the Phoenix Plaza for the price of $3,000,000 (the "Harris Air Offer"). (R. 2556,
2572-78.) On or about November 21, 2011, Debra received an offer to purchase the
Sandy Plaza for $590,000 from Chicago Holdings, LLC ("Chicago Holdings Offer"). (R.
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6955, 6971-78.) As required under the Order entered on June 22, 2011, Debra
immediately provided Michael with a copy of both offers. (R. 6955, 6968.) In response,
Michael filed a Motion to Compel Respondent to Provide Information Sufficient to
Obtain Appraisals on Real Property that is Currently Listed for Sale and To Reject Offers
to Purchase ("Motion to Reject Offers") on November 23, 2011, wherein he requested the
trial court to reject the Harris Air Offer and the Chicago Holdings Offer. (R. 2521-23.)
Based on the existing court orders, on November 25, 2011, Debra accepted the Chicago
Holdings Offer subject to the trial court's approval. (R. 6955-56, 6971-79.) The closing
date was scheduled for January 15, 2012. (R. 6976.)
16.

On December 6, 2011, Debra filed a Memorandum in Support of Motion

for An Order Permitting Respondent to Retain Petitioner's Half of Net Rental Income
From the Phoenix Plaza, Sandy Retail Center, an~ Deer Valley Condominium, wherein
she informed the trial court that the Sandy Retail Center and Phoenix Plaza were
currently listed for sale and/or under contract for sale. (R. 2587-91.) On December 13,
2011, Debra filed a Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion to Compel Respondent to
Provide Information Sufficient to Obtain Appraisals on Real Property That is Currently
Listed for Sale and To Reject Offers to Purchase wherein she once again alerted the trial
court that the Sandy Retail Center was under contract for sale with a closing scheduled
for January 2012. (R. 2595-2603.)
17.

At a hearing before Commissioner Evans on December 20, 2011,

(continued from September 8, 2011 due to Michael's bankruptcy), where fourteen
motions were scheduled to be heard, testimony was presented regarding the pending
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offers relative to the Sandy Retail Center and the Phoenix Plaza and their scheduled
closings on January 16, 2012 and January 20, 2012, respectively. (R. 2604, 2647-52,
6956, 6984-99.) On January 24, 2012, the trial court entered its Order with respect to the
\lfij

issues dealt with at the hearing on December 20, 2011. (Addendum, Ex. G) (R. 2647-53.)
Michael acknowledged receiving the Harris Air Offer and the Chicago Holdings Offer.
(R. 6984-99.) The trial court granted Debra's Motion to Reduce Price and ordered the
Sandy Retail Center be listed at $599,000, as recommended by Michael Carroll. (R.
2650.) The trial court also approved the Harris Air Offer and ordered that the closing
agent deem and treat all net sales proceeds from the sale of the Phoenix Plaza as payable
to Debra in partial satisfaction of the judgments which Debra had against Michael. (R.
2649-50.) Due to time constraints and the volume of motions to be heard, the hearing
was continued until January 6, 2012. (R. 2651.)
18.

On January 6, 2012, the trial court, among other things, denied Michael's

Motion to Reject Offers. (R. 2620, 2687-93.) Based on the terms of the real estate
purchase contracts and pursuant to trial court orders, closing on the Sandy Retail Center
sale had been rescheduled to occur no later than February 6, 2012, and the closing on the
Phoenix Plaza sale was to occur no later than April 9, 2012. (R. 2706, 2726, 4248.)
19.

Notwithstanding the potential negative financial impacts and contractual

liabilities the parties would suffer if the pending sales did not timely close, Michael
improperly recorded four /is pendens on January 27, 2012, against the Sandy Retail
.,;;

Center, Phoenix Plaza, Deer Valley Condominium and Arizona Property. (R. 2726, 286287.)

{00636033-1 }
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20.

Upon receiving notice on January 30, 2012, of the recording of the four /is

pendens, Debra's counsel alerted Michael's counsel that the /is pendens were wrongfully
recorded and requested that the lis pendens be immediately removed. (R. 2727, 2892.)
Michael's counsel was reminded that (i) Debra was the only record title holder of the
Sandy Retail Center since Michael was divested of title on June 22, 2011, and (ii) by
filing a lis pendens ~gainst the properties, Michael was violating the trial court's orders.
(R. 2891.)
21.

On February 1, 2012, Debra was forced to file a Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, Lien Nullification, Damages, and Other
Relief. R. 2705-8. The trial court issued a Temporary Restraining Order relative to the
Sandy Retail Center on February I, 2012 ("TRO") finding that Michael had violated the

·'1
trial court's orders by filing the lis pendens. (R. 3014-18.) A preliminary injunction
hearing before the trial court was conducted on February 3, 2012. (R. 2959-62.) Pursuant
to paragraph 2 of the Findings and Order (Addendum, Ex. H), the trial court found that
the lis pendens filed against the Sandy Retail Center ''to be a 'wrongful lien' under the
provisions of Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-1 et. seq. and, as necessary, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B6-1304." (R. 2960.) Accordingly, the lis pendens was declared to be void ab initio. (R.
2960.)
22.

Notwithstanding the terms ofthe Findings and Order, Michael had another

/is pendens recorded on the Sandy Retail Center early on the morning of February 6,
2012 ("Second Lis Pendens''), the morning of the scheduled closing. (R. 2983, 2990-92,
4389-90.) The TRO was still in effect when Michael recorded the Second Lis Pendens
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on the Sandy Retail Center. (R. 2983.) On February 7, 2012, Michael had another /is

pendens recorded on the Phoenix Plaza. (R. 4390.)
23.

On February 7, 2012, after finding out about the Second Lis Pendens

having been recorded on the Sandy Retail Center, Debra was forced to file a Second
Motion for Nullification of Second Lis Pendens Filed by Petitioner, Damages, Contempt
and Other Relief and Motion for Order to Show Cause (Expedited Decision Requested)
("Second Motion"). (R. 2982-92.) A telephonic hearing on the Second Motion was
scheduled for February 9, 2012 before Judge Shaughnessy. (R. 2999.) At the telephonic
hearing, the trial court granted the Second Motion and issued its Second Findings and
Order and Order to Show Cause (Addendum, Ex. I), which also included a finding that
"[t]he Lis Pendens is determined to be a 'wrongful lien' under the provisions of Utah
Code Ann.§ 38-9-1 et seq. and as necessary, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-1304." (R. 3000.)
24.

A preliminary injunction hearing before Judge Shaughnessy was held on

February 28, 2012, to address, among other issues, all six /is pendens filed by Michael.
(R. 4384.) The trial court found, among other things, that (i) despite having notice
through counsel that the /is pendens were wrongfully recorded, Michael refused to
remove the Lis pendens and continued to refuse to remove them, (ii) the six /is pendens
were "wrongful liens" as that term is defined under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.§
38-9-1 et seq., and as necessary, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-1304, and (iii) that the
recording of the /is pendens was wrongful and in violation of the orders of the trial court.
(R. 4368-70, 4388-91.) On March 5, 2012, the trial court entered its Findings and Order
Granting Preliminary Injunction, Lien Nullification, and Other Relief (Addendum, Ex. L)

{00636033·1 }
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and enjoined Michael from interfering with the sale of the Phoenix Plaza. (R. 4393.) The
trial court reserved the issue of damages for the six wrongful liens in violation ofU.C.A.
§ 38-9-4, for a later date. (R. 4394.)
25.

On March 1, 2012, the trial court entered its Findings, Order, and Judgment

relative to the hearing conducted on July 26, 2011. (Addendum, Ex. J) (R. 4360-67.)
Among other relief, the trial court: (i) entered judgment against Michael in the amount of
$1,912,696 ("$1.9M"); (ii) held Michael in contempt for his failure to pay Debra amounts
due her and for his failure to refinance the Phoenix Plaza mortgage; and (iii) awarded
Debra attorney's fees on both a contractual basis and statutory basis. (R. 4365.)
26.

On March 5, 2012, the trial court issued another temporary restraining

order against Michael, once again enjoining him from interfering with the sale of the
Phoenix Plaza by making, uttering, recording, or filing any document which would cloud
title to the Phoenix Plaza or contacting any person associated with the sale including, but
not limited to, brokers, agents, buyers, and closing agents. (R. 4401.)
27.

Despite Michael's attempts to thwart the closing of the Phoenix Plaza in

violation of the trial court's orders, the sale of the Phoenix Plaza was fmally closed on or
about April 25, 2012. (R. 5278.)
· 28.

On May 23, 2012, a telephonic hearing was conducted during which the

trial court reviewed the history of this action and entered certain rulings. (Addendum, Ex.

P) (R. 7563: pps 2-24.)
29.

Debra continued her efforts to collect on the judgment against Michael that

had been entered on July 26, 2011, by filing a writ of execution against the St. George
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Condominium. (R. 5546-49, 5599-603.) Thereafter, beginning in May 2012, Michael
stopped making mortgage payments on the St. George Condominium, although the
property was awarded to him in the Decree. (R. 677, 5885, 5890-99, 5910-14.) Michael
;;;J

was also ordered to pay all associated debt on the St. George Condominium under the
Decree. (R. 677, 5884-85.) Given that Debra is a co-obligor on the mortgage
encumbering the St. George Condominium, she began to pay the monthly mortgage

\j;)

payments and late fees to protect her credit. (R. 5885.) At a hearing on October 2, 2012
before Judge Shaughnessy, Michael was ordered to pay in a timely manner all mortgage
payments, HOA fees, and other liabilities associated with St. George Condominium and
to reimburse Debra the monthly mortgage payments she had paid to that date, which
totalled $5,561.82. (R. 6413-6417.) At another hearing on January 22, 2013, Michael
was again ordered by Judge Shaughnessy to timely pay all future costs associated with
the St. George Condominium including, but not limited to, the mortgage, HOA fees,
utilities, and casualty insurance payments, and to provide immediate evidence of such
payments to Debra's counsel. (R. 6482-86.)
30.

On April 9, 2013, the trial court entered an Order to Show Cause against

Michael to show cause, why he "should not be held in contempt for violating the terms of
the Order entered February 13, 2013, relative to the hearing conducted January 22, 2013,
by failing to reimburse [Debra] $3,402.09 for the insurance premium and mortgage
payments she previously paid; and by refusing to make the February and March 2013
mortgage payments." (R. 6627-29.)

{00636033-l }
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31.

On April 17 through 19, 2013, an evidentiary hearing was conducted before

the trial court to address all remaining issues and at the end of trial a ruling was
announced by the trial court. (R. 6874, 6863-73.) On May 29, 2013, the trial court
entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law ("Findings") (R. 6874-87), which
among other things, included the trial court:
•

Affirming all rulings, orders and judgments previously made in the case to
date with one exception involving an issue not relevant to this appeal. (R.
6875.)

•

Finding Michael had filed /is pendens on the parties' properties to prevent
the sales of those properties that had been ordered to be sold by the trial
court. The trial court found that it had authority to nullify the /is pendens,
and require the removal of the /is pendens that were recorded relative to the
Fraud Action; however, because of the legal question, and some doubt as to
whether Utah's Wrongful Lien Act should apply to a /is pendens, the trial
court declined to impose any statutory damages. (R. 687 5.)

•

Declining to find Michael in contempt, with respect to the recording of the

/is pendens, for the same reason it declined to impose statutory damages.
(R. 6875.)
•

Declining in the interest of justice to impose any further contempt finding
against Michael or any fjnther sanction with respect to any additional
contempt issues that were presented. (R. 6878.)

(00636033-1 }
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32.

Along with the Findings, the trial court also entered its Final Order and

Judgment ("Judgment"). (R. 6888-96.) Paragraph 17 of the Judgment updates the
amount of the judgment entered against Michael on March 1, 2012, with various offsets
...J

and adjustments as ordered by the trial court. (R. 6892-93.) The updated amount of the
judgment entered in favor of Debra was $1,128,948.62 together with interest from May
23, 2012. (R. 3893.) Under paragraph 8 of the Judgment, Debra was awarded attorney's
fees and costs from January 1, 2008 through May 31, 2012, in the total amount of
$309,074.72 for actions required to be taken to enforce the terms of the Stipulation and
the Decree. (R. 6890.)
33.

Both parties filed post-trial motions, which were denied by the trial court

on July 11, 2013 and July 12, 2013 {Addendum, Ex. 0). (R. 7125-27, 7131-33.)

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The foundational facts in this case are relatively simple. Pursuant to the terms of
the Stipulation and Decree, Michael was to pay Debra cash in the amount of $1.9M as
property settlement. Michael was to also refinance the mortgage encumbering the
\tJJ

Phoenix Plaza and use the loan proceeds to pay Debra the amount owed. In Robinson I,
this Court determined the terms of the Stipulation and Decree are equitable. Michael did
not perform these obligations and, accordingly, breached the terms of the Stipulation.
Michael's failure to perform these obligations resulted in the trial court holding him in
contempt. Thereafter, Debra took actions to enforce the terms of the Stipulation and the
Decree and was awarded a judgment.
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Michael attempts in this appeal to reargue the same defenses of mistake,
impossibility and fraud that were present or argued relative to Robinson I. In Robinson/,
this Court found mistake and impossibility were not contractual defenses. Fraud was
raised in the trial court but not on appeal. Res judicata applies precluding any of these
defenses from being raised in subsequent actions for any purpose.
Under the terms of the Stipulation and the Decree, the Sandy Retail Center was to
be sold. Under the orders of the trial court relative to Debra's requested relief for
enforcement, the Phoenix Plaza was ultimately ordered to be sold. Michael interfered
with the sale of these two properties by, among other actions, filing lis pendens that
clouded title so that the sales could not be closed. The trial court found that the /is
pendens were "wrongful liens" but declined to award statutory damages due to the issue

of whether a /is pendens can be a "wrongful lien."
Finally, the trial court awarded Debra her attorney's fees and costs for the
enforcement actions she took. Debra has a contractual and statutory basis for the award.
ARGUMENT
IX.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY ENTERED A $1.9M JUDGMENT
AGAINST MICHAEL FOR HIS BREACH OF THE TERMS OF THE
STIPULATION AND DECREE AND PROPERLy FOUND ms
CONTEMPT IN FAILING TO EVEN SUBMIT AN APPLICATION TO
REFINANCE THE MORTGAGE ON THE PHOENIX PLAZA.

Under the terms of the Stipulation and the Decree, Michael was to pay Debra
$ l .9M 1 as property settlement. Michael was to also refinance the mortgage encumbering

1

This amount consists of the sum of amounts due under paragraphs 11.B., 12.B. and 15
of the Decree.
{00636033-1 }

16

the Phoenix Plaza and use the loan proceeds to pay Debra. Michael failed to pay Debra
the $1.9M owed. Michael also failed to submit an application to refinance the mortgage.
As this Court stated in Robinson I, Michael's "ability to provide evidence that
~

performance was impossible or highly impracticable is severely limited where he never
actually applied for a loan as contemplated, let alone having done so in the time frame set
forth by the stipulation." Robinson I, n. 4.
Michael places great weight on the decision of the Utah Supreme Court in Goggin

v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16,299 ~.3d 1079. In Goggin, the Utah Supreme Court stated:
. . . there is no place for contempt sanctions in an equitable
distribution of marital property. Under the Contempt Statute,
a court may order a party to pay for the "actual loss or injury"
he caused. And although a court has considerable discretion
in determining whether to sanction a party, it does not have
discretion to impose a sanction beyond the actual injury
caused by the contemptuous behavior. Moreover, it does not
have discretion to distribute marital property in a way that is
designed to punish a party's contemptuous behavior. Id. at
iJ 52.
The trial court in Goggin fashioned a property distribution taking Mr. Goggin's
contempt into account as an element of an "equitable" property distribution. Id. at ifif5961. In the instant case, the equitable distribution had already been fashioned by the
parties, approved by the trial court and affirmed by this Court before contempt was even
raised as an issue. In Robinson I, this court stated:
Thus, from the district court's decision to enforce the
stipulation, we assume - - and have no findings that would
indicate otherwise - - that the court determined that the
property division was equitable.
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Id. at 113. Accordingly, in this case, contempt was not a factor in fashioning an equitable
property division. Contempt was found only after Michael's breach of the terms of the
Stipulation and Decree had been established.
The actµal injury to Debra is the loss of the benefit of the terms of the Stipulation
entered into by the parties. Debra bargained for and agreed to receive $1.9M as her
equitable share of the division of the marital estate. The trial court and this Court have
both determined that such was an equitable distribution. Id.
Accordingly, the $1.9Mjudgment en~ered against Michael for having failed to pay
Debra her equitable share of the marital estate was proper. Michael's contempt was
found for his failure to pay Debra that amount and in his failure to submit the loan
application as a means to pay the $1.9M amount.

X.

MICHAEL AGAIN ARGUES IMPOSSIBILITY WHICH HAS ALREADY
BEEN DECIDED IN ROBINSON I.
Michael next argues that he cannot be held in contempt of the terms of the Decree

entered on December 31, 2008, that required him ''to go back in time" to make a loan
application by November 17, 2007 (within 15 days of the date of the Stipulation on
November 2, 2007). This argument is nothing more than Michael's impossibility of
performance defense made in Robinson I. In Robinson I, this court stated:
This defense is wholly inapplicable here because [Michael]
alleges no unforeseen event occurring after the stipulation
was signed in November 2007 that altered the possibility of
performance. . . Thus, without any later-occurring event
rendering performance impossible or highly impracticable,
[Michael's] argument of impossibility is unavailing ....

Id. at 112.
{00636033-1 }
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In Robinson I, this Court clearly indicated that Michael's obligation to submit a
loan application commenced November 2, 2007, the date of the Stipulation, not
December 31, 2008, the date of the Decree. Michael was under a contractual obligation
pursuant to the terms of the Stipulation to submit an application to refinance the mortgage
by November 17, 2007. He failed to do so. He breached that term of the Stipulation and
the Decree. His failure to submit the application constitutes contempt because (i) he
knew what was required of him and the time frame, (ii) had the ability to comply, but (iii)
willfully failed to do so. Van Hake v. Thomas, 159 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988).
XI.

MICHAEL IS PRECLUDED FROM CLAIMING MISTAKE OR
IMPOSSIBILITY AS DEFENSES AGAINST THE CONTEMPT CHARGES
BROUGHT AGAINST HIM.
Michael argues that the trial court erred in precluding his claim that mistake and

impossibility are defenses against the contempt charges brought against him. In

Robinson I, this Court ruled that the contractual defenses of mistake and impossibility are
not applicable under the facts of this case. Id. at if19-12.
Relative to the hearing conducted on July 26, 2011, on March 1, 2012, the trial
court issued its Findings, Order and Judgment. (R. 4360-67.) In paragraphs 12-17, the
trial court specifically found and held that Michael was in contempt because (i) the
...,;J)

Decree awarded Debra $1.9M, (ii) Michael was required to submit the loan application to
refinance the Phoenix Plaza mortgage within 15 days of November 2, 2007; (iii) Michael
knew and clearly understood he had an obligation to refinance the Phoenix Plaza
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mortgage as the means to pay Debra, but (iv) Michael failed to submit the application at
any time after November 2, 2007.
In Robinson I, as to mistake, this Court stated that if Michael "did not feel that the
information upon which he relied was sufficient, he should have either insisted on any
information he felt he needed before he entered into the stipulation or modified the terms
of the stipulation accordingly." Id. at ,r11. Asking for the deal to be fair "in hindsight" is
not a defense for contempt. Id. Similarly, Michael's defense of impossibility, whether as
a contract defense or for civil contempt, and "the ability to provide evidence that
performance was impossible or highly impracticable is severely limited where he never
actually applied for a loan as contemplated, let alone having done so in the time frame set
forth by the stipulation." Id. at n. 4.
Michael is prohibited from raising mistake or impossibility as a defense to
contempt because those are now res judicata. When a second defense (in the instant case
mistake or impossibility as a defense to contempt) is essentially the same as a previously
raised defense (in the instant case mistake or impossibility as a contractual defense in

Robinson I) which has gone to final judgment, res judicata means that neither of the
parties can again litigate that defense or any issue, point or part thereof which was or
could have been litigated in the former action." Bradshaw v. Kershaw, 627 P.2d 528, 531
(Utah 1981). Accordingly, Michael is precluded from raising the defenses of mistake and
impossibility as defenses to contempt.
Finally, Michael again claims in this appeal that the trial court erred by not
conducting an evidentiary hearing and thereby excluding evidence from Mr. Gottschall,
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Mr. Wadley and Michael regarding Michael's inability to refinance the Phoenix Plaza
mortgage. This issue was decided in Robinson I, when this Court determined that the
failure of the trial court to hold an evidentiary hearing was immaterial to its decision
vii

because there are no disputed facts determinative of whether the contractual defenses
applied. Id. at ,r 14.

XII.

MICHAEL IS PRECLUDED FROM CLAIMING FRAUD AS A DEFENSE.

Michael next argues that the trial court erred by precluding Michael's claim of
Debra's alleged fraud as a defense to his contempt. Resjudicata bars Michael's claimed
defense.
The doctrine of res judicata has "two branches: claim preclusion and issue
preclusion." Moss v. Parr Waddoups Brown Gee & Loveless, 2012 UT 42, ,r 20, 285
P.3d 1157. Claim preclusion bars a party from re-litigating a claim for relief that was
previously litigated on the merits and resulted in a final judgment. Id. at if 21. Issue
preclusion, commonly called collateral estoppel, presents a party from re-litigating issues
which have been previously decided on the merits and resulted in a final judgment. Id. at
~

if23. Claim preclusion has three requirements: (1) the second action must involve the
same parties, privies, or assigns as the original action; (2) the claim must have been
brought or have been available in the original action; and (3) the original action must

..;)

have led to a final judgment on the merits. Id. at if 21.
The trial court determined that "[t]here is claim preclusion as to [Michael's]
...J

allegations of fraud against [Debra]. This issue was raised by [Michael] after November
2, 2007. That issue was not taken up on appeal although [Michael] had an opportunity to
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raise the issue on appeal. It therefore is not a defense to the contempt charge." (R. 4362.)
Michael alleged fraud in pleadings he filed after November 2, 2007 on at least four
occasions. (R. 39, 45-47, 113, 365.).
With respect to the first requirement of claim preclusion, the parties are identical.
With respect to the second element of claim preclusion, Michael now argues that
under Marcis & Associates, Inc. v. Neways, Inc., 2000 UT 93, 16 P.3d 1214 (Utah 2000),
a party is required to include claims in an action fqr res judicata purposes only if those
claims arose before the filing of the complaint in the earlier action. Michael then argues
that the allegations of Debra's fraud obviously occurred after this divorce action was
already filed. But in the instant case, Michael did, in fact, raise the issue of Debra's
alleged fraud and misrepresentation in the trial court. Those issues were litigated and
ruled on by the trial court. Therefore, Marcis has no application in the instant case.
Marcis, at if25.
With respect to the third requirement of claim preclusion, Michael argues that
under Noble v. Noble, 761 P.2d 1369 (Utah 1988), there can be no final judgment entered
in a divorce action on a tort claim of fraud and, hence, the third element of claim
preclusion is not met. The distinction between claim preclusion and issue preclusion
resolves the issue.
Michael raised and litigated the issue of Debra's fraud in the divorce action and
the trial court found that Debra "didn't engage in any fraudulent or deceptive behavior or
bad faith." (R. 491.) Michael did not appeal that issue in Robinson I. Under claim
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preclusion, Michael is precluded from again raising that issue in the divorce action as a
defense, including as a defense for contempt.
In Noble, the issue of husband having intentionally shot wife was litigated in the
~

divorce action and finally determined. In the separate tort action brought by wife,
husband was precluded from requiring wife to re-litigate that particular issue under issue
preclusion. Id. at 1374-75.
Accordingly, all three elements of claim preclusion have been met and Michael is
precluded from claiming fraud as a defense to the issue of contempt.

XIII. THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ADJUDICATE MICHAEL'S TORT
CLAIMS BUT IT DID, AS PART OF THE DIVORCE ACTION,
ADJUDICATE THAT DEBRA DID NOT DEFRAUD MICHAEL AND
FRAUD WAS NOT A DEFENSE TO THE FINDING OF CONTEMPT.
In his brief, Michael argues that it was improper for the trial court to state that
Michael's tort claim of fraud is barred under the doctrine of claim preclusion simply
-J

because he did not raise it in this divorce action.
This argument is unavailing for several reasons. First, Michael did raise the issue
of fraud in numerous pleadings filed with the trial court. See, infra IV. Second, the trial
court found that Debra did not defraud Michael (R. 491.) Third, the trial court found that
Michael had "no applicable defenses to his contempt and he persists in disobeying Court

~

orders." (R. 4362.) Finally, the trial court determined that "[t]here is claim preclusion as
to [Michael's] allegations of fraud against [Debra]. This issue was raised by [Michael]
after November 2, 2007. That issue was not taken up on appeal although [Michael] had
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an opportunity to raise the issue on appeal. It therefore is not a defense to the contempt
1(.,i

charge." (R. 4362.)

v

The trial court in this action found that Debra had not defrauded Michael.
Accordingly, Michael is precluded under claim preclusion from raising Debra's alleged
fraud as a defense to Michael's contempt. Moss, at ,r 20.

XIV. - THE TRIAL COURT AND THIS COURT FOUND THAT THE
DISTIRBUTION OF THE MARITAL ESTATE WAS EQUITABLE UNDER
THE TERMS OF THE STIPULATION. ENFORCEMENT OF THE
TERMS OF THE STIPULATION, WHICH RESULTED IN A DIFFERENT
DISTRIBUTION, WERE THE DIRECT RESULT OF MICHAEL'S
ACTIONS.

On appeal in Robinson I, Michael argued that the district court erred in failing to
make a determination that the division of assets described in the Stipulation was fair and
reasonable. Id. at ,r 13. Michael makes the same argument with respect to the ultimate
division of the marital estate based on Debra's enforcement of the terms of the
Stipulation. Michael is the only person responsible for the outcome of the ultimate
division of the marital estate after Debra's enforcement actions.

In Robinson I, this Court stated:
[Michael] correctly asserts that a stipulation dividing
p~operty between divorcing parties should be adopted only "if
the court believes it to be fair and reasonable," Klein v. Klein,
544 P.2d 472,476 (Utah 1975). But [Michael] provides no
authority for his resulting assertion that a district court may
not enforce a stipulation unless the district court makes a
formal finding that it is fair and reasonable. And the
presumption seems to be the exact opposite, that is, that a
stipulation will ordinarily be enforced "unless the court finds
it to be unfair or unreasonable," Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d
782, 789 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) Thus, from the district court's
decision to enforce the stipulation, we assume - - and have no
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findings that would indicate otherwise - - that the court
determined that the property division was equitable. And
based on the facts of this case, in particular the sophistication
of the parties and the facts that they each had the opportunity
to consult with counsel and other advisors before entering the
stipulation, we cannot say that the court's admittedly cursory
finding exceeds the limits of reasonableness.

Id. at ,I13 ( emphasis in original).
Michael, in essence, asks this Court for a "redo." The divis_ion of the marital
property was found to be equitable by this Court in Robinson I. Michael's actions caused
the protracted litigation that followed when Debra was required to proceed with
·v;;J

enforcement actions. The case of Allen v. Ciokewicz, 2012 UT App 162, ,I 49, 280 P.3d
425 is not applicable for the reason that the trial court in that case was making an initial
distribution of property. In the instant case, the initial distribution of property was made
pursuant to the Stipulation. Debra's enforcement actions caused, as Michael terms it, an
inequitable distribution of the marital property. There are no exceptional circumstances
permitting a "redo" given the facts of this case.
XV.

THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY FOUND THAT THE LIS PENDENS
WERE WRONGFUL LIENS.
Michael twice recorded lis pendens on both the Phoenix Plaza and the Sandy Plaza

relative to the Fraud Action in an attempt to frustrate scheduled closings. The trial court
~

in the divorce action entered a number of orders, each finding that the /is pendens were
wrongful liens under Utah Code Ann. § 3 8-9-1, et seq. and, as necessary under Utah
Code Ann. § 78B-6-1304. (R. 2960, 3004, 4390.)
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Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1303 authorizes the filing of a /is pendens in only certain
narrow circumstances:
Either party to an action affecting the title to, or the right of
possession of, real property may file a notice of the pendency
of the action with the county recorder in the county where the
property or any portion of the property is located.
Utah courts have confirmed that a "lis pendens may only be filed in connection with an
action (1) 'affecting the title' to real property, or (2) 'affecting ... the right to possession
of [] real property."' Winters v. Schulman, 1999 UT App 119, ,r 21,977 P. 2d 1218
(quoting Utah Code Ann.§ 78-40-2, the predecessor to§ 78B-6-1303). In Winters, this
Court concluded that the Us pendens at issue was "invalid because the complaint and
[divorce] decree failed to address title to or possession of the Utah real property." Id. at ,r
21. The Winters court further observed that because a post-divorce enforcement
proceeding sought only monetary damages, it was "unrelated to title or possession of the
Utah real property," and the fact that the claimant sought to encourage payment of $.e
damages by requesting a lien on the real property did not change the claim's
"fundamental character." Id. at ,r 22.
A Us pendens may be released upon motion if the "court finds that the claimant
has not established by a preponderance of the evidence the probable validity of the real
property claim that is the subject of the notice." Utah Code Ann. § 78B-6-1304(2)(b). It is
evident that to the extent an action does not affect title to or possession of real property, it
cannot be a valid "real property claim," and thus, requires release of the lis pendens.
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The complaint in the Fraud Action did not make any claim as to title or the right of
possession as to the Sandy Retail Center or the Phoenix Plaza, but only made claims for
monetary damages. (R. 2894-2912.) The complaint in the Fraud Action did claim relief
~

for a constructive trust, but /is pendens are not appropriate in actions claiming
constructive trust relief. Levinson v. Eight Judicial District Court ofNevada, 857 P .2d
18, 20 (Nev. 1993). "In determining the validity of a lis pendens, courts have generally
restricted their review to the face of the complaint." Winters, at ,r 19.

Winters also made clear that the filing of an invalid /is pendens, in addition to
subjecting the lis pendens to release pursuant to § 78B-6-1304(2), can form the basis of a
claim for wrongful lien as defined by :tJtah Code Ann.§ 38-9-1(6). See Winters, 1999 UT
App 119, ,r 14. The Utah Code defines "wrongful lien," in relevant part, as:

any document that purports to create a lien, notice of interest,
or encumbrance on an owner's interest in certain real property
and at the time it is recorded is not:
(a) expressly authorized by this chapter or another state or
federal statute;
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of
a court of competent jurisdiction in the state; or
( c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed
by the owner of the real property.
Utah Code Ann. § 3 8-9-1 (6). Utah Code Ann. § 3 8-9-7 allows the owner of the property
to petition the court to nullify the wrongful lien. In addition to an order nullifying the
lien, the court "shall issue an order declaring the wrongful lien void ab initio, releasing
the property from the lien, and awarding costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the
petitioner." Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-7(5)(a).
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Even if the lis pendens are found to not have been wrongful liens, there was a
second basis for the trial court to nullify the /is pendens. As the trial court stated in its
Minute Entry dated March 1, 2012, (Addendum, Ex. K) (R. 4369.):
Whether a lis pendens is a wrongful lien for purposes
of Utah's wrongful lien statute, and whether this court has the
authority to order removal of a lis pendens under the lis
pendens statute, are not dispositive. Where, as here, the
property in question is a marital asset subject to the
jurisdiction of this court, and where this court has in the past
entered orders associated with that property, this court
respectfully submits that it has the authority to issue orders in
aid of its jurisdiction or orders that are necessary or
appropriate to carry out or enforce its prior orders.
A trial court has authority to issue orders to aid or as may be necessary to enforce its prior
orders. "Judicial power 'is the authority to hear and determine justiciable controvercies .
. . [It] includes the authority to enforce any valid judgment, decree or order."'

Timpanogos Planning and Water Mngt Agency v. Central Utah Water Conservancy
District, 690 P.2d 562, 569 (Utah 1984) citing Galloway v. Truesdell, 422 P.2d 237,242
(Nev. 1967) (emphasis in original).
Michael also argues that a motion to have the /is pendens nullified must have been
filed in the Fraud Action. The trial court noted, however, that:
Section 7 8B-6-13 04( 1) states that an affected party "may
make a motion to the court in which the action is pending."
The statement is permissive, and the "court in which the
action is pending" is the Third Judicial District Court.
However, the court does not rule on the question of whether
the "court in which the action is pending" means the
particular judge before whom the case is pending, or that
district, because it is unnecessary to do so.
(R. 4369.)
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In summary, the trial court properly found that the lis pendens were wrongful
liens. Alternatively, the trial court had authority to nullify the lis pendens under its
inherent judicial authority.
~

VIII. THE TRIAL COURT'S AW ARD OF ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS
WERE APPROPRIATE UNDER A CONTRACT CLAIM AND ALSO
UTAH CODE ANN.§ 30-3-3(2).
Debra made a claim for an award of attorney's fees and costs under a contract
claim and also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-3(2) relative to her enforcement of the terms of
the Stipulation and the Decree. Attorney's fees may be awarded if authorized by statute
or by contract. Jones v. Riche, 2009 UT App 196, 11,216 P.3d. 357.
With respect to Debra's contract claim, paragraph 44 of the Decree provides:
The prevailing party to an action for breach of a term of the
Agreement shall be entitled to his or her attorney's fees and
costs.
(R. 685.) Contractual attorney's fees provisions are enforceable under Utah law.
Saunders v. Sharp, 840 P.2d 796 (Utah App. 1992).

With respect to Debra's statutory claim, Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-3 creates two
\6)

classes of attorney fees - those incurred in establishing court orders and those incurred in
enforcing court orders. Connell v. Connell, 2010 UT App 139, ,I 30, 233 P.3d 836. All
attorney's fees and costs Debra has incurred since shortly after the date the Stipulation
was signed have been to enforce the terms of the Stipulation.
Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-3(1) deals with attorney's fees incurred "to establish an
order of ... division of property in a domestic case ...." (Emphasis added). However,
Utah Code Ann.§ 30-3-3(2) provides:
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(2) In any action to enforce an order of custody,
parent-time, child support, alimony, or division of propertY in
a domestic case, the court may award costs and attorney fees
upon determining that the party substantially prevailed upon
the claim or defense. The court, in its discretion, may award
no fees or limited fees against a party if the court finds the
party is impecunious or enters in the record the reason for not
awarding fees. (Emphasis added.)
In Connell, this Court stated:
Fees awarded under subsection (1) must be based oµ the usual
factors of need, ability to pay, and reasonableness. See
Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11, 176 P.3d 476, ,r 49. By
contrast, in awarding fees under subsection (2), the court
"may disregard the financial need of the moving party."
Finlayson v. Finlayson, 874 P.2d 843, 850 (Utah Ct. App.
1994); see also Lyngle v. Lyngle, 831 P.2d 1027, 1030 (Utah
Ct. App. 1992) ("In an action to enforce the provisions of a
divorce decree, an award of attorney fees is based solely upon
the trial court's discretion, regardless of the financial need of
the moving party."). The guiding factor in fee awards under
subsection (2) is whether the party seeking an award of fees
substantially prevailed on the claim. See Utah Code Ann. §
30-3-3(2).

Connell, at ,I 28.
In Connell, this Court also noted that:
... fee awards under subsection (2) serve no
equalizing function but allow the moving party to collect fees
unnecessarily incurred due to the other party's recalcitrance.
See Finlayson, 874 P.2d at 850-51. In Tribe v. Tribe, 59 Utah
112, 202 P .213 ( 1921 ), the supreme court discussed the
rationale for awarding attorney fees when one party "refuses
to comply with the requirements of [an order or] decree" such
that the other party "is compelled to bring proceedings
against" the offending party to ensure compliance with that
order. Id. at 216. The court explained that the trial court may
award reasonable· attorney fees to the moving party so that he
or she is not forced ''to fritter away in costs and counsel fees"
the amounts received under the order "by bringing repeated
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actions to enforce payment. ... " Id. The court may in its
discretion award no fees or limited fees if it finds the
offending party impecunious or enters in the record another
reason for not awarding fees. See Utah Code Ann.§ 30-33(2) .

\4fl
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Connell at iJ 30.
Debra submitted her claim for attorney's fees and costs in admitted trial exhibits
61 and 61A. (R. 7569, 779:12.) The trial court only awarded Debra fees and costs for the
time period between January 1, 2008 and May 31, 2012. (R. 6890-91.) Debra's request
for an award of fees and costs incurred prior to January 1, 2008 and after May 31, 2012 in
the total amount of $97,787.05 were denied. (R. 6890-91.)
In its Minute Entry dated July 12, 2013, dealing with post-trial motions, the trial
court noted
that it did not award [Debra] all of the fees she sought and did
not award her fees she incurred in connection with matters on
which she was not successful at the hearing held in April
2013. The court stands by its attorney fee ruling for the
reasons stated on the record and as set forth in [Debra's]
opposition papers.
(R. 7132.)
Debra substantially prevailed on every issue. That the trial court did not find
Michael in contempt on numerous obstructionist actions he took during the course of the

..,iJ

proceedings did not change the ultimate outcome of this case or the ultimate judgment
amount awarded to Debra. The findings in a ruling on post-trial issues, in which the trial
court awarded additional attorney's fees to Debra, best describes the award in the Final
Order and Judgment:

{00636033-1 }
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The Court finds that [Debra] substantially prevailed on all of
the issues brought before the court, and Michael overstates
the relative degree of his success. More important, as the
court has previously noted on the record, the need for those
additional proceedings was brought about entirely by
Michael's conduct. Throughout these post-judgment
proceedings [Michael] has intentionally delayed and
interfered with the orderly disposition of the matters before
the court. [Debra] has been left with no choice but to proceed
as she has. Requiring [Michael] to bear the costs occasioned
by his conduct is the only reasonable result under the
circumstances.
(R. 7530-31.)
Accordingly, the award of attorney's fees and costs by the trial court should be
affirmed.
CONCLUSION
The Final Order and Judgment should be affirmed in all respects. Debra should be
awarded her attorney fees and costs on appeal.
DATED this

JJ. nl day of August, 2014.
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS

J~!~

DEAN C. ANDRE~
DIANA L. TELFER
Attorneys for Respondent/Appellee
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FILED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981)
CLYOE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216
Telephone (801) 322-2516
·
Attorneys for Respondent
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAELS. ROBINSON,
Petitioner,

STIPULATION AND PROPERTY
SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT

Civil No. 074900501

V.

DEBRA J. ROBINSON,
Respondent.

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
Comm. Michael S. Evans

The parties make the following stipulations and agreements for the purpose of
settlement of this action and respectfully move the Court to adopt the stipulations and
agreements in the final Decree of Divorce to be entered herein.
DIVORCE

1.

The parties shall proceed to obtain a Decree of Divorce granting each a

divorce from the other as provided for by law dissolving the marriage of the parties.
2.

The parties consent that a Decree of Divorce may be entered with terms

consistent to the terms of this Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement (the
"Agreement").
3.

Petitioner is a bona fide -and actual resident of Salt Lake County, State of

Utah, and has been for more than three months prior to the commencement of this action.
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4.

Petitioner and Respondent are husband and wife, respectively, having been

married on October 4, 1992.
5.

Disagreements have ensued between the parties concerning their marriage

and their future together; meaningful communication between the parties has ceased;
notwithstanding attempts bythe parties to reconcile and resolvetheirdifferences, the same
have been to no avail and have become irreconcilable making continuation of the marriage
under the circumstances impossible.
CHILDREN

6.

The parties have no children born as issue of their marriage and none are

expected.
ALIMONY AND RELATED PROVISIONS

7.

Each party irrevocably waives any claim to past, present or future alimony

under any circumstance or condition.
8.

Each party shall be responsible to maintain his or herown medical and dental

insurance coverage and each shall be responsible for his or her own uninsured medical
and dental costs.
PROPERTY AND DEBT DISTRIBUTION
9.

Prior to and during their marriage, the parties acquired certain real and

personal property which shall be divided between the parties as described below. Prior to
and during the marriage, the parties incurred certain debts and obligations which shall be
allocated between the parties as described below. The party assuming a particular debt
or obligation shall indemnify and hold the other party harmless therefrom.
10.

Petitioner shall be awarded the Seven Springs residence and shall assume

and pay any debt encumbering the property.

2
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11.

Respondent shall be awarded the ten acre parcel in Scenic, Arizona and shall

assume and pay any debt encumbering the property.
12.

Respondent shall be awarded the Mayan Palace timeshare and shall assume

and pay any debt encumbering the property.
13.

Petitioner shall be awarded the parties' interest in the condominium in St.

George, subject to Petitioner assuming and paying any debt encumbering the property.
Petitioner may continue to own and rent the condominium or, alternatively, sell it but
Petitioner shall be responsible for all costs of sale. Respondent shall be given a credit as
described below in the amount of $62,500 for her equity in the condominium calculated as
one half of the difference between the fair market value of the condominium ($250,000)
less the current mortgage ($125,000). Rental income from the Phoenix Plaza property
shall be used to pay all condominium costs and expenses including PITI until such time as
Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property as described
·below.
14.

Respondent shall be awarded the parties' interest in the condominium in

Deer Valley, subject to Respondent assuming and paying any debt encumbering the
property. Respondent may continue to own and rent the condominium or, alternatively, sell
it but Respondent shall be responsible for all costs of sale. Petitioner shall be given a
credit as described below in the amount of $234,000 for his equity in the condominium
calculated as (i) one half of the difference between the fair market value of the
condominium ($900,000) less the purchase price ($515,000), plus (ii) $27,870 for the
down payment paid by Petitioner, plus (iii) $7,500 for the earnest money paid by Petitioner,
plus (iv) one half of the mortgage pay down in the amount of $6, 130, at the time Petitioner
has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property. Rental income from
the Phoenix Plaza property shall be used to pay all condominium costs and expenses
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including PITI until such time as Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the
Phoenix Plaza property as described below. Rental income shall be recognized as income
when earned, not deposited. Cash from rental income when earned shall be equally
divided until such time as Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix
Plaza property as described below. .
15.

The disposition of the parties' interest in the retail center,in Sandy shall occur

as described below.
A.

The retail center shall be immediately listed for sale. The parties shall

agree to the listing agent, the listing price, any reduction in the listing price, and the

@

ultimate terms of sale. In lieu of Petitioner receiving cash from the sale, Petitioner
shall be given a credit in the amount of $391,000 ($32,188 + $358,812) for his
interest in the retail center. This credit reflects and assumes estimated net sales
proceeds in the amountof$749,812 of which Petitioner shall receive $391,000 and
Respondent shall receive $358,812. If the net sales proceeds are greater than
$749,812, Respondent shall pay Petitioner one half of the difference between the
actual net sales proceeds and $749,812. If the net sales proceeds are less than
$749,812, Petitioner shall pay Respondent one half of the difference between the
actual net sales proceeds and $749,812.
B.

The parties shall jointly mange the retail center until it is sold.

Respondent shall provide the bookkeeping and accounting services for the retail
center and provide Petitioner the regular monthly reports. The 2007 real property
taxes shall be paid from the joint funds of the parties. Any CAM revenue shall be
equally divided between the parties.
C.

Until such time as the retail center is sold, the parties may agree to

equally distribute to themselves a portion or all of the cash from the net rental
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income. At the time the retail center is sold, each party shall be awarded one half
of any cash from the net rental income.
D.

The parties shall agree as to whether any legal action shall be taken

in an attempt to collect certain unpaid rents and other bad debt. Each party shall
pay one half of any costs incurred and shall be awarded one half of any monies
recovered.
16.

The disposition of the parties' interest in the Phoenix Plaza property shall

occur as described below.

A.

Petitioner shall be awarded the Phoenix Plaza subject to Petitioner

taking the following actions.
B.

Petitioner shall re-finance the mortgage encumbering the Phoenix

Plaza and pay Respondent the amount of $1,784,419 for her equity in the Phoenix
Plaza property calculated as (i) one half of the difference between the stipulated fair
market value of the Phoenix Plaza property ($7 .25M) less the purchase price
($4.5M), plus (ii) $891,803 for the down payment paid by Respondent, plus (iii)
$12,500 for the earnest money paid by Respondent, plus (iv) one half of the
mortgage pay down in the amount of $67,616 at the time Petitioner has paid
Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property, plus (v) $62,500 for the
St. George condominium credit, less (vi) $234,000 for the Deer Valley condominium
credit, less (vii) $391,000 for the Sandy retail center credit. If the re-financing does
not occur within one hundred twenty (120) days of the date the parties sign this
Agreement, Petitioner shall pay Respondent interest at the rate of eight percent
(8%) from one hundred and twenty (120) days after the parties sign this Agreement.
Petitioner shall file the loan refinance application within 15 days of the date of this

5
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Agreement. Respondent shall assist Petitioner in preparing and filing the loan
refinance application.

C.

The parties shall jointly manage the Phoenix Plaza until the time the

re-financing occurs, Respondent shall provide the bookkeeping and accounting
services for the Phoenix Plaza and provide Petitioner the regular monthly reports.

D.

Until Respondent is paid her equity in the Phoenix Plaza, (1) the net

rental income shall be used to pay, as necessary, the operating costs of the
Phoenix Plaza and the other properties as described above and (2) the parties may
agree to equally distribute to themselves a portion or all of the cash from the net
rental income. At the time Respondent is paid her equity in the Phoenix Plaza, each
party shall be awarded one half of any cash from the net rental income.
E.

Tenants of the Phoenix Plaza owe certain common area maintenance

fees ("CAM Fees") for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. Any CAM Fees collected
relative to time periods prior to the time Petitioner re-finances the mortgage on the
Phoenix Plaza shall be equally divided between the parties. The parties shall agree
to any collection costs including attorney fees to be incurred in an attempt to collect
the CAM Fees.
F.

Each party shall pay one half of all costs and expenses including any

prepayment penalty associated with the payoff of any existing mortgage or encumbrance
or the origination of any new mortgage or encumbrance relative to the re-financing of the
Phoenix Plaza debt.
17.

The disposition of the parties' interest in the parking lot parcel next to the

Phoenix Plaza shall occur as described below.
A.

Petitioner shall be awarded the parking lot property subject to

Petitioner taking the following actions.
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8.

At the time of and as a part of the re-financing relative to the mortgage

encumbering the Phoenix Plaza, Petitioner shall pay Respondent the amount of
$105,777 which is equal to one half of the difference between (1) $425,000
{representing the stipulated fair market value of the parking lot parcel) less (2) the
unpaid principal amount of the mortgage in the amount of $213,446 on the parking
lot parcel at the time of the re-financing of the Phoenix Plaza mortgage. This
amount may be adjusted as required by each party paying one half of the amount
to settle or otherwise resolve the disputed claim of Keith Funk for certain asphalt
services provided relative to the parking lot parcel.

In the event the amount

necessary to resolve the disputed claim of Keith Funk has not been determined by
the time of the re-financing occurs, such· amount shall not be taken into
consideration and each party shall thereafter pay one half of the amount necessary
to resolve the disputed claim.

18.

Petitioner shall be awarded the Ford Excursion vehicle and the BMW

motorcycle. Petitioner shall assume and pay the debt encumbering the Ford Excursion
vehicle. There is no debt encumbering the BMW motorcycle.
19.
vehicles.

Respondent shall be awarded the Chevrolet Avalanche and Toyota Matrix
Respondent shall assume and pay the debt encumbering the Chevrolet

Avalanche vehicle. There is no debt encumbering the Toyota Matrix vehicle.
20.

Petitioner shall be awarded the Cessna 210 airplane. There is no debt

encumbering the airplane. On the first closing to occur of either the sale of the Sandy retail
center or the refinancing of the Phoenix Plaza property, Petitioner shall pay Respondent
$22,500 from his share of the net sales proceeds in consideration of Petitioner being
awarded the airplane.

7
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21.

Respondent shall be awarded the aluminum boat and motor. The interest

of the parties in the sailboat shall be awarded to Matthew Larson.
22.

Petitioner shall be awarded his retirement accounts in the Cardiomed Profit

Sharing Plan. Petitioner represents that no contributions have been made to his account
in the Cardiomed Profit Sharing Plan during the term of the marriage. Petitioner shall be
awarded his IRA accounts.
23.

Respondent shall be awarded her 401 (k) retirement accounts. Respondent

shall be awarded her IRA accounts.
24.

Each party shall be awarded one half of any Utah Education Savings Plan

accounts in either parties' name.
25.

Any bank account maintained jointly by the parties for their personal use or

used in conjunction with a real property shall be equally divided between the parties at the
time the account is closed, the property is sold, or Respondent is paid out her equity in the
property.

Petitioner shall be awarded the Rawkin Horse bank account and the cash in

Petitioner's possession.
26.

Each party shall be awarded his or her individual checking and savings

accounts.
27.

The parties have no life insurance policy that has a cash surrender value.

28.

Each party shall be awarded his or her clothing, jewelry, sporting equipment,

musical instruments, and personal effects.
29.

Each party shall be awarded as his or her separate property, property

acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired by gift, devise or inheritance, or as a gift
from the other party during the marriage
30.

Petitioner shall· be awarded the furniture, furnishings and other personal

property located in the real properties awarded to him except as described in Exhibit A
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attached, which items shall be awarded to Respondent. Respondent shall be awarded the
furniture, furnishings and other personal property located in the real properties awarded
to her except as described in Exhibit B attached, which items shall be awarded to
Petitioner. Respondent may store her personal property at the Seven Springs residence
until thirty days after the date this Agreement is signed by the parties. The parties shall
clearly identify in a list the property that is being stored. Respondent may store her grand
piano at the Seven Springs residence for an indefinite period of time provided that
Respondent shall remove the grand piano within 60 days of demand for such from
Petitioner.
31.

This paragraph is intentionally deleted from this Agreement.

32.

Each party shall be awarded one half of any marital property not specifically

p_rovided for in this Agreement.
33.

Each party shall assume and pay one half of any marital debt or obligation

not specifically provided for in this Agreement.
34.

Each party shall assume and pay his or her debts and obligations incurred

since the time of the separation of the parties, and indemnify and hold the other party
harmless therefrom.
TAX PROVISIONS
35.

In the event any income tax return of the parties filed on a married filing joint

basis is audited, the parties shall be equally liable for any tax, penalty or interest assessed
or shall be equally entitled to any refund. The parties shall equally pay one half of the
excise sales and lodging taxes due to the State of Utah relative to the rental of the Deer
Valley condominium.
36.

The parties shall file federal and state income tax returns on a married filing

joint pasis for the year 2007. Each party shall be awarded one half of any refund or each
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party shall pay one half of any taxes, penalties or interest due on the 2007 returns w~_th the
:,

exception that the incremental taxes owed relative to retirement distributions taken ~y
Petitioner during 2007 shall be paid sol~ly by Petitioner from his separate funds. Each
party shall be awarded one half of any alternative minimum tax credit carryforward from the
2007 federal income tax return.
37.

Petitioner shall be entitled to any tax deduction relative to the Seven Springs

residence accruing from January 1, 2008.

Respondent shall be entitled to any tax

deduction relative to the Scenic, Arizona property or the Mayan Palace timeshare accruing
from January 1, 2008.
38.

Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the

St. George condominium from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity in the
Phoenix Plaza property.
39.

Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the

Deer Valley condominium from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity in the
Phoenix Plaza property.
40.

Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the

Sandy retail center from January 1, 2008 until the time of sale. Respondent shall elect to
either realize the gain on the sale of the property or enter into a § 1031 exchange
transaction since Respondent has assumed the tax basis in the property by granting
Petitioner a credit for his interest.
41.

Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the

Phoenix Plaza property from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity in the
property.
42.

Each party shall be awarded and entitled to claim one half of any quarterly

installment payment made for federal or state income taxes prior to Petitioner re-financing

10

,- ..

\

the mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property and paying Respondent her equity in the
property as described above.
43.

Petitioner shall be liable for any income tax or penalty relative to distributions

he has taken from his retirement during 2007 at the parties' highest marginal tax rate.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
44.

The parties shall execute such documents as may be necessary to transfer

the property as awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto.
45.

Each party shall pay his or her attorney fees and costs individually incurred

in this action.
46.

Respondent may have her previous surname of Johnson restored to her if

she so desires.
47.

A restraining order shall be entered enjoining each party from harassing.

annoying or bothering the other party or any family member of the other party.
48. Each party has made a full and fair disclosure to the other of his or her assets,
financial condition and worth, and each party has had the opportunity to inspectthe other's
records as they relate to the subject matter hereof and is satisfied by the disclosures of the
other party and knowingly and willingly waives any further disclosures.
49.

The parties also represent that they have made no assignment, transfer, or

distribution of any funds or property to any third party except in the course of typical and
reasonable living and business expenses.
50.

The parties represent that prior to the execution of this Agreement they have

each reviewed and discussed its terms with their respective counsel, if deemed necessary,
and that the same represents a fair and equitable distribution of the assets acquired and
liabilities incurred by the parties.

11
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51.

In the event of a dispute between the parties as to the interpretation of a term

of this Agreement, the parties shall mediate the issue before either party may initiate court
action. Each party shall pay one half of the mediator's fee.
52.

The file in this action shall be classified as private.

53.

The prevailing party to an action for breach of a term of this Agreement shall

be entitled to his or her attorneys fees and costs.
54.

Each party shall use his or her best efforts to effectuate the refinancing of the

existing mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property and shall cooperate and provide
necessary documentation and signatures on a timely basis.
55.

Until the refinancing of the mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property occurs,

the parties shall maintain the status quo on the payment of their expenses and the receipt
of funds.

12
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STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the

)nd

day of

!lfuvlrok

2007 personally appeared before me
1

MICHAEL S. ROBINSON, being duly sworn under oath says that he is the signer of the
foregoing instrument.

NOTARY PlJBLIC
Residing at: _ _ _ _ _ __
My Commission Expires:

13
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STATE OF UTAH

)
: ss.
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
On the JI)/ day of

/U11,mb-,c

2007, personally appeared before me DEBRA

J. ROBINSON, being duly sworn under oath says that she is the signer of the foregoing
instrument.

NO ARYPLic

Residing at: _ _ _ _ _ __

14
•

' .... ,; •.,.!.

27

EXHIBIT A

~

ITEMS DEBRA WANTS FROM SANDY RESIDENCE

1.

Tempurpedic Bed

2-:--

Marl31e Buddha

3.

Washer & Dryer

4.

Stainless Steel Barbeque

5.

New Chase Lounges and Umbrella around pool

6.

Flat screen in bed1oom 1i P./-;'h;,,.,,r

.)

v:;J

7.
,.fi)

v:)

to JJ;/,f>~r

d,Q..UAL---

Jt,R ut/---

Gamer furr~and R_ig in downstairs family room
-lb Pt.titi~K~

~

Uttl---

8.

Treadmill

9.

Purchases during travel equally divided

10.

Photographs divided or copied - cost divided equally.

11.

Equally divide sheet music

12.

Freezer in garage
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DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981)
Third Judicial District
CLYOE SNOW SESSIONS & SWENSON
One Utah Center, Thirteenth Floor
201 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2.216
Telephone (801) 322-2516
ENTERED IN REGl'g~~~~~~b-r.-.....Attorneys for Respondent
DATE
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
MICHAELS. ROBINSON,
DECREE OF DIVORCE

Petitioner,
Civil No. 074900501
V.

J~dge Glenn K. Iwasaki
DEBRA J. ROBINSON,
Comm. Michael S. Evans
Respondent.

The above-captioned matter came on regularly for consideration by the Court
without hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-4.

The parties entered into a

Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement {the "Agreement") to settle all issues of this
action. Pursuant to the terms of the Agreement, the parties consented that a Decree of
Divorce could be entered consistent with the terms of the Agreement. The Court considered the testimony of Respondent by way of affidavit as to jurisdiction and grounds for this
divorce. The Court having reviewed the Agreement and other pleadings on file herein, and
having entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, does now ORDER, ADJUDGE
and DECREE as follows:
DIVORCE
1.

Each party is awarded a divorce from the other.

if ~ii l
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ALIMONY AND RELATED PROVISIONS
2.

Each party irrevocably waives any claim to past, present or future alimony

under any circumstance or condition.
3.

Each party shall be responsible to maintain his or her own medical and dental

insurance coverage and each shall be responsible for his or her own uninsured medical
and dental costs.
PROPERTY AND DEBT DISTRIBUTION
4.

Prior to and during their marriage, the parties acquired certain real and

personal property which shall be divided between the parties as described below. Prior to
and during the marriage, the parties incurred certain debts and obligations which shall be
allocated between the parties as described below. The party assuming a particular debt
or obligation shall indemnify and hold the other party harmless therefrom.

5.

Petitioner shall be awarded the Seven Springs residence and shall assume

and pay any debt encumbering the property.
6.

Respondent shall be awarded the ten acre parcel in Scenic, Arizona and shall

assume and pay any debt encumbering the property.
7.

Respondent shall be awarded the Mayan Palace timeshare and shall assume

and pay any debt encumbering the property.

8.

Petitioner shall be awarded the parties' interest in the condominium in St.

George, subject to Petitioner assuming and paying any debt encumbering the property.
Petitioner may continue to own and rent the condominium or, alternatively, sell it but
Petitioner shall be responsible for all costs of sale. Respondent shall be given a credit as
described below in the amount of $62,500 for her equity in the condominium calculated as
one half of the difference between the fair market value of the condominium ($250,000)
less the current mortgage ($125,000). Rental income from the Phoenix Plaza property
shall be used to pay all condominium costs and expenses including PITI until such time as
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Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property as described
below.
9.

Respondent shall be awarded the parties· interest in the condominium in Deer

Valley, subject to Respondent assuming and paying any debt encumbering the property.
Respondent may continue to own and rent the condominium or, alternatively, sell it but
Respondent shall be responsible for all costs of sale. Petitioner shall be given a credit as
described below in the amount of $234,000 for his equity in the condominium calculated
as (i) one half of the difference between the fair market value of the condominium
($900,000) less the purchase price ($515,000), plus (ii) $27,870 for the down payment
paid by Petitioner, plus (iii) $7,500 for the earnest money paid by Petitioner, plus (iv) one
half of the mortgage pay down in the amount of $6,130, at the time Petitioner has paid
Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property. Rental income from the Phoenix
Plaza property shall be used to pay all condominium costs and expenses including PITI
until such time as Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza
property as described below. Rental income shall be recognized as income when earned,
not deposited. Cash from rental income when earned shall be equally divided until such
time as Petitioner has paid Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property as
described below.
10.

The disposition of the parties' interest in the retail center in Sandy shall occur

as described below.

A.

The retail center shall be immediately listed for sale. The parties shall

agree to the listing agent, the listing price, any reduction in the listing price, and the
ultimate terms of sale. In lieu of Petitioner receiving cash from the sale, Petitioner
shall be given a credit in the amount of $391,000 ($32,188 + $358,812) for his
interest in the retail center. This credit reflects and assumes estimated net sales
proceeds in the amount of $749,812 of which Petitioner shall receive $391,000 and
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Respondent shall receive $358,812. If the net sales proceeds are greater than
$749,812, Respondent shall pay Petitioner one half of the difference between the
actual net sales proceeds and $749,812. If the net sales proceeds are less than
$749,812, Petitioner shall pay Respondent one half of the difference between the
actual net sales proceeds and $749,812.
B.

The parties shall jointly mange the retail center until it is sold.

Respondent shall provide the bookkeeping and accounting services for the retail
center and provide Petitioner the regular monthly reports. The 2007 real property
taxes shall be paid from the joint funds of the parties. Any CAM revenue shall be
equally divided between the parties.
C.

· Until such time as the retail center is sold, the parties may agree to

equally distribute to themselves a portion or all of the cash from the net rental
income. At the time the retail center is sold, each party shall be awarded one half
of any cash from the net rental income.
D.

The parties shall agree as to whether any legal action shall be taken

in an attempt to collect certain unpaid rents and other bad debt. Each party shall
pay one half of any costs incurred and shall be awarded one half of any monies
recovered.
11.

The disposition of the parties' interest in the Phoenix Plaza property shall

occur as described below.
A.

Petitioner shall be awarded the Phoenix Plaza subject to Petitioner

taking the following actions.
B.

Petitioner shall re-finance the mortgage encumbering the Phoenix

Plaza and pay Respondent the amount of $1,784,419 for her equity in the Phoenix
Plaza property calculated as (i) one half of the difference between the stipulated fair
market value of the Phoenix Plaza property ($7.25M) less the purchase price
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($4.5M), plus (ii) $891,803 for the down payment paid by Respondent, plus (iii)
$12,500 for the earnest money paid by Respondent, plus (iv) one half of the
mortgage pay down in the amount of $67,616 at the time Petitioner has paid
Respondent for her interest in the Phoenix Plaza property, plus (v) $62,500 for the
St. George condominium credit, less (vi) $234,000 for the Deer Valley condominium
credit, less (vii) $391,000 for the Sandy retail center credit. If the re-financing does
not occur within one hundred twenty (120) days of the date the parties signed the
this Agreement, Petitioner shall pay Respondent interest at the rate of eight percent
(8%) from one hundred and twenty (120) days after the parties sign this Agreement.
Petitioner shall file the loan refinance application within 15 days of the date of this
Agreement. Respondent shall assist Petitioner in preparing and filing the loan
refinance application.
C.

The parties shall jointly manage the Phoenix Plaza until the time the

re-financing occurs, Respondent shall provide the bookkeeping and accounting
services for the Phoenix Plaza and provide Petitioner the regular monthly reports.
D.

Until Respondent is paid her equity in the Phoenix Plaza, (1) the net

rental income shall be used to pay, as necessary, the operating costs of the Phoenix
Plaza and the other properties as described above and (2) the parties may agree
to equally distribute to themselves a portion or all of the cash from the net rental
income. At the time Respondent is paid her equity in the Phoenix Plaza, each party
shall be awarded one half of any cash from the net rental income.

E.

Tenants of the Phoenix Plaza owe certain common area maintenance

fees ("CAM Fees") for the years 2005, 2006 and 2007. Any CAM Fees collected
relative to time periods prior to the time Petitioner re-finances the mortgage on the
Phoenix Plaza shall be equally divided between the parties. The parties shall agree
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to any collection costs including attorney fees to be incurred in an attempt to collect
the CAM Fees.
F.

Each party shall pay one half of all costs and expenses including any

prepayment penalty associated with the payoff of any existing mortgage or
encumbrance or the origination of any new mortgage or encumbrance relative to the
re-financing of the Phoenix Plaza debt.
12.

The disposition of the parties' interest in the parking lot parcel next to the

Phoenix Plaza shall occur as described below.

A.

Petitioner shall be awarded the parking lot property subject to

Petitioner taking the following actions.
B.

At the time of and as a part of the re-financing relative to the mortgage

encumbering the Phoenix Plaza, Petitioner shall pay Respondent the amount of
$105,777 which is equal to one half of the difference between (1) $425,000
(representing the stipulated fair market value of the parking lot parcel) less (2) the
unpaid principal amount of the mortgage in the amount of $213,446 on the parking
lot parcel at the time of the re-financing of the Phoenix Plaza mortgage. This
amount may be adjusted as required by each party paying one half of the amount
to settle or otherwise resolve the disputed claim of Keith Funk for certain asphalt
services provided relative to the parking lot parcel.

In the event the amount

necessary to resolve the disputed claim of Keith Funk has not been determined by
the time of the re-financing occurs, such amount shall not be taken into
consideration and each party shall thereafter pay one half of the amount necessary
to resolve the disputed claim.
13.

Petitioner shall be awarded the Ford Excursion vehicle and the BMW

motorcycle. Petitioner shall assume and pay the debt encumbering the Ford Excursion
vehicle. There is no debt encumbering the BMW motorcycle.
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14.
vehicles.

Respondent shall be awarded the Chevrolet Avalanche and Toyota Matrix
Respondent shall assume and pay the debt encumbering the Chevrolet

Avalanche vehicle. There is no debt encumbering the Toyota Matrix vehicle.
15.

Petitioner shall be awarded the Cessna 210 airplane. There is no debt

encumbering the airplane. On the first closing to occur of either the sale of the Sandy retail
center or the refinancing of the Phoenix Plaza property, Petitioner shall pay Respondent
$22,500 from his share of the net sales proceeds in consideration of Petitioner being
awarded the airplane.
16.

Respondent shall be awarded the aluminum boat and motor. The interest of

the parties in the sailboat shall be awarded to Matthew Larson.
17.

Petitioner shall be awarded his retirement accounts in the Cardiomed Profit

Sharing Plan. Petitioner represents that no contributions have been made to his account
in the Cardiomed Profit Sharing Plan during the term of the marriage. Petitioner shall be
awarded his IRA accounts.
18.

Respondent shall be awarded her 401 (k) retirement accounts. Respondent

shall be awarded her IRA accounts.
19.

Each party shall be awarded one half of any Utah Education Savings Plan

accounts in either parties' name.
20.

Any bank account maintained jointly by the parties for their personal use or

used in conjunction with a real property shall be equally divided between the parties at the
time the account is closed, the property is sold, or Respondent is paid out her equity in the
property.

Petitioner shall be awarded the Rawkin Horse bank account and the cash in

Petitioner's possession.
21.

The Each party shall be awarded his or her individual checking and savings

accounts.
22.

The parties have no life insurance policy that has a cash surrender value.
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23.

Each party shall be awarded his or her clothing, jewelry, sporting equipment,

musical instruments, and personal effects.

24.

Each party shall be awarded as his or her separate property, property

acquired prior to the marriage, property acquired by gift, devise or inheritance, or as a gift

from the other party during the marriage

25.

Petitioner shall be awarded the furniture, furnishings and other personal

property located in the real properties awarded to him except as described in Exhibit A
attached, which items shall be awarded to Respondent. Respondent shall be awarded the
furniture, furnishings and other personal property located in the real properties awarded to
her except as described in Exhibit B attached, which items shall be awarded to Petitioner.
Respondent may store her personal property at the Seven Springs residence until thirty
days after the date the Agreement was signed by the parties. The parties shall clearly
identify in a list the property that is being stored. Respondent may store her grand piano
at the Seven Springs residence for an indefinite period of time provided that Respondent
shall remove the grand piano within 60 days of demand for such from Petitioner.

26.

Each party shall be awarded one half of any marital property not specifically

provided for in the Agreement.

27.

Each party shall assume and pay one half of any marital debt or obligation

not specifically provided for in the Agreement.

28.

Each party shall assume and pay his or her debts and obligations incurred

since the time of the separation of the parties, and indemnify and hold the other party
harmless therefrom.
TAX PROVISIONS
29.

In the event any income tax return of the parties filed on a married filing joint

basis is audited, the parties shall be equally liable for any tax, penalty or interest assessed
or shall be equally entitled to any refund. The parties shall equally pay one half of the
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excise sales and lodging taxes due to the State of Utah relative to the rental of the Deer
Valley condominium.
30.

The parties shall file federal and state income tax returns on a married filing

joint basis for the year 2007. Each party shall be _awarded one half of any refund or each
party shall pay one half of any taxes, penalties or interest due on the 2007 returns with the
exception that the incremental taxes owed relative to retirement distributions taken by
Petitioner during 2007 shall be paid solely by Petitioner from his separate funds. Each
party shall be awarded one half of any alternative minimum tax credit carryforward from the
2007 federal income tax return.
31.

Petitioner shall be entitled to any tax deduction relative to the Seven Springs

residence accruing from January 1, 2008.

Respondent shall be entitled to any tax

deduction relative to the Scenic, Arizona property or the Mayan Palace timeshare accruing
from January 1, 2008.
32.

Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the

St. George condominium from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity in the
Phoenix Plaza property.
33.

Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the

Deer Valley condominium from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity in the
Phoenix Plaza property.
34.

Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the

Sandy retail center from January 1, 2008 until the time of sale. Respondent shall elect to
either realize the gain on the sale of the property or enter into a § 1031 exchange
transaction since Respondent has assumed the tax basis in the property by granting
Petitioner a credit for his interest.
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35.

Each party shall report one half of any net income or net loss relative to the
..

Phoenix Plaza property from January 1, 2008 until Respondent is paid her equity in the
property.
36.

~.
Each party shall be awarded and entitled to claim one half of any quarterly

installment payment made for federal or state income taxes prior to Petitioner re-financing
the mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property and paying Respondent her equity in the
property as described above.
37.

Petitioner shall be liable for any income tax or penalty relative to distributions

he has taken from his retirement during 2007 at the parties' highest marginal tax rate.
MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
38.

The parties shall execute such documents as may be necessary to transfer

the property as awarded by the Court to the party entitled thereto.
39.

Each party shall pay his or her attorney fees and costs individually incurred

in this action.
40.

Respondent may have her previous surname of Johnson restored to her if

she so desires.
41.

Each party is restrained from harassing, annoying or bothering the other party

or any family member of the other party.
42.

In the event of a dispute between the parties as to the interpretation of a term

of the Agreement, the parties shall mediate the issue before either party may initiate court
action. Each party shall pay one half of the mediator's fee.
43.

The file in this action shall be classified as private.

44.

The prevailing party to an action for breach of a term of the Agreement shall

be entitled to his or her attorneys fees and costs.
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45.

Each party shall use his or her best efforts to effectuate the refinancing of the

existing mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property and shall cooperate and provide
necessary documentation and signatures on a timely basis.

46.

Until the refinancing of the mortgage on the Phoenix Plaza property occurs,

the parties shall maintain the status quo on the payment of their expenses and the receipt
of funds.

)[

f)k

DATED this _ _ day of ~ r y , 2008.

GLENN K. IWASAKI
District Court Judge
APPROVED this _ _ day of
_ _ _ _ _ _ ,2007
JONES WALDO HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH

MELISSA M. BEAN
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

l

On this %ay of November, 2007, I hereby caused to be served on the
Petitioner a true and correct copy of the foregoing DECREE OF DIVORCE by having
the same delivered by U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to:
Kenneth A. Okazaki, Esq.
Melissa Bean, Esq.
Jones Waldo Holbrook & McDonough
170 South Main Street, #1500
P. 0. Box 45444
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
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EXHIBIT A

ITEMS DEBRA WANTS FROM SANDY RESIDENCE
1.

Tempurpedic Bed

2:-

Marble Buddha

3.

Washer & Dryer

4.

Stainless Steel Barbeque

5.

New Chase Lounges and Umbrella around pool

-6.
7.

-r

I()

1}...r

l-1:() f>~r

Flat screen ifl bed1oom

~tber furn~ and

-"~_(\l)
t ~

t Hhk ....,..

~-

c.:_.,

aJ!tl'{ Uc/.--

Rig in downstairs family room

+o Ptt-1,~~,

~

UL.ti---

8.

Treadmill

9.

Purchases during travel equally divided

10.

Photographs divided or copied - cost divided equally.

11.

Equally divide sheet music

12.

Freezer in garage

'--

~-
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DAVIS, Presiding Judge:

11 Petitioner Michael S. Robinson (Husband) appeals the Decree
of Divorce finalizing his divorce from Respondent Debra J.
Robinson (Wife).
Husband argues that the district court erred,
in several respects, by -enforcing a stipulation between the
parties. We affirm.
BACKGROUND
~2
During Husband and Wife's marriage, they acquired many
pieces of income-producing real property, including condominiums,
vacant land, and strip malls. The most va·luable of these pieces
of property was a strip mall in southern Utah (the plaza). After
Husband filed for divorce in February 2007, the parties, over the
course of several months, discussed their differing views as to
how they should divide the various properties in which they had
an interest.

13 On November 2, 2007, Husband and Wife attended formal
mediation, at which they were each represented by counsel. At
the mediation, the parties finally resolved the property division

,,.-•.
!

\

l

.!

issues and signed a Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement
(the stipulation}.
The stipulation calculated Wife's share of
various assets to be approximately $1.78 million, awarded the
plaza to Husband, and provided that Husband would refinance the
mortgage on the plaza so as to pay Wife the $1.78 million. The
parties stipulated that the fair market value of the plaza was
$7.25 million. The stipulation also provided that Husband would
file a loan application within fifteen days and that Wife would
provide information necessary to assist Husband in preparing the
application.
14
Husband not only failed to apply for a loan within the
fifteen days provided for in the stipulation, but he at no time
thereafter made such an application.
In February 2008, Wife
moved for entry of a divorce decree based on the stipulation.
Husband thereafter filed motions to set aside the·stipulation,
arguing that his performance under the stipulation was excused
because due to the parties• mistaken assumptions regarding the
status of the plaza's leases, it was impossible for him to secure
the contemplated loan on the plaza.
~5
Based upon affidavits and proffered testimony, the
commis.sioner recommended that the stipulation be enforced. The
commissioner reasoned, "[I]t's clear to me that the deal was
reached in a fair fashion, and it represented the parties'
agreement at the time." The district court then, without
complying with Husband 1 s request for an evidentiary hearing,
accepted the commissioner's recommendations and entered the
decree of divorce incorporating the provisions of the
stipulation.
·
ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW

16 Husband argues that his performance under the stipulation _
should have been excused under the contractual· defenses of mutual•
mistake and impossibility. Whether such defenses should have
afforded Husband relief under the facts as he argues them is a
question of law that we review for correctness. See American
Towers Owners Ass'n v. CCI Mech., Inc., 930 P.2d 1182, 1185 (Utah
1996).
17

Husband next argues that in order to enforce the
stipulation, the district court was obliged to make a specific
determination that the stipulation represented a fair and
equitable division of the parties' property. Whether the
district court made the necessary factual findings to support its
determination .is a question of law that we review for
correctness. Cf. State v. Nelson, 950 P.2d 940, 942-43 (Utah Ct.
App. 1997) .
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Husband also argues that the district court violated his due
process rights when it f ai.led to hold an evidentiary hearing
before enforcing the stipulation and entering the decree of
divorce.
"Constitutional issues, including questions regarding
due process, are questions of law that we review for
correctness." Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, 1 25, 100 P.3d 1177.

ANALYSIS
I.

Contractual Defenses

~9
Husband argues that the district court erred in failing to
grant relief under two contractual defenses.
Because neither of
these defenses was applicable to the facts of this case, we
conclude that the district court did not err in this regard.
A.

Mutual Mistake

110 Husband alleges that he should have been relieved from
performance under the stipulation because of the contractual
defense of mutual mistake. 1
"A party may rescind a contract when, at the
time the contract is made, the parties make a
mutual mistake ·about a material fact, the
existence of which is a basic assumption of
the contract.
If the parties harbor only
mistaken expectations as to the course of
future events and their assumptions as to
facts existing at the time of the contract
are correct, rescission is not proper."
Deep Creek Ranch, LLC V. Utah State Armory Bd., 2008 UT 3, ~ 17,
178 P.3d 886 (quoting Mooney v. GR & Assocs., 746 P.2d 117-4, 1178

1.
In making his argument for mutual mistake, Husband.places
some reliance on the case of Kendall Insurance, Inc. v. R & R
Group, Inc., 2008 UT App 235, 189 P.3d 114. But the lead opinion
in that case is that of only one judge because the second judge
concurred only in the result--without elaboration--and the third
judge dissented.
Thus, the opinion relied on is not binding as
precedent, as it would be had at least two judges joined the
opinion. See generally State v. Thurman, 846 P.2d 1256, 1269
(Utah 1993) (quoting authority stating that "'a decision of a
panel constitutes a decision of the court and carries the weight
of stare decisis in a subsequent case before the same or
dif·ferent panel 1 " ) •
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{Utah Ct. App. 1987)). The mistaken assumptions to which Husband
points are regarding the money that the plaza "would generate";
the vacancy rate that "would" exist; the value the plaza "would
have"; that the leases "would be" sufficient to secure a new loan
or else the existing tenants 11 would re-sign extensions"; and that
Husband "would be able to" refinance the plaza. These
assumptions are simply expectations as to future everits--that
those events would not vary significantly from the current state
of evertts--and therefore do not support the contractual defense
of mutual mistake. As to the current status of the leases and
the income of the plaza--the amounts from which the plaza's value
was calculated2 --Husband was well aware of those figures ..
Indeed, the evidence Husband offers to show that the parties were
mistaken as to the value of the plaza speaks only to the value of
the plaza after events unfolded regarding the expiring .leases.
Husband sets forth no evidence that at the time the stipulation
was signed the plaza was not worth the value the parties
attributed to it.
111 Further, even had Husband, as he alleges, made a mistake in
his valuation due to inadequate information, his argument would
still be unavailing because" [u]nder contract law, a party may
not rescind an agreement based on mutual mistake where that party
bears the risk of mistake." State v. Patience, 944 P.2d 381,
387-88 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing 17A Am. Jur. 2d Contracts
§ 215 (1991)).
"A party bears the risk of a mistake when . . .
he is aware, at the time the contract is made, that he has only
limited knowledge with respect to the facts to which the mistake
relates but treats his limited knowledge as sufficient .
"
Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 154 (1981); see also Klas v.
Van Wagoner, 829 P.2d 135, 141 n.8 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (applying
the above rule from the restatement). Thus, if Husband did not
feel that the information upon which he relied was sufficient, he
should have either insisted on any information he felt he needed
before he entered into the stipulation or modified the terms of
the stipulation accordingly. But as the commissioner recognized,
Husband took no such steps to avoid the risk associated with
inadequate information:
To the extent [Husband] relied upon [Wife] 's
handwritten analysis or any other verbal

2.
Interestingly, although the parties agreed on a fair market
value for the plaza, th~y did not agree as to the underlying
amounts on which such·a calculation is typically based. For
example, although the parties knew that the property was fully
occupied at the time of the stipulation, they could not agree on
whether to use a vacancy rate of three percent or five percent.
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representations that she made, [Husband]
chose to rely upon those representations and
he chose not to include any of those
representations·in the [stipulation], to make
any reference to them whatsoever, or to
include them as pre-conditions.
The commissioner determined that, instead, Husband was simply
asking for the deal to be fair "in hindsight," which is not a
ground for rescission, see Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co.,
699 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah 1985) (stating that an appellate court
11
will not nullify a settlement contract because one of the
parties would have acted differently if all the future outcomes
had been known at the time of agreement").
Thus, the defense of
mutual mistake does not provide relief under the facts of this
case.
B.

Impossibility

~12 Husband also argues that his performance under the
stipulation should have been excused due to the impossibility of
such performance.
"Under the contractual defense of
impossibility, an obligation is deemed discharged if an
unforeseen event occurs after formation of the contract and
without fault of the obligated party, which event makes
performance of the obligation impossible or highly
impracticable. " Western Props. v. Southern Utah Aviation, Inc. , ·
776 P.2d 656, 658 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (emphases added) (footnote
omitted); see also Restatement (Second) of Contracts§ 266(1)
(1981) ("Where, at the time a contract is made, a·party's
performance under it is impracticable without his fault·because
of a fact of which he has no reason to know and the non-existence
of which is a basic assumption on which the contract is made, no
duty to render that performance arises, unless the language or
circumstances indicate the contrary. " .( emphasis added) ) . This
defense is wholly inapplicable here because Husband alleges no
unforeseen event occurring after the stipulation was signed in
November 2007 that altered the possibility of performance.
See
generally Western Props., 776 P.2d at 658 n.3 ("The requirement
that the event occur after formation of the contract
distinguishes a case of supervening impossibility . . . from a
case in which the contract cannot be performed because of a
mistake, an unknown legal requirement, or other fact in existence
at the time the contract is made."). Instead, Husband argues in
his brief that at no point could he have obtained a loan "given
the state of the leases in November 2007, January 2008, or

20090082-CA

5

,.

709

,--·;

,.-...

,'.

anytime thereafter. 113 Thus, without any later-occurring event
rendering performance impossible or highly impracticable,
Husband's argument of impossibility is unavailing and the
district court did not err in failing to address the issue. 4
II.

Fair and Equitable Division of Property

113 Husband next argues that the district court erred in failing
to make a determination that the division of assets contained in
the stipulation was fair.and reasonable. But the district court
did discuss whether the division of the properties was equitable:

The Court finds that the parties represent
that prior to the execution of the
[stipulation] they have each reviewed and
discussed its terms with their respective
counsel, if deemed necessary, and that the
same represents a fair and equitable
distribution of the assets acquired and
liabilities incurred by the parties.
We do, however, recognize that this finding is somewhat ambiguous
in that it could have been relating that the parties determined

3. Husband argues that his ineligibility for a loan based on the
status of the leases was an unforeseen future event. However,
when Husband entered the stipulation, he was well aware of the
current status of the leases and could have checked to see if
such would be adequate _to .support the contemplated loan. This
ineligibility therefore fails as an unforseen future event.
Likewise, the future expectations advanced under Husband's mutual
mistake argument do not support his impossibility claim because
they are not future· events that made performance impossible.
Husband admits that the alleged impossibility of performance
existed even when the stipulation was signed.
Furthermore, as a
general rule, stability in market events and financial ability
are not basic assumptions of contracts. See Restatement (Second)
of Contracts§ 261 cmt. b (1981) ("The continuation of existing
market conditions and of the financial situation of the parties
are ordinarily not such [basic] assumptions, so that mere market
shifts or financial inability do not usually effect discharge
under the rule [regarding impracticability].").
4. We further note that Husband's ability to provide evidence
that performance was impossible or highly impracticable is
severely limited where he never actually applied for a loan as
contemplated, let alone having done so in the time frame set
forth by the stipulation.
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the division to be equitable, as opposed to the district court
having made such a determination. 5 Nonetheless, we are
unconvinced that further findings are necessary in this case.
Husband correctly asserts that a stipulation dividing property
between divorcing parties should be adopted only "if the court
believes it to be fair and reasonable," Klein v. Klein, 544 P.2d
472, 476 (Utah 1975) ·. But Husband provides no authority for his
resulting assertion that a district court may not enforce a
stipulation unless the district court makes a formal finding that
it is fair and reasonable. And the presumption seems to be the
exact oppos_i te, that is, that a stipulation will ordinarily be
enforced "unless the court finds it to be unfair or
unreasonable," Colman v. Colman, 743 P.2d 782, 789 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) (emphases added).
Thus, from the district court's decision
to enforce the stipulation, we assume--and have no findings that
would indicate otherwise--that the court determined that the
property division was equitable. And based on the facts of this
case, in particular the sophistication of the parties and the
fact that they each had the opportunity to consult with counsel
and other advisors before entering the stipulation, we cannot say
that the court's admittedly cursory finding exceeds the limits of
reasonableness.
III.

Failure to Hold an Evidentiary Hearing

~14 Despite Husband's request for an evidentiary hearing, the
district court accepted the commissioner's recommendation and
entered the decree of divorce without holding an evidentiary
hearing.
Husband argues that this denied him due process. We
disagree.
Importantly, Husband argues that we may reach his
first issue on appeal because there are no disputed facts
determinative of whether the contractual defenses apply. We
agree and determine that for this same reason, no evidentiary
hearing was required. Although factual disputes ordinarily
require a complete evidentiary hearing, there is simply no need
for such a hearing when,· as here, all factual disputes are

5. However, according to comments made at oral argument, both
parties apparently considered this finding to express the
determination, albeit a conclusory one, by the district court
that the stipulation was fair and equitable. Yet Husband neither
marshals the evidence to adequately challenge this finding nor
cites to any authority providing that more detailed findings are
required to explain why the stipulation was fair and reasonable.
See generally Chen v. Stewart, 2004 UT 82, -~~ 76-80, 100 P. 3d
1177 {explaining the marshaling requirement); Smith v. Smith,
1999 UT App 370, ·1 8, 995 P. 2d 14 (discussing briefing
requirements) .
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immaterial to the district court's decision.
See Beltran v.
Allan, 926 P. 2d 892, 898 {Utah Ct. App. 1996) ( "There is no
dispute to these facts, and an evidentiary hearing would be of no
benefit. 11 ) ; Liska v. Liska, 902 P. 2d 644, 650 (Utah Ct. App.
1995) {"We have already determined the commissioner's
recommendation was appropriate . . . because the undisputed facts
overwhelmingly demonstrate [such]. Accordingly, any error made
by the district court in failing to conduct an evidentiary
hearing to determine the appropriateness of the commissioner's
recommendation is likewise harmless."}. Regardless of the
disputed issues--who had the financial records of the plaza, who
was responsible for signing leases, whether Husband had
sufficient information from Wife to file a loan application, and
what representations Wife made as to the financial situation of
the plaza--Husband was not, as we have explained above, entitled
to relief under the contractual defenses asserted.
Therefore,
the district court did not err in declining to hold an
evidentiary hearing before enforcing the stipulation and entering
the decree of divorce.
CONCLUSION
115 We determine that the contractual defenses of mutual mistake
and impossibility are inapplicable under the facts of this case.
We also determine that the district court did not err in
accepting the stipulation without making further findings that
the stipulation was fair and equitable. Finally, we are
convinced that H~sband's due process rights were not violated due
to the absence of an evidentiary hearing because there were no
disputed factual issues mater.ial to the question before the
distric
Accordingly, we affirm.
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUR~-fFOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAELS. ROBINSON,
JUDGMENT AND ORDER

Petitioner,
. Civil No. 074900501
V.

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
DEBRA J. ROBINSON,
Comm. Michael S. Evans
Res ondent.

,,
.•••

I

On January 13, 2011, the Order to Show Cause· of Respondent Debra J.
Robinson came on regularly for hearing before Commissioner Michael S. Evans.
Petitioner was present and represented by Steven Kuhnhausen. Respondent was
present and represented by Dean C. Andreasen and Sar~~ L. Campbell. Counsel
informed the Court that the parties had entered into a partial stipulation to resolve
certain issues of the action. The stipulation was read into the record, acknowledged by
the parties, and accepted by the Court. With respect to the disputed issues, the Court
considered the papers and affidavits filed by the parties, and. also the arguments and
proffers of counsel. Based thereon, the Court made findings and recommendations as
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described in the unofficial transcript of the ruling of the Court, attached hereto as Exhibit
A. Based on those findings and recommendations, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and

decreed as follows:
1.

Respondent's Motion to Strike the affidavits of John Gottschall and Eric

Wadley is hereby granted.
2. ·,

Respondent shall manage the Phoenix Plaza and Sandy Retail Center,

and she shall continue to manage the Deer Valley condo. She shall be the one to
interact directly with the tenants, secure the deposits and rents, and deposit all funds
from those rental properties into the parties' joint account. From the joint account,
Respondent shall pay the expenses for the Phoenix Plaza, the Sandy Retail Center, the
St. George home, and the Deer Valley condo. No other expenses shall be paid from the
parties' joint account, and Respondent shall provide a monthly accounting to Petitioner.
3.

The parties shall immediately list the Phoenix Plaza property for sale with

a mutually acceptable agent at a price of $3,000,000. If and when the Phoenix Plaza is
sold, the sales proceeds shall be placed in an escrow account.
4.

The Sandy Retail Center shall be listed for sale. Michael Carroll is

appointed as listing agent for the Sandy Retail Center and has authority to determine
the initial listing price. Any reductions in the listing price shall be agreed to by the
parties. In making a decision to reduce the listing price, each party may submit to Mr.
Car~oll up to two expert opinions as to the property's value.
5.

Judgment is entered against Petitioner in favor of Respondent in the

amount of $438,924.43 representing interest at a rate of eight percent (8%) per annum

{00197227~1}
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on the amounts owed under the Decree of Divorce (1J 11(B): $1,784,419.00; 1J 12(B):
$105,777; 1J 15: $22,500) from March 2 2008 (120 days after the parties signed the
1

Agreement) to January 13, 2011.
6.

The Court finds there has been a prima facie showing of Petitioner's

failure to comply with and breach of the terms of the Decree of Divorce.
7.

The Court finds Petitioner never filed an application to refinance.

8.

The issue of Petitioner's contempt is certified for evidentiary hearing

regarding his failure to comply with the terms of the parties' Decree of Divorce.
9.

The issue of attorney fees and costs being awarded to Respondent in

connection with this Order to Show Cause hearing is certified for evidentiary hearing
and shall be considered at the hearing on the issue of Petitioner's contempt.
10.

The Court finds the language of the Decree of Divorce does not trigger the

award of a judgment for the principal amounts involved, which principal amounts are
due and owing upon the refinance of the property or perhaps as a sanction following a
finding of contempt.
11.

Petitioner's motion to require mediation is not required and, therefore, not

ordered.

{00197227-1}
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DATED this

~4

day of

4

.1

j y\WTAA,viv

2011.

BY ;iE COURT:

DATED this

2

r'" day of ------"8_tM_.____ 2011.
4.-·

BY THE COURT:

GLENN K. IWASAKI
District Court Judge

D this .:lL._day of
11

HNHAUSEN
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On t h i ~day of January 2011, I hereby caused to be served on the
...J

Petitioner a true and correct copy of the foregoing JUDGMENT AND ORDER by having
the same hand delivered to:
Steven Kuhnhausen, Esq.
10 West 300 South, #603
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981)
SARAH L. CAMPBELL (#12052)
CLYOE SNOW & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216
Telephone (801) 322-2516
Fax (801) 521-6280
dca@clydesnow.com
slc@clydesnow.com
Attomevs for Respondent

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAELS. ROBINSON,
Petitioner,

(UNOFFICIAL) PARTIAL TRANSCRIPT
OF RULING PORTION OF HEARING JANUARY 13, 2010

Civil No. 074900501

V.

DEBRA J. ROBINSON,
Respondent.
CE:
SK:

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
Comm. Michael S. Evans

Commissioner Michael S. Evans
· Steven Kuhnhausen, Attorney for Petitioner

DCA: Dean C. Andreasen, Attorney for Respondent
DR:

Debra Robinson

MR:

Michael Robinson

CE:

I'll receive and approve the agreement of the parties as has been stated on the
record.

In regard to the issue of contempt, I will recommend the same be

certified for further hearing. It appears to me as though, there's been, in fact,
there's no dispute that a prima facia showing of failure to comply with the Decree

{00198125-1}
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of Divorce has occurred. The Decree provides specificallyt and you've read it a
lot, counsel, but one very specific direction to Mr. Robinson was the "shall file the
loan refinance application within 15 days of the date of this Agreement." Mr.
Robinson doesn't say he couldn't file the loan refinance application, that it was
impossible for him to do that. He says he was dissuaded and that's insufficient.
And because he didntt take the first stept of course, the other steps resulting in
the refinance have never occurred.

So again, I will recommend the issue of

contempt be certified. Howevert given the language of the Decree, I can't find
that that would trigger the award of a judgment for the principal amount involved.
I will recommend that a judgment for the 8% interest be awarded as that is
separate and apart and there's no dispute that that portion of the Decree has
been triggered. I'll· recommend that the request for fees in connection with this
hearing be certified and considered by the Court at the hearing on the issue of
contempt. I have reviewed again, in cursory fashion today, the Court of Appeals
decision, no mention is made of attorneys' fees there, and it's my understanding
that it's appropria~e to request an award of fees of the Court before whom you
are appearing, so I'll recommend, well, I'll not rule one way or the other, but I'll
not award attorneys fees that were incurred on appeal. I'm certainly not certain
where that standst but I'll not recommend any be awarded at this time. I believe
I've addressed all the issues. Hav~ I missed anything counsel?

SK:

No, I think you're done.

Oh, my countermotion to go to mediation on those

unclear paragraphs.
CE:

I can't find there's, the language is, if a term needs to be interpreted they go to ·
mediation, I can't find there are any unclear terms that would require mediation,
not that mediation would be a bad idea to talk about what you do now that
everything that was contemplated three years ago is no longer in placet as if
selling the home, but I'm not going to require it.

{00198125-1}
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SK:

Okay.

DCA: What about payments of amounts coming out as distributions from the rental
proceeds, the net rental proceeds after payment of expenses.

CE:

That was left within the discretion of the parties, was it not?

SK:

Yes.

CE:

In the Decree? Welt I've awarded a Judgment for the interest amount and I trust
that you'll provide the formula you arrive at to Mr. Kuhnhausen that you apply in
arriving at the grand total of the interest accrued from the date of the triggering
event to today is my recommendation of, it would appear those proceeds would
be available for execution if you can't reach some other agreement.

DCA: May I ask a clarification, then, of the distinction, I'm assuming the Court's going
to have me draft the Order, the distinction between no judgment being entered
against Mr. Robinson for the principal amounts owing, as compared to the
interest. What is the distinction?

CE:

The principal amount is due and owing upon the refinance of the property. The
interest is due and owing upon the lack of refinance of the property. So, the 8%
is a fixed amount. The other amounts aren't due until the refinance occurs or
perhaps as a sanction following a finding of contempt.

DCA: And the Court's findings that he has never filed an application to refinance?
CE:

That was my finding, yes.

{00198125-1}
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DCA: Thank you.

SK:

Thanks again for accommodating my schedule.

CE:

Thank you. I appreciate counsel, your cooperating together to allow this hearing
to proceed. And I will ask Mr. Andreasen, you prepare the Order. Thank you
counsel. Thank you folks. Good luck.

{00198125-1}
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DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981)
SARAH L. CAMPBELL (#12052)
CLYOE SNOW & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216
Telephone (801) 322-2516
Fax(801)521-6280
dca@clydesnow.com
slc@clydesnow.com
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Third Judlclal District

Attorneys for Respondent
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAELS. ROBINSON,

ORDER

Petitioner,
Civil No. 074900501
V.

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
DEBRA J. ROBINSON,
Comm. Michael S. Evans
Respondent.

On June 21, 2011, the (i) Motion for Stay of Proceedings to Enforce the
Judgment, (ii) Motion for Order, and (iii) Motion to Strike Respondent's Verified Motion
for Sale of Phoenix Plaza filed by Petitioner Michael S. Robinson ("Petitioner") and the
(a) Verified Motion to Enforce Sale of Sandy Retail Center and (b) Verified Motion to
Enforce Sale of Phoenix Plaza filed by Respondent Debra J. Robinson ("Respondent")
came on regularly for hearing before Commissioner Michael S. Evans. Petitioner was
present and represented by Steven Kuhnhausen. Respondent was present and
represented by Dean C. Andreasen and Sarah L. Campbell. The Court considered the
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papers filed by the parties and the arguments and proffers of counsel..Based thereon, it
is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows:
1.

Petitioner's Motion for Stay of Proceedings to Enforce the Judgment is

denied.

2.

Petitioner's Motion to Strike Respondent's Verified Motion for Sale of

Phoenix Plaza is denied

3.

Respondent's Verified Motion to Enforce Sale of Sandy Retail Center is

granted.
4.

Respondent's Verified Motion to Enforce Sale of Phoenix Plaza is granted.

Sandy Retail Center

5.

Pursuant to Rule 70 of the URCP, Petitioner is divested of all title in the

Sandy Retail Center (sometimes also referred to as the "Sandy Plaza" or "Demi Plaza")
located in Salt Lake County, State of Utah at 7760 South 700 East, Sandy, Utah 84047
and more particularly described as follows:
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Section 30, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 183 feet, thence West
183 feet; thence South 183 feet, thence East 183 feet to the place of
beginning.
Less and excepting the following described parcel conveyed to Sandy City
by that certain Special Warranty Deed recorded November 16, 1989 as
Entry No. 4848748 in Book 6176 at Page 1435 of Official Records:
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Section 30, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence North
0°02'05'' East 183.0 feet, along the section line thence North 89°53'1 O"
West 53.0 feet; thence South 0°02'05" West 117.0 feet; thence South
45°04'31" West 36.74 feet; thence North 89°53'10" West 104.0 feet;
thence South 0°02'05" West 40 feet; thence South 89°53'10" East 183.0
feet to the point of beginning.
{00219922-2 }
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Tax Parcel ID NO: 22-30-478-008-0000
6.

Respondent is vested with complete title in the Sandy Retail Center

(described above), clear and free of any title of Petitioner. Respondent may sign all
documents necessary to list the Sandy Retail Center for sale and to close the sale of it. ·
This Order divesting Petitioner of title is solely for the purpose of facilitating the listing
and sale of the Sandy Retail Center and does not affect the term of any previous order
of the Court.

7.

,..J

If Respondent receives an offer to purchase the Sandy Retail Center,

Respondent shall provide Petitioner a copy of all documents relative to the sale and an
accounting of the sales proceeds.
Phoenix Plaza
8.

Petitioner is ordered to execute addendum No. 3, attached hereto as

Exhibit A, of the Real Estate Purchase Contract for the Phoenix Plaza by June 21,
2011.
9.

The Court finds there are no substantial changes between addendum no.

3 and addendum no. 2, which is Petitioner's counteroffer related to sale of the Phoenix
Plaza.
Other Provisions
10.

Should Petitioner fail to execute addendum No. 3, the court clerk is

authorized and ordered to do so before noon on June 22, 2011, and such signature
shall have the same effect as if Petitioner had personally signed the document.
11.

Respondent's request for attorney's fees in connection with the motions

heard today is certified for evidentiary hearing and shall be considered at the hearing on
{00219922-2}
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the issue of Petitioner's contempt, currently scheduled for July 21, 2011.

12.

Petitioner's request for attorney's fees related to his Motion to Strike

Respondent's Verified Motion for Sale of Phoenix Plaza is denied because he was not
damaged by the motion failing to be verified.
13.

Relative to Petitioner's Motion for Order, Respondent's contempt in not

providing a full accounting to Petitioner is certified for evidentiary hearing because there
is a prima facie case that she has not provided a full accounting.
DATED this

°1,"d..._

day of

~

,,,

2011.

BY THE COURT:

~N~~~I
S
MICHAELS. EVA
District Court Commissioner

DATED this~ 2_

~

day of _J_._u_J.-,-(JJI'
_ _ _ _ _ 2011.
BY THE COURT:

KUHN HAUSEN
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On this .JJnt/day of June 2011, I hereby caused to be served on the Petitioner a
true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by having the same hand delivered to:
Steven Kuhnhausen, Esq.
10 West 300 South, #603
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL S. ROBINSON,

FINDINGS, ORDER, AND JUDGMENT

Petitioner,
Civil No. 074900501
V.

Judge Glenn K. Iwasaki
DEBRA J. ROBINSON,
Comm. Michael S. Evans

I

,I

Respondent.

On July 26; 2011, the Court conducted an evidentiary hearing on (i) the
certification of Petitioner's contempt under the Order entered March 1, 2011; (ii) t1:1e
certification of Respondent's contempt under the Order entered June 22, 2011; and (iii)
the certification of ~espondent's attorney fees incurred as a result of her motions to
enforce the Decree of Divorce and subsequent orders. Petitioner was present and·
represented by Steven Kuhnhausen. Respondent was present and represented by
Dean C. Andreasen and Sarah L. Campbell. The Court considered the papers filed by
the parties, the arguments and proffers of counsel, and the stipulation of the parties as

·.,_.. .
{00225576-1 }
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to certain issues. Based thereon, the Court made the following findings as more
completely described in the transcript of the Court's ruling, attached hereto as Exhibit A:
Motion in Limine
1.

. Petitioner has not established Mr. Wadley as an expert such that he can

offer an opinion about facts to which he does not have personal knowledge.
2.

Mr. Wadley has no personal knowledge of the matters before this Court. In

fact, any information upon which he could base his testimony he received. from
Petitioner, who is Mr. Wadley's father-in-law.

3.

While Petitioner's counsel has indicated that Mr. Wadley will not be

testifying as an expert, it seems that the proffer centers on expert opinion and expert
testimony.

4.

If Petitioner is not calling Mr. Wadley as an expert and he is a lay witness,

then Mr. Wadley's proffered testimony lacks foundation and is irrelevant because he
was not involved with or present during any of the communications between the parties
during the relevant timeframes.
5.

Accordingly, it is proper that Respondent's motion in limine be granted.

Motion to Dismiss Contempt Proceedings
6.

The crux of Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss is what more can be done to

Petitioner and why doesn't Petitioner have an opportunity to purge his contempt.
7.

There is a dual component as to contempt proceedings. Petitioner has an

opportunity to purge his contempt if he complies with the Court's direction and order,

c·.

and there is also the viable component.of punishment for failure to comply.

{00225576-1 }
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8.

The claims in Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss are not well taken because he

has no applicable defenses to his contempt and he persists in disobeying Court orders.
9.

The defenses of impossibility and mutual mistake were both completely

addressed in the Court of Appeals opinion, and the Petitioner is precluded from arguing
defenses.

10.

There is claim preclusion as to Petitioner's allegations of fraud a~nst

Respondent. This issue was raised iR eye~ 11 ,otiefl &REI memerandum filel; ~oner
after November 2, 2007. That issue was not taken up on appeal although Petitioner had

\T -\Ul¼- fl>ve, 1/2 YWt Cl (1{, ~)e__ hi
Petitioner is precluded from arguing impossibility, mutual ~
&~~ Th ~ C,ov\,~rt, ~e,,. ~e

an opportunity to raise the issue on appeal.
11.

Accordingly,

mistake,orfraut ().S Cl.
Petitioner's Contempt

~

· \V •

12.

Petitioner is held to be in contempt for the following reasons.

13.

The Decree awards the Phoenix Plaza to Petitioner and also requires that

he refinance the mortgage encumbering the Phoenix Plaza and pay Respondent
$1,784,419. Specifically, Petitioner was required to file an application to refinance the
Phoenix Plaza mortgage within fifteen ( 15) days from the parties, signing of the
Stipulation. Decree 1I 11 (B).

14.

The Decree also requires Petitioner to pay Respondent the following

amounts to accomplish an equitable division of the marital estate:

a. Paragraph 12(8) of the Decree requires Petitioner to pay Respondent
the sum of $105,TT7;

(

_)
{00225576-1 }

3

4362

\ ..........

\

...._ .

b. Paragraph 15 of the Decree requires Petitioner to pay Respondent the
sum of $22,500.
c. Accordingly, a total of $1,912,696 was.to be paid to Respondent.
.15.

Petitioner knew and clearly ·understood he had an obligation to refinance

the Phoenix Plaza mortgage.
16.

Petitioner failed to apply for a loan to refinance the Phoenix Plaza

mortgage within the time agreed and has made no application at any time thereafter.
17.

Petitioner has still not submitted a mortgage refinance application relative

to the Phoenix Plaza, which has now become the subject of a sale pursuant to a
stipulation of the parties incorporated into the Order entered March 1, 2011.
18.

Petitioner has not made a single payment to Respondent to satisfy his

obligations to her under the Decree.
19.

Petitioner has had some ability to pay Respondent property settlement

from the sale of other property and insurance proceeds.
Respondent's Contempt
20.

Respondent is no~ in contempt for failing to provide the accounting based

upon the totality of the circumstances as well as providing the accounting in June of

2011 and July of 2011, with no objections by Petitioner at this time.
21.

Under the terms of the Decree, Respondent is responsible to "provide the

bookkeeping and accounting services" and "provide Petitioner the regular monthly
reports" for the Sandy Retail Center and the Phoenix Plaza. Decree fflI 10(8), 11(C).
22.

(.

Pursuant to ,i 2 of the Judgment and Order, which transferred

management of the parties' commercial properties to Respondent, Respondent is also·
{00225576-1 } .
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to provide a monthly accounting for the Phoenix Plaza and the Sandy Retail Center to
Petitioner.
23.

On June 13, 2011, Respondent provided Petitioner with an accountjng for

the Sandy Retail Center and the Phoenix Plaza that is complete e-xsept-fer--the---year--------------•
201 O and the months of January and February 2011, during which time Petitioner was
still managing the properties.
24.

~~

Respondent was unable to complete the accounting for the year 2010 and

January and February of 2011,beea1:1&e Petit101 ,er .-efl:lsed eRd coRtiAues to 1-&fuse

Lt,ow

to

s'{V\JJ,..v

pFO¥ide Reeessary info, malion inelueling rental deposits for the relevant p e r i o d ~ :

25.

~½
~~u-lrui\VI
~::i '

O\,"t 1'\,u__

Respondent's Attorney Fees
Tuer~ is both a statutory basis and a contractual basis for

Respondent her attorney fees and costs incurred in enforcing certain provisions of the

\~~~~

Decree.
26.

The parties' Decree provides that "[t]he prevailing party to an action forfo.r

breach of a term of the.Agreement shall be entitled to his or her attorneys fees a n d ~ ~

~(W

costs." Decree 1I 44.

w.

27.

Respondent has had to seek enforcement of the Decree.

28.

Respondent is entitled to her attorney fees, the specific amount which will

~~

be subject to proof by affidavit and a response and reply.
Based on these findings and the stipulation of the parties, it is hereby ordered,
adjudged and decreed as follows:

1.

(
~

.____.

Respondent's Motion in Limine to Exclude Testimony of Eric Wadley is

granted.
{00225576-1 }
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2.

Petitioner's Motion to Dismiss Contempt Proceeding is denied.

3.

Judgment is entered against Petitioner and in favor of Respondent in the

amount of 1,912,696.00, representing the amounts owed under the Decree of Divorce

m11<B>: $1,184,419.00; ,r 12cs): $1os,111; 111s: $22,soo}.
4.

Judgment is entered against Petitioner in favor of Respondent in the

amount of $81,748.10 representing interest at a rate of eight percent (8%) per annum
on the amounts owed under the Decree of Divorce from January 13, 2011 to July 26,

2011.

5.

Petitioner is in contempt.

6.

Respondent is not in contempt.

7.

Petitioner is sentenced to thirty days in the Salt Lake County jail, which

sentence is suspended at the present time.

8.

Respondent is awarded her attorney fees, the specific amount which will

be subject to proof by affidavit and a response and reply.
9.

Based upon the positions taken by counsel and the Court's suggestion,

Respondent is not precluded from exercising collection means to satisfy her judgments.
However, collection actions will be stayed (limited forbearance) relative to the Phoenix
Plaza for a period of 60 days from the Court's ruling at the evidentiary hearing on July

26, 2011.
1-0.

The parties shall meet and confer to determine the least expensive

approach and most effective means to resolve account reconciliation issues.

(
{00225576-1}
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11.

Petitioner is restrained from contacting people associated with the closing

of the sale of the· Phoenix Plaza-including brokers, - agents, buyers, and closing
agents-other than as he is requested to provide documents or information.

12.

For at least sixty days, Petitioner is restrained from selling, transferring,

conveying, gifting, secreting, or otherwise disposing of any personal or real property.

13.

Each party is restrained from making disparaging comments about the

other party.

14.

Petitioner shall sign deeds to the Scenic Arizona property and the Park

City condo conveying complete title to Respondent within ten days of the deeds being
presented to him.

DATED this

~ "o' day of Ml'si-C\\

2011.

BY THE COURT:

~-

APPROVED this _ _ _day of
August 2011

STEVEN KUHNHAUSEN ·
Attorney for Petitioner

{00225576-1}
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On t h i ~ a y of August 2011, I hereby caused to be served on the Petitioner

a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS, ORDER, AND JUDGMENT by
having the same mailed via first class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to:
Steven Kuhnhausen, Esq.
10 West 300 South, #603
Salt Lake City, UT 84101

c·.

)
{00225576-1 }
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DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981)
SARAH L. CAMPBELL (#12052)
CLYOE SNOW & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216
Telephone (801) 322-2516
Fax (801) 521-6280 .
dca@clydesnow.com
slc@clydesnow.com

f U.~b fJISrtUtl' COURT
Third Judicial .District

JAN 2 4 20i2

Attorneys for Respondent
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL S. ROBINSON,

ORDER

Petitioner,
Civil No. 074900501
V.

Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy
DEBRA J. ROBINSON,
Comm. Michael S. Evans
Respondent.

On December 20, 2011, seven of the fourteen pending motions came on
regularly for hearing before Commissioner Michael S. Evans. The motions considered
were the (A) Motion to Terminate 8% Interest as Per Paragraph 11 in the Divorce
Decree filed by Petitioner Michael S. Robinson ("Petitioner") and the (B) Motion for
Order to Compel Compliance of Bank of the West; (C) Motion for an Order to Compel
Petitioner to Sign Seller Disclosures Related to the Phoenix Plaza and for a Permanent
Restraining Order; (D) Motion for Approval of Reduced Listing Price for Sandy Retail
Center; (E) Objection and Motion to Quash Subpoena Duces Tecum; (F) Motion for
Issuance of Bench Warrant Against Carol Busche; and (G) Motion to Approve and

{ 0 0 2521 94 -2 }
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Enforce Substitute Offer to Purchase Phoenix Plaza filed by Respondent Debra J.
Robinson ("Respondent"). Petitioner was present and represented by Steven
Kuhnhausen. Respondent was present and represented by Dean C. Andreasen and
Sarah L. Campbell. Carol Busche was present and represented by Budge W. Call.
Cardiomed Incorporated Profit Sharing Plan was represented by Scott A. Hagen.
Counsel informed the Court that the parties had entered into a stipulation to
resolve two of the pending motions. The stipulations were read into the record,
acknowledged by the parties, and approved by the Court. With respect to the disputed
issues, the Court considered the motions, the papers and affidavits filed in support and
opposition, and the arguments and proffers of counsel. Based thereon, the Court hereby
finds, orders, adjudges, and decrees as follows:
(A). Petitioner's Motion to Terminate 8% Interest
1.

Petitioner's Motion to Terminate 8% Interest as Per Paragraph 11 in the

Divorce Decree is denied.
2.

There is no statutory or contractual basis for awarding Petitioner his

attorney's fees and this request is denied.
(8). Respondent's Motion to Compel Bank of the West
3.

The Objection of the Cardiomed Incorporated Profit Sharing Plan to

Subpoena Duces Tecum is overruled.
4.

Respondent's Motion for Order to Compel Compliance of Bank of the

West is granted.

{00252194-2 }
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5.

Bank of the West is ordered to respond to the Subpoena Duces Tecum

dated May 16, 2011, served on it relating to the accounts of Michael S. Robinson and
the Cardiomed Incorporated Profit Sharing Plan.
(CID). Petitioner's Motions as to Seller Disclosures and Substitute Offer on Phoenix
Plaza
6.

Respondent's Motion to Approve and Enforce Substitute Offer to

Purchase Phoenix Plaza is granted.
7.

The new offer has been made at the same price and under the same

terms as the prior offer.
8.

Petitioner is the owner of the Phoenix Plaza and the only person subject to

IRS form 1099 reporting pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Decree.
9.

The Phoenix Plaza shall be sold free and clear of any interest of the

parties.
10.

Petitioner is ordered to sign all documents necessary to close sale of the

Phoenix Plaza including, but not limited to, the Real Estate Purchase Contract,
counteroffers (addendums), deeds, seller disclosures, affidavits and/or indemnities, and
other closing documents.
11.

In the event Petitioner fails to sign a document necessary to close the sale

of the Phoenix Plaza within twenty-four hours of the document being presented to him,
the court clerk is authorized and ordered to sign the relevant document on Petitioner's
behalf, and such signature shall have the same effect as if Petitioner had personally
signed the document.

{00252194-2}
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12.

In the event Petitioner fails to sign a document necessary to close the sale

of the Phoenix Plaza, Respondent is authorized and may sign the relevant document on
Q
Petitioners behalf, so long as the document does not place Respondent in the chain of
title.
13.

The closing agent shall deem and treat all seller proceeds from the sale of

the Phoenix Plaza including, but not limited to, seller proceeds, rents, and rent deposits,
as if they were payable to Petitioner but such funds shall not be disbursed to Petitioner
but shall be disbursed to Respondent in partial satisfaction of the judgments which
Respondent has against Petitioner.
14.

Respondent shall provide Petitioner a copy of all documents relative to the

sale of the Phoenix Plaza and an accounting of the sales proceeds.
15.

Respondent's request for attorney's fees and costs is certified for

evidentiary hearing.
16.

Petitioner's contempt for non-compliance with the terms of the Decree of

Divorce is certified for evidentiary hearing.
17.

The sixty-day restraining order imposed on Petitioner by the Court at the

hearing on July 26, 2011, is hereby made permanent for the duration of this action.
· (E). Reduced Listing Price of Sandy Retail Center
18.

Respondent's Motion for Approval of Reduced Listing Price for Sandy

Retail Center is granted.
19.

The Sandy Retail Center may be listed at $599,000, as recommended by

Mike Carroll.

{00252194-2 }
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(F). Respondent's Obiection and Motion to Quash
20.

If Petitioner decides to re-issue any subpoenas, he will give Respondent

the proper notice required by the Rules of Civil Procedure and serve them on her.
21.

Additionally, Petitioner will immediately give Respondent copies of all

documents received -in response to the subpoenas duces tecum previously issued and
served in connection with this case.
(G). Motion for Issuance of Bench Warrant Against Carol Busche
22.

Budge Call has entered an appearance on behalf of Carol Busche and will

accept service of a Subpoena to Appear.at Deposition.
23.

The deposition of Carol Busche will be scheduled for a mutually

convenient date in January 2012.
Additional Motions
24.

The other motions that remain pending before the Court will be heard on

January 6, 2012 at 10:00 a.m.

5
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DATEDthisndayof ~MAAOM.!'..,..

2012.

BY T~E COURT:

District co·~_rt-q-9mmrsaj~&e·~y
''._ v ,·,".-:1.f

IT IS SO ORDERED this

~

day of .
BY THE COURT:

TODD M. SHAUG
District Court Judge

APPROVED as to form this .
_ _ _day of January 2012

STEVEN KUHNHAUSEN
Attorney for Petitioner

APPROVED as to form this
f i ~ a y of January 2012

scJr:6:tJ ~ ~

Attorney for Cardiomed Incorporated Profit Sharing Plan

APPROVED as to form this
___
. day of January'2012

BUDGE W. CALL
Attorney for Carol Busche
{00252194-2 }
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On this _ _ day of January 2012, I hereby caused to be served on the
Petitioner a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER by having the same hand
delivered to:
Steven Kuhnhausen, Esq.
10 West 300 South, #603
Salt Lake City, UT 84101
Budge W. Call, Esq.
Bond & Call
8 East Broadway, #720
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
ScottA. Hagen, Esq.
Ray Quinney & Nebeker
36 South State Street, Suite 1400
Salt Lake City, UT 84111

{00252194-2}
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DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981)
SARAH L. CAMPBELL (#12052)
CLYOE SNOW & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216
Telephone (801) 322-2516
Fax (801) 521 -6280
dca@clydesnow.com
slc@clydesnow.com
Attorneys for Respondent

RLED DISTRICT COURT
Third Judicial District

FEBO 3° 2012
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL S. ROBINSON ,

FINDINGS AND ORDER
Petitioner,
Civil No. 074900501
V.

Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy
DEBRA J. ROBINSON,
Comm. Michael S. Evans
Respondent.

On February 3, 2012, Respondent Debra J. Robinson's Motion for Temporary
~

Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, Lien Nullification, Damages, and Other Relief
came on regularly for hearing before the Court, Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy presiding.
Respondent was present and represented by Dean C. Andreasen. Petitioner Michael
S. Robinson was present and represented by Michael A Jensen via telephone.
The Court considered the Motion, the papers filed in support and opposition
thereto, and the arguments and proffers of counsel. Based thereon , and for good cause
shown, it is hereby ordered, adjudged and decreed as follows:

{00258723-1 }
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1.

The Court finds that on January 27, 2012, Petitioner recorded a document

entitled Lis Pendens with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office of the State of Utah 1
as entry no. 11322084, in book 9986, at pages 2486-2489 (the "Lis Pendens") affecting
that certain parcel of property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and more particularly
described as follows:
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Section 30, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 183 feet, thence West
183 feet; thence South 183 feet, thence East 183 feet to the place of
beginning.
c.
w
Less and excepting the following described parcel conveyed to Sandy City
by that certain Special Warranty Deed recorded November 16, 1989 as
Entry No. 4848748 in Book 6176 at Page 1435 of Official Records:
Beginning at the Southeast corner of Section 30, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence North
0°02'05" East 183.0 feet, along the section line thence North 89°53'1 0"
West 53.0 feet; thence South 0°02'05" West 117 .0 feet; thence South
45°04'31" West 36.74 feet; thence North 89°53'10" West 104.0 feet;
thence South 0°02'05" West 40 feet; thence South 89°53'10" East 183.0
feet to the point of beginning.

G

Street Address: 7760 South 700 East, Sandy, Utah 84047
Parcel No. 22-30-478-008-0000
(the "Property").
2.

The Lis Pendens is determined to be a "wrongful lien" under the provisions

of Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-1 et seq.
3.

Q.\'\~

1

"-~ \ I \ . . ( ; ~ ~ ,

t,t.t~ C,p

a~ /JM'() ·

Accordingly, the Lis Pendens is declared to be void ab initio and of no

force or effect.

~ 1-6~-~-

1?01,,

1\U ~

{00258723-1 }
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~

4.

The Property is released from any lien, cloud, or encumbrance to title

based on the Lis Pendens. The Lis Pendens provides no notice of claim or interest to
the Property.
5.

A certified copy of this document shall be recorded with the Office of the

Salt Lake County Recorder.
6.

Respondent is awarded her costs and reasonable attorney's fees as may

be established by way of affidavit of counsel to be submitted pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 38-9-1 et seq.
7.

~ ~'vi lo (!.t.. Pw..VI ~ ·1 i I; - <.. - I~""'f l.l,,) .

o. v, vl

-,-,.M-

~

The issue of damages for this wrongful lien is reserved for further hearing.

DATED this 9<}dayofFebruary, 2012.
BY THE COURT:

{00258723-1 }
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

On this _ _ day of February 2012, I hereby caused to be served on the
Petitioner a true and correct copy of the foregoing FINDINGS AND ORDER by having
the same emailed and mailed via first-class U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to:
Michael A. Jensen, Esq.
Jensen Law Firm
136 South Main Street, #430
P. 0. Box 571708
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
mike@utahattorney.com

{00258723-1 }
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Attorneys for Respondent

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
MICHAELS. ROBINSON,
Petitioner,

SECOND FINDINGS AND ORDER
And
ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE

V.

Civil No. 074900501

DEBRA J. ROBINSON,
Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy
Respondent.
Comm. Michael S. Evans

On February

!: 2012, Respondent Debra J. Robinson's Second Motion for

Nullification of Second Lis Pendens Filed by Petitioner, Damages, Contempt and Other
Relief and Motion for Order to Show Cause (Expedited Decision Requested} came on
regulartyfor consideration before the Court, Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy presiding.
The Court considered the Motion, papers filed in support and opposition thereto,

and the arguments and proffers of counsel. Based thereon, and for good cause shown,
it is hereby o~ered, adjudged and decreed as follows:

{00259695-1}
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1.

The Court finds that on February 6, 2012. Petitioner recorded a document

entitled Lis Pendens with the Salt Lake County Recorder's Office of the State of Utah.
as entry no. 11327536, in book 9988. at pages 8694-8696 (the "Lis Pendensj affecting
that certain parcel of property located in Salt Lake County, Utah, and more particularly
described as follows:
Commencing at the Southeast comer of Section 30, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Meridian, thence North 183 feet, thence West
183 feet; thence South 183 feet, thence East 183 feet to the place of
beginning.
Less and excepting the following described parcel conveyed to Sandy City
by that certain Special Warranty Deed recorded November 16, 1989 as
Entry No. 4848748 in Book 6176 at Page 1435 of Official Records:
Beginning at the Southeast comer of Section 30, Township 2 South,
Range 1 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence North
0°02•05n East 183.0 feet, along the section line thence North 89°53'10"
West 53.0 feet; thence South 0°02'05" West 117.0 feet; thence South
45°04'31" West 36.74 feet; thence North 89°53'10" West 104.0 feet;
thence South 0°02•05n West 40 feet; thence South 89°53'1 O" East 183.0
feet to the point of beginning.
Street Address: TT60 South 700 East, Sandy, Utah 84047
Parcel No. 22-30-478-008-0000
(the "Property').

2.

The Lis Pendens is detennined to be a 'wrongful lien" under the provisions

of Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-1 et seq. and, as necessary, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-6-1304.

3.

Accordingly, the Lis Pendens is declared to be void ab initio and of no

force or effect.

{00259695-1 }
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4.

The Property is released from any lien, cloud, or encumbrance to title

based on the Lis Pendens. The Lis Pendens provides no notice of claim or interest to
the Property.
5.

A certified copy of this document shall be recorded with the Office of the

Salt Lake County Recorder.

6.

Respondent is awarded her costs and reasonable attorney's fees as may

be established by way of affidavit of counsel to be submitted pursuant to Utah Code
Ann.§ 38-9-1 et seq. and Utah Code Ann.§ 788-6-1304(6).

7.

The issue of damages for this wrongful lien is reserved for further hearing.

8.

Petitioner is ordered to appear before this Court, 450 South State Street,

Fourth Floor-W47, Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-1860, on

-i--6

~

2012, at \r'· (J(J "'~"ia:Y.-and show cause why he should not be held in

civil contempt for the violation of this Court's orders and why appropriate sanctions
should not be imposed including a fine, incarceration, an award of Respondent's
attorney's fees and costs, and other equitable relief.
DATED this

t?\

day of February, 2012.

BY THE COURT:

TOD M. SHAUGHNESSY
District Court Judge

{00259895--1}
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this _J:M_ day of February 2012, I hereby caused to be served on the
Petitioner a true and correct copy of the foregoing SECOND FINDINGS AND ORDER

and ORDER TO SHOW CAUSE by having the same emailed and mailed via first-class
U.S. mail, postage prepaid, to:
Michael A. Jensen, Esq.
Jensen Law Firm
136 South Main Street, #430
P. 0. Box 571708
Salt Lake City, UT 84145
Notice is not being made directly to Petitioner based on the request of his counsel.

4i--·
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT

*

IN AND FORSALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL S. ROBINSON,
MINUTE ENTRY
Petitioner,
Case No. 074900501
vs.

DEBRA J. ROBINSON,

Judge Todd Shaughnessy

Respondent.

Pending before the court is Petitioner's objection to the form of order proposed
by Respondent for the hearing held on July 26, 2011. The matter was briefed and
then argued on February 28, 2012_.

Petitioner was represented by Kevin Bond.

Respondent was represented by Dean Andreasen. Following the hearing, the court
received and reviewed a supplemental brief and exhibits from Petitioner. The court
also reviewed, among other things, orders and transcripts related to proceedings in
the case prior to July 26, 2011, the court of appeals' opinion in Robinson v. Robinson,
2010 UT App 96, the transcript of the July 26, 2011, -hearing, and related materials.
On the basis of the foregoing, and for good cause appearing, the court now enters this
minute entry and rules on Petitioner's objection as follows.

The only issue now before the court is documenting the rulings that were made
at the hearing held on July 26, 2011 . Judge Iwasaki presided over that hearing, and

4 3 71

over this case, prior to his retirement. However, ~e did not have an opportunity to sign
the order or rule on the objection before he retired, and consequently that
responsibility now falls on a new judge. The change in judges, howev~r, does not
change t_he scope of the task at hand. The court appreciates efforts by counsel for
both parties to help get the court up to speed on the long and complicated history of
the case, but whether the objection is being made to the judge who heard the motion
or to a new judge, it is not the proper method to re-argue matters upon which the court
made a clear ruling or to revisit prior related rulings in the case. As stated, the court's
current task is simply to document accurately Judge lwasaki's rulings at the July 26
hearing.

1

The July 26, 2011, hearing was set as an evidentiary hearing on an order to
show cause arising from Petitioner's purported failure to refinance, or attempt to
refinance, the property and various issues related thereto~ The parties first argued a
motion in limine to exclude testimony from Eric Wadley, which was granted.· (Tr. 5).
Next,_ the parties argued a Motion to Dismiss Contempt Proceedings that has just
been filed by Petitioner. (Tr. 5). Petitioner's principal argument was that because the
court had ordered the sale of the property, Petitioner could not purge any contempt
that may be found and/or that by seeking a sale of the property, Respondent had
effectively purged any contempt.

In that context, the parties argued whether

Much of the supplemental memorandum filed by Petitioner is devoted to arguing that the fraud claims
asserted by Petitioner in the separate action he recently filed against Respondent and others in West Jordan are not
barred by the doctrines of claim preclusion or issue preclusion. The court does not fully understand why those
arguments are being made here, and why they are being made in the context of an objection to the form of the order
for the July 26 hearing. The West Jordan lawsuit was not discussed at the July 26 hearing; indeed, it could not have
been discussed since it had not yet been filed. Though there was a discussion of res judicata ~t the July 26 hearing,
that discussion involved whether fraud claims had been raised, or could have been raised, earlier in this case.
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impossibility, mistake, or fraud, could serve as a defense to contempt. (Tr. 7, 9). And,
in that context, Judge Iwasaki referenced a motion that Petitioner had filed seeking
relief based on fraud, and suggested that it at least appeared the motion was pending
before the commissioner. (Tr. 13).

In arguing against the motion to dismiss, Respondent's counsel noted that
impossibility and mutual mistake were not available as defenses to contempt because
these defenses had been considered and rejected by the Utah Court of Appeals. (Tr.
18-19).

Respondent's counsel then addressed fraud as a defense to contempt,

arguing claim preclusion. Specifically, Respondent's counsel argued that fraud could
not be a defense because Petitioner "raised it at the commissioner level, at the trial
court level and didn't take it up on appeal·." {Tr. 20)._ Respondent's counsel also
pointed out that, in fact, there was no motion pending before the commissioner related .
to fraud becau~e Petitioner's counsel ''withdrew that motion on June the 22nd ." (Tr.
20). 2 In reply, Petitioner's counsei again mentioned fraud, but disagreed that it had
been raised, saying "he didn't get it raised properly, it's still available to him. He has
until - he has three years to file an independent action." (Tr. 21-22).

3

2

Petitioner's supplemental memorandum acknowledges that Petitioner did in fact withdraw this
motion. {Supp. Mem. Para. 68). On June 16, 2011, Petitioner's counsel signed a Notice of Withdrawal of ·
Motion for Relief from Judgment Pending Assertion of Additional Claims. That notice. apparently was
served on June 17, 2011, and it was docketed on June 21, 2011, the same day on which a hearing was
held before Commissioner Evans.
3
The court's independent review of the docket and record confirms Respondent's statement that
Petitioner has asserted from very early on, in a variety of contexts, that Respondent provided false and
misleading information, that she mislead him into entering the stipulation, and engaged in a wide variety
of misconduct. Ultimately, Petitioner's position seems to be that unless and until he discovers a// of
Respondent's purported misdeeds, he is under no obligation to assert any of them. Aside from the
passing reference quoted above, that issue was not raised before Judge Iwasaki at the July 26 hearing,
and consequently it is not addressed herein.
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Against this background, Judge Iwasaki (i) denied the motion to dismiss the

.

contempt proceeding (Tr. 24 ), (ii) "as to the issues of impossibility and mutual mistake~
the Court finds that they were both addressed completely in the Court of Appeals
opinion", and therefore could not be relied upon by Petitioner- as a defense to
contempt (Id.), and (iii) relying on the doctrine of claim preclusion, ruled that fraud
likewise could not be relied upon by Petitioner as a defense to contempt (Id.).

He

summarized that ruling by stating, "But as to impossibility, mutual mistake, and fraud
as to claims preclusion, the Court denies - the Court finds that the petitioner is
precluded from arguing those matters." (Tr. 24).
C.

\ti/

Petitioner relies on the following statement made by Judge Iwasaki at the July
26 hearing: "As to claim preclusion, while there's a pending fraud motion and
allegations to support a fraud before the commissioner, the Court again finds that
there is claim preclusion as to that issue." (Tr. 24 ). From this, Petitioner seems to
argue that the court did not rule on the claim preclusion issue.

That statement, .

however, must be read on context: Petitioner's counsel had just argued there was a
fraud motion before the commissioner; Respondent's counsel had pointed out that the
fraud motion had been voluntarily withdrawn by Petitioner. In fact, the fraud motion
had been voluntarily withdrawn by Petitioner several weeks earlier. Judge Iwasaki
Was not in a position to verify either party's position,. and therefore stated that "what
recommendation comes out of the fraud recommendations, the court will address it at
that time."

4

(Tr. 24 ). 4

After addressing each of Petitioner's claimed defenses to

In reality, there was no such motion before the commissioner, and therefore no reconunenclation _to

consider.
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contempt, the court proceeded to find Petitioner in contempt and impose sanctions. If
Judge Iwasaki had concluded that fraud was a valid defense, available to P~titioner,
and then-pending before the commissioner, he would not have taken these steps .
. Thus, the hearing transcript alone demonstrates that Judge Iwasaki squarely ruled
fraud was not a defense to the contempt charge. Whether Judge Iwasaki was correct
is not before the court. As stated, the task at hand is to correctly document the ruling
and nothing more.

The court has reviewed the Findings, Order, and Judgment submitted by
counsel for Respondent. The court has made interlineations as shown and signed the
proposed order.

Based on the foregoing, Petitioner's objection to the form of the order is ·
overruled. The order proposed by Respondent is being signed by the court, with the
changes as noted therein.

DATED this 1st day of March, 2012.
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL S. ROBINSON,
MINUTE ENTRY
Petitioner,
Case No. 074900501

vs.
DEBRA J. ROBINSON,

Judge Todd Shaughnessy

Respondent.

Pending before the court is Respondent's motion for a preliminary injunction,
lien nullification, damages, and other relief.

The court previously ruled, on an

emergency basis, on that portion of the motion dealing with the Sandy Retail Center.
The court deferred ruling on the balance of the motion because Petitioners counsel
was out of the country and was in the process of attempting to withdraw from the
case. To ensure that Petitioner could be heard on the matter, and be represented by
counsel of his choice, the court heard only that portion of the motion necessary to
address the then-immediate sale of the Sandy Retail Center, and deferred the balance
of the motion.

The balance of the motion was argued on February 28, 2012.

Petitioner was represented by Kevin Bond. Respondent wa~ represented by Dean
Andreasen. The court has reviewed the moving and opposition papers, the pleadings
and papers on fil~ in the case, along with the -evidence presented by both sides, and
I

now grants Respondent's motion.

1
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Some of Petitioner's arguments in opposition to the rnotion are addressed by
other orders entered by the court today, which the court incorporates by reference.
The remaining issues are (i) whether a lis pendens is properly characterized as a
wrongful lien for purposes of Utah Code Ann. § 38-9-1, (ii) whether this court, as '
opposed to the court in West Jordan, has the authority to order removal of the lis
pendens pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 788-6-1304(1 ), and (iii) whether Petitioner is
permitted to record serial lis pendens pursuant to the Utah Court of Appeals' opinion in

Doug Jessop Constr., Inc. v. Anderton, 2008 UT App. 348.

Whether a lis pendens is a wrongful lien for purposes of Utah's wrongful Hen
statute, and whether this court has the authority to order removal of a lis pendens
under the lis pendens statute, are not dispositive. 1

Where, as here, the property in

question is a marital asset subject to the jurisdiction of this court, and where this court
has in the past entered orders associated with that property, this court respectfully
submits that it has the authority to issue orders in aid of its jurisdiction or orders that
are necessary or appropriate to carry out or enforce· its prior orders. The court is not
persuaded that the Anderton case permits serial recording of lis pendens. The holding
in Anderton is very narrow - in that case, the first Ii~ pendens was invalidated because
there was no legal proceeding pending to support the lis pendens thereby rendering it
invalid; the court acknowledged that such an action could be filed and when it was, the
The court notes that section 78B-6-1304(1) states that an affected party "may make a motion to
the court in which the action is pending.n The statement is permissive, and the "court in which the action
is pending" is the Third Judicial District Court. However, the court does not rule on the question of
whether the "court in which the action is pendingn means the particular judge before whom the case is
pending, or that district, because it is unnecessary to do so.
·
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second lis pendens was recorded. The second lis pendens did not violate the court's
injunction because the court permitted the lawsuit to be filed, and the lis pendens
merely provided record notice of that lawsuit.

The case does not support the

proposition thata party may file a lawsuit, record a lis pendens, and then; in-response
to an order invalidating that lis pendens, record another one.

Based on the foregoing, counsel for Respondent is directed to submit to the
court an order granting the remaining relief sought in her motion for a preliminary
-injunction. Because this matter is time-sensitive, the court suspends the time periods
in Rule 7 for lodging objections.

Respondent must serve her proposed order, by

electronic mail or hand delivery, before close of business today. Petitioner will have
until the close of business tornorrow, fy1arch 2, 2012, to file any objections and, with ·
them, a proposed form of order that Petitioner believes correctly reflects the court's
rulings herein.

DATED this 1st day of March, 2012.
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DEA_N C. ANDREASEN (#3981)
SARAH L. CAMPBELL (#12052)
CLYDE SNOW &SES~JONS
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 fi 1-2216
Telephone (801) 322-2516
·
Fax (801) 521-6280
dca@clydesnow.com
slc@clydesnow.com

;

!FILED

ms·•Kl~l COURT

Third Judicial District

MAR

52012

O

Attorneys for Respondent
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL S. ROBINSON,
Petitioner,

FINDINGS AND ORDER GRANTING
PRELIMINARY.INJUNCTION, LIEN
NULLIFICATION, AND OTHER REl,.IEF

V.

Civil No. 074900501
DEBRA J. RO~INSON,
Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy
Respondent.
Comm. Michael S. Evans

_On February 28, 2012, the (i) Motion for Temporary Restraining Order,
Preliminary Injunction, Lien Nulliffcat,on, Damages, and Other Relief dated February 1,
2012, and the (ii) Second Motion for Nuilification of Second Lis Pendens Filed by
Petitioner, Damages, Contempt, and Other Relief and Motion for Order to Show Cause
dated February 7, 2012 (collectively the "Motion") filed by Respondent Debra J.
Robinson ("Respondent")
came on for hearing before the Court, Judge Todd M.
.
.
Shaughnessy presiding. Petitioner Michael S. Robinson ("Petitioner") was present and

{00263979-1 }
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represented by F. Kevin Bond and Budge W. Call. Respondent was present and
repre-sented by Dean C. Andreasen and Sarah -L. Campbell. T-he -Coart ·considered the
papers filed by the parties and the arg·urrients and proffers of counsel. Based thereon,
.

.

the Court made the findings reflected in the Minute Entry dated March 1, 2012, attached
hereto as Exhibit A, and as follows:
FINDINGS
1.

Petitioner recorded Lis Pendens against four properties in four different

counties in Utah and Arizona, in which R~spondent has an interest (the "Lis Pendens").
The Lis Pendens were recorded on the properties commonly known as the Sandy Retail
Center, the Phoenix Plaza, the Deer Valley Condominium, and the Arizona Parceldescribed more fully below.
2.

On January 27, 2012, Petitione·r recorded a document ·entitled Lis

Pendens with the Salt Lake County Recorder'~ Office of the State of Utah, as entry no.
11_ 322084, in bpok 9986, at pages 2486-89 affecting that certain parcel of property
located in .Salt Lake County, Utah, and more particularly described as follows:
Commencing at the Southeast corner of Section 30, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Meridian, th.ence North 183 feet, thence West 183 feet; thence
South 183 feet, thence East 183 feet to the place of beginning. .
Less and excepting the fo,llowing des:cf,bed parcel conveyed to Sandy City by
that certain Special Warranty Deed recorded November 16, 1989 as Entry No.
4848748 in Book 6176 at Page.1435.of Official Records:
Beginning at the Southeast corner· ot'Section 30, Township 2 South, Range 1
East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian and running thence North .0°02'05" East 183.0
feet, along the section line the_nce Nort~ 89~53'10" We~t 53.0 feet; the;mce South
0°02'05~ West. 117.0 feet; .thence.South 45°04'31_" West 36.74 feet;
thence North
.
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89°53'10" West 104.0 feet; thence South 0°02'05" West 40 feet; thence South
89°53'10" East 183.0 feet ~o the_point of beginning.
Street Address: 7760 South 700 East, Sandy, Utah 84047
Parcel No. 22-30-478-008-0000
(the "Sandy Retail Center").
3.

On January 27, 2012, Petitioner recorded a document entitled Lis

Pendens with the Washington· County Recorder's Office of the State of Utah, as
document no. 20120002718 affecting that certain parcel of property located in
Washington County, Utah, and more particularly described as follows:
Beginning at a Point Which Lies South 0°35'40 11 East, 430.15 Feet Along
the Section Line and North 81°41'20" East, 212.49 Feet from the
Northwest Corner of Se~tion. 24, Township 42 South, Range 16 West, Salt
Lake Base and Meridian and Running °Thence South 0°21 '40" East, 9.51
Feet; Thence North· 83°00'00" East, -88.52 Feet; Thence North 78°30'00"
East, 36.71 Feet; Thence South 47°54'40" East, 288.32 Feet to a Point on
the Westerly Right of Way Line of· Valley View Drive; Thence North
42°05'20" Ea~t_, 179.00 F_eet Along ~aid Westerly Right of Way; Thence
North 47°54'40" West, 50.46 Feet; Thence North 02°54'40" West, 136.69
Feet; Thence South. 74°24'40" East, 134.30 Feet to a Point on Said
Westerly Right of Way, Said Point Being. Also on a Curve to the Left, the
Radius Point of WhichHe~rs North.69°03'15" West, 400.00 Feet Distant;
Thence Northeasterly Alori-g Said ·westerly Right of Way and Arc of Said
Curve Through a Central Angle. of 05°21 '25", a Distance of 37.40 Feet to
the Poirit of Tangency; Thenc.e North 15°35'20" East, 18.34 Feet Along
Said Right of Way; Th~nce North 74°24'40" West, -148.51 Feet; Thence
North 3°01'13" West, 146.25 Feetto a-_point·(?n the Southerly Right of Way
. of Suns~t Boulevard, Said Point Seing. Also on a Curve to the Left, the
Radius Point of Which Bears South 5°33'49" West, 1298.14 Feet Distant;
Thence Westerly Along Said Southerly Right of Way and the Arc of Said
Curve Through a Central° Angle of 1°40'50", a Distance of 38.08 Feet;
Thence South 97.87 feet; Thence West 149.91 Feet; Thence North 99.37
Feet to a Point on Said Southerly Right of Way, Said Point Being Also on
a· Curve lo the Left, the R~dius Point of Which Bears South 2°44'15" East,
1298.14 Feet Distant; Thence Westerly Along Said Southerly Right of Way
and the Arc of Said Curve Tt:,rough a Central Angle of 9°55'52", a
{00263979-1 }
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Distance of 225.01 Feet;· Thence Sputh 0°21'40" East, 296.07. Feet to the
Point of Beginning.
Street Address: 929 W, ·S~nset Blvd., Was_hington,_ Utah 84770
Parcel No. SG-6-2-24-44451
(the "Phoenix Plaza")
4.

On January 27, 2012, P~titioner _recorded a document entitled Lis

Pendens with the Summit County Recorder'.s Office of the State of Utah, as entry no.
00938337, in book 2113, at pages 0782-85 affecting that certain parcel of property
located in Summit, Utah, and more particularly described as follows:
Unit 59, • Fawngrove · Condominiums, a Utah Condominium. Project,
Together With Its Undivided Appurtenant Ownership Interest in and to the
Common Areas and Facilitie~ of tnei Project as the Same are Identified in
the Record of Survey Map ·Recorded: December 17, 1980, as Entry No.
174104,:and the Condominium :Declaratiqn Recorded December 17, 1980
as Entry. No. 174105 in Book M174 At Page 773, the First Supplemental
Record of ·Survey Map Recorded March 1'2, 1982 as Entry No. 189403
and th~ Supplemental• Declaration of and Amendment to the
Condominium Declaration Recorded-March·-12, 1982 as Entry No. 189404
in Book _M214 at Page·531', the Record of Survey Map .for Fawngrove
Condominiums Phase ·II -R~co~ded. November 15, 1985 as Entry _No.
241835 and the Second Supple·mental Declaration of and Amendm~nt to
Condominium Deciaratioli ::Recorded ·:November 15, · 1985 as E_ntry No.
24.1836 in Book 361 · _at Page 623, the Record of Survey M,ap of
. Fawngrove Condominiums .Phase ll Re·corded Ju·ne 16, 1986 as Entry No.
252810,. and the 1-hird Supplem~IJt,al Declarc;ition of and Amendment to
Condominium Declaration Recorded June 16, 1986 as Entry No. 252811
in Book .388 at Page 608. ar)o the· Record of Survey Map Recorded April
19, 1990. as Entry No. 32332°5 and the.-Fourth Supplemental Declaration of
and Amendment to Condominium.Declaration Recorded April 19, 1990 as
Entry No.· 323326 in Book .561 ·at Pag~ 495 of the Official Records, in the
Office of, the Summit Co'unfy R~corder. · .
Street Address: 16~4 ·oeer. Valley priye North, Park City, Utah 84060
•

I•

.'

;

•

I

•

Parcel ~9- FGR-11-59
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(the "Deer Valley Condominium')

5.

On-February 3, ,2012, Petitioner recorded a document entitled Lis
.

.

Pendens with the Mohave Co~nty Recorder's Office of the State of Arizona, as fee no.
2012005595 affecting that certain parcel of prop~rty located in Mohave County, Arizona,

.

.

and more particularly described as follows:
The Southwest Quarter (SW ¼) of P~rcel 5, of Franhi Chaparral Estates,
According to the Plat Thereof, Recorded December 10, 1985, in Book 2 of
Parcel Plats, Page 85, Records of Mohave County, Arizona.
Except One-Half of All Minerals, as Reserved in Instrument Recorded in
Book 118 of Deeds, Page 462.
Parcel No. 402-77-005
(the "Arizona Parcel")

6.

On January 30, 2012; aft~r Re_sp~ndent received notice of the Lis

Pendens recorded against the pr~perties, Respondent's counsel gav~ notice to
Petitioner's counsel ~hat the liens were wron~fully reco.rded and requested that the Lis

?~-h-t\Ohl:-V" rekv.se ~ -\v ,e-Mt;Ne., 1'1,(:... h!.V\SJ

Pendens be immedi~tely removed.·

.

7.

Protitioner's

.

then counsel,

rcfflmml of t~e Lis Pendens
~

.-recoided.

8.

y

..

~~J

Miol=la~i Jensen, Fespondcd to the reqtiest.for COV\TJVJllt.~

.

.

to f l.{v{Se_

by disavo>Nin~ any Fesponsibility tor those liens being.,,. re.ci ve~ t1;.
. .. , .
TO \'~ \'VlD\IL.

·

.. · .

.

-tvt.c.

\\{M ~,

<(1.M.~

On February 1, 201·2, Respondent filed a Motion for Temporary

Restraining Order, Preliminary Injunction, Lien Nullification, Damages, and Other Relief.

a. Temporary Restraining Order (the "TRO").

On February 1,.'2012, the Court issued
'
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~

9.-

The TRO provided for

apreliminary injunction hearing on February 3,

2(:)'1-2, at 9:-00 am. A copy of-the issued TRO was .mailed and ·emaHed to Michael Jensen
and Petitioner. The issued TRO was'sent directly.to Petitioner because Mr. Jensen was
out of the country for three weeks _on vacation. During the weekend of February 3, 2012,
a constable attempted to serve Petition:er ~our times with the TR0 but Petitioner cvaaea ~

. . ·..

-service of proses~

10.

·

"flAA

0

·

Mr. Jensen must have received the TRO and the papers filed in

conjunction therewith because on February 2, 2012, he filed a memorandum in
opposition which was received by the Court on February 2, 2012.

11.

The Court attempted to contact Mr. Jensen for the hearing on the morning
•

.i

•

on February 3_, 2012, but without su~cess. The Court proceeded with the hearing. At the
hearing, the Court concluded that the /is pendens_filed on the Sandy Retail Center was
a wrongful lien· and declared it to he .void .at> initio and entered Findings and Order. (The
Findings and· Order incorrectly sta~e that Petitioner ·was present in person and Mr.
Jensen was present via teleptio~e bec~use ,_the. document was prepared in advance of
the hear_ing and attendance was· anticipated 'iilth~ugh the correction was not. made
.

.

before _the document was signed.by the. Court.)

12.

The Findings arid Order were sent to Mr. Jensen via email on February 3,

2012, and ultimately recorded with :the_ Salt Lake County Recorder's Office.
13.

Notwithstanding the terms of the Court's Findings and Order, Petitioner

had another /is pendens recorded·on . th~· Sandy· Retail Center early on the morning of

{00263979-1 }
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I

February 61 2012. The TRO was.still in effect when Petitioner recorded the second /is
pendens on the·Sandy··Retail Gentef.

14.

On February 7, 2012, ·Petitio,ier had another /is pendens recorded on the

~hoenix Plaza as document no. 201209:04136 with the Washington County Recorder's
Office of the State of Utah.

15.

On February 7, 2012, after finding out about the second /is pendens being

recorded on the Sandy Retail Center by Petitioner! Respondent filed a Second Motion
for Nullification of Second Lis Pendens;

16.

On February 9, 2012, the Court conducted a hearing on the Second

Motion for Nullification~ Mr. Jensen was present via telephone for the hearing. The Court
g,ranted the Second Motion and issued its Second Findings and Order and Order to
Show Cause.
17.

PctiUei=mr has speeifieelly oidlatetf and aisobeyed the above-desc,ibed

01de1s ofthc Cgurt by cecotding the fii'sl and second
Center.

18.

~t

.

For the same reasons as set forth

,'is pende,,s 011 tlie Sandy

.

Retail

in the two motions filed to have the /is ·

pendens nullified on the sa·ndy Reta_il Center, the /is pendens on the Phoenix Plaza,

Deer Valley Condominium; and the Arizona Parcel should also be deemed wrongful
liens and nullified.

19.

At the hearing on February 9, 2012, the Court ordered that the hearing on

the nullification of the /is pendens clouding title to the Phoenix Plaza, Deer Valley

{00263979-1 }
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Condominium, and the Arizona Pare·~, ·as well as the Order to Show Cause would be
conducted on February ~-a antj·29, 2012.

20.

The Court has already found .and concluded that the two /is pendens

recorded on the Sandy RetairCenter were wrongful liens and they were, accordingly,
nullified by previous order of the Court.

21.

The Court finds and ·concludes that the /is pendens recorded on the

Phoenix Plaza, the Deer Valley -Condominium and the Arizona Parcel are also "wrongful
liens" as that term is defined under the provisions of Utah Code Ann.§ 38-9-1 et seq.,
and as necessary, Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-:-6--1304, and that an order shall be entered
nullifying the s~n:ie.

22.

The Court finds·and.:concl.udes that Petitio.ner's actions in recording the

two /is pendens on the Sandy 'Retail Center and the two /is pendens on the Phoenix
I

.

.

.

I

Plaza, and individual /is pendens ·on' the· Peer Valley Condominium and the· Arizona

.

. .
_:
~
Parcel are wrollgful and were/..,8. IEAoWiil!j::'iolation i:>f the order✓c;f this Court. ,f(V"23.

. \.\A . . . ;

.P'etiUorier has. oiolated Ceurt efders ifl the this actio11 by filii ig ,'is penclens

-ageiAst tile Sandy Retail Center a1 id. Phoenix Plaza and by diverting rent received fronr
.

.

~

~

tl=te Sandy Retail Ce11te1 and. Pfio~hbc--Pia•;z;a ·11l=leA. Respo1 ,dent I ,as been granted full-autl=lority to list and Close the ~ale of the Sand~ Retail Center and the Phoenix Plaza

• and is the Cour:t ordei ed 1, ia, ,ager ef beth pr=epertie·s witl I sele authority te sollect and.

-deposit r:eAts.

24.

Unless the Court· g'rarit~ Res.p-ondent's Motion and· enters a preliminary·

injunction, Respondent will suffer actual or thteatened imme.diate and irreparable injury
{00263979~ 1 }
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as a result of Petitioner's efforts to interfere with and jeopardize the sale of the Phoenix
Plaza.
25.

Respondent will suffer irreparable harm unless a preliminary injunction is

immediately issued because of (1) the pending sale of the Phoenix Plaza to a third-party
buyer which is under a Real Estate Purchase Contract ("REPC") with a scheduled

:~

closing date of no later than April 9, 2012, which transaction is likely or in actual threat
of being lost as a result of Petitioner's recording of a /is pendens against the Phoenix
Plaza; and (2) because of the continuing denial and deprivation of Respondent's right to
her interest and control over the Phoenix Plaza, as real property rights constitute a
unique interest, the loss of which constitutes irreparable harm to Respondent.
26.

The threatened injury to Respondent outweighs the damage, if any, that

the preliminary injunction may cause Petitioner given the finding of irreparable harm to
Respondent by the deprivation of her real property rights to the Phoenix Plaza, including
the right to realize the net sales proceeds of the Phoenix Plaza, and Petitioner will not
sustain damage where he stipulated to the sale of the Phoenix Plaza and its sales price.
27.

The preliminary injunction will not be adverse to, and will serve the public

interest because the Court has ah interest in enforcing court orders.

':D
.£/J

¢

28.

Based upon the evidence b~f~re the Court demonstrating Petitioner's

kABWiAg violatien

et Get1rt efders s11d ~filing of a /is pendens agaiilst the Sandy Retail

Center, Phoenix Plaza~ DeerValley Condominium, and Arizona Parcel without a
sufficient legal basis, there

is substantial likelihood that Respondent Will prevail on the

merits of her underlying claims against Petitioner.
{00263979-1 }
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29.

Given that Petitioner has stipulated to the sale of the Phoenix· Plaza, the

Court has ordered the sale of the· Phoenix Plaza, and· R·esponcfent is the only one as
between her and Petitioner who will receive the net proceeds from the sale of the Sandy
Phoenix Plaza, the Court finds there is ;no reasonable· basis to require Respondent to
provide security under Rule 65A(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
THEREFORE, pursuant to Rule 65A of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and
good cause appearing,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1.

Respondent's Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Lien Nullification,

Damages, and Other Relief is granted in all respects.
2.

Petitioner is enjoined from acting or failing to act, or causing any third ·

party to act or fail to act, contrary to the terms of the Decree of Divorce ente_red by the
_Court in this matter on De~ember 31', 2QOB_and a_l~ subsequent orders.
3.

Petitioner is ~nJoined· from int~rferihg wi~h the sale of the Phoenix Plaza by

making, uttering, recording, or filing-'~my do_cument which will cloud title to the Phoenix
Plaza or contacting any person associated with. the sale of the Phoenix Plaza without
permission of the Court.
4.

The above-described Lis Pendens are declared to be void ab initio and of

no force or effect. ·
.

5.

.

.

.

The Phoenix Plaza; Deer Valley Condominium, and Arizona Parcel are .

released from a·ny lien, cloud, or encumbra_nce to title based on the Lis Pendens. The

{00263979-1 }
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Lis Pendens provides no notice of claim or interest to the Phoenix Plaza, Deer Valley
Condominium, and j:\-rizona Parcel.
6.

A certified copy of this document shall be recorded with the Offices of the

Salt Lake County Recorder, Washington County ~ecorder, Summit County Recorder,
and Mohave County Recorder.

7.

~ l,,\.lLA.-Wt..d ~

.

L

cavv'\cciWYi

Respondent is awarded her costs and reasonable attorney's fees~s may IN), ty\

be established by way of affidavit of counsel to be,submitted pursuant to Utah Code
Ann. § 38-9-1 et seq., Utah Code Ann. § 788-6-1301 et seq., and paragraph 44 of the

flt\,~S.

WLOttW'

1¼AY

Decree of Divorce.
8.

amo•mi

Judgment is cntcr=ea against Petitioner in faoor of Respo11derIt ii, tl1e

.·

-&v

--(M,~

at $60,00Q for Petitio11e,'s k11owing{lling of six wrongful liens in violation of Utah

-\-b

Code Ann. § 38-9-4
1

9.

\u.. IU,--\,e,-vwl1 ~ M" A \w \-eY

d.&vlt:-- ,

--rt-AY

An s 1,<idsntiary· hearing on· Petitioner's contempt aAa a hearing on ttm

pendiAg motieri fer order to sh<,vv e~use shall be 1·1eld on

March_,

~2~on1~2~,aeitt-_-:_-_-_-_-_-_-...=:-,m, Additional attorney's fees and costs are reserved for the
evidentiary hearing and may beaw~·rded. ·. ·

10.

Respondent-is nci required to.'provide security under Rule 65A(c} of the

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.

{00263979-1 }

11

4394

(

DATED this

G

day of March 2012.
: BY THE COURT

{00263979-1'}
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this

M_ day of March 201-2~' I hereby caused to be served on the Petitioner

a true and correct copy of the foregoing.FINDINGS AND ORDER GRANTING

PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION, UEN NULLIFICATION, AND OTHER RELIEF by having
the same emailed to:
F. Kevin Bond, Esq.
BOND & CALL, L.C.
8 East Broadway, Suite 720
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111_
kbond@bondcall-law.com

Attorney for Petitioner

{00263979-1 }
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 074900501 by the method and on the date
specified.
MAIL: DEAN C ANDREASEN ONE UTAH CENTER 13TH FLR 201 S MAIN ST SALT
LAKE CITY, UT 84111-2216
MAIL: F, KEVIN·BOND 8 E BROADWAY STE 720 SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111
03/05/2012

/s/ AMANDA OLSEN

Date:
Deputy Court Clerk

Page 1 (last)
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DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981)
DIANA L. TELFER (#10654)
CLYDE SNOW & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216
Telephone (801) 322-2516
Fax (801) 521-6280
dca@clydesnow.com
dlt@clydesnow.com

f81~8 IISTQ·JCJ' COURT
Thrrd Judicial District

MAY 2 9 2013
SALi l.Al(E COUNy\

By__,..__ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Deputy Clark

Attorneys for Respondent
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAELS. ROBINSON,
Petitioner,

fRESPONDEN=r·s PROfl6SED] ,Q.__
FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil No. 074900501

V.

DEBRA J. ROBINSON,
Respondent.

Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy
Comm. Joanna Sagers

On April 17-19, 2013, an evidentiary hearing was held in the above-captioned
matter before the Court, Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy presiding. Petitioner Michael S.
Robinson was present and represented by counsel, F. Kevin Bond and Budge W. Call
of Bond & Call, LC. The Respondent, Debra J. Robinson, was present and
represented by counsel, Dean C. Andreasen and Diana Telfer of Clyde Snow &
Sessions.
The Court having heard the evidence presented by the parties and the witnesses
called, and after considering the additional briefing and oral arguments of counsel:

{00382641-1 }

hereby enters the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, in the above
matter.

FINDINGS OF FACT
Prior Rulings, Orders and Judgments
1.

All rulings, orders and judgments that been made in the case to date are

affirmed. With the exception of a modification to the Court's prior ruling with respect to
the tax liability arising from sale of the Phoenix Plaza, as specifically set forth below,
nothing herein is intended to alter or modify, in any way, any of the rulings that have
already been made in this case.

Wrongful Lien Damages
2.

The Court finds that Petitioner filed lis pendens on the parties' properties

to prevent the sales of those properties that were ordered to be sold by this Court. This
Court has the authority to nullify, and require the removal of, the lis pendens that were
recorded relative to the West Jordan action. However, because there is a legal
question, and some doubt as to whether Utah's Wrongful Lien Act should apply to a lis
pendens, the Court declines to impose any statutory damages.
Contempt Issues

3.

Lis Pendens. The Court will not make a finding of contempt, with respect

to the recording of the lis pendens, for the same reason it declined to impose statutory
damages.

{00382841-1 }
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4.

Interfering with the Sale of Properties.
(A) Sandy Retail Center. The Court finds that Respondent sold the Sandy

Retail Center for an amount less than the amount authorized by the Court's
Order. Therefore, Respondent has unclean hands and is not in a position to
enforce a contempt order against Petitioner.
(B) Phoenix Plaza. The Court exercises its discretion and declines to
make a finding of contempt with respect to interference with the sale of the
Phoenix Plaza. However, the Court does not condone the activities that were
undertaken by Petitioner and finds they constituted improper conduct by
Petitioner in certain instances.

5.

Diversion of Assets. The Court finds that Respondent has failed to prove

by clear and convincing evidence all of the elements of contempt relative to her claim
that Petitioner diverted certain assets. The amounts that were presented to the Court,
other than the diversion of rent, occurred prior to the time that the order was entered in
this case, and the Court finds that contempt has not been established.
6.

Diversion of Rents. The Court finds that Petitioner did divert the Ernesto's

rent. Petitioner acknowledged the same. The Court finds Respondent essentially did
the same thing, although the Court finds that Respondent is in a better position because
she accounted for it and didn't attempt to conceal it. Nevertheless, the Court finds that
because Respondent has unclean hands, she is not in a position to enforce a contempt
finding against Petitioner in that regard.

{00382841.-1}
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7.

Failure to Provide Bankruptcy Accounting. The Court declines to impose

contempt for Petitioner's failure to comply with orders of the Bankruptcy Court. This
issue should be addressed by Judge Marker if Respondent wishes to pursue contempt
~

of.his order.
8.

Failure to Sign Documents. The Court finds that with respect to the Sandy

Retail Center, the Respondent had unclean hands regarding the amount for which the
property was sold, and therefore can't pursue a contempt finding against the Petitioner.
The Court declines, in the interest of justice, to make a con~empt finding with respect to
the Phoenix Plaza.
9.

Disparaging Comments. The Court has, by prior. order entered November

19, 2012, resolved the issue with respect to disparaging comments and that order
stands, including the finding of contempt, the imposition of contempt sanctions and the
award of Respondent's· attorneys' fees and costs.
10.

Contempt for Failing to Refinance the Phoenix Plaza.

The Court has

already made a contempt finding with respect to Petitioner's failure to refinance the
mortgage encumbering the Phoenix Plaza, and is not disturbing that finding. Additional
sanctions have been mooted at this point by virtue of the sale of the Phoenix Plaza, and
therefore the Court declines to impose any additional sanctions for that contempt.
11.

St. George Condo Issues. The Court finds that discovery issues, with

respect to the St. George Condo, should be governed by Rule 37,.and not through
sanctions for contempt. Therefore, to the extent relief is requested under Rule 37 it is
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denied.

The Court finds that Respondent was not prompt about producing her tax

returns so she is not in a position to complain about Petitioner not having produced his
tax returns. Additionally, the Court finds that Respondent has not proven by clear and
convincing evidence that Petitioner did not provide everything that he had in his
possession with respect to the rental income that he has been receiving from the St.
George Condo. Furthermore, Respondent has not established that Petitioner had the
ability to make the payments that he was required to make.

12.

Additional Contempt Issues. The Court declines in the interest of justice

to impose any further contempt finding or any further sanction with respect to any
additional contempt issues that were presented and have not been covered above.
Attorneys' Fees and Costs

13.

The Court finds that Respondent should b~ awarded her attorneys' fees

and costs incurred from January 1, 2008 through May 31, 2012 in the total amount of

$309,074.72. However, this amount should be reduced by $83,373.18 which was
awarded in a previous Judgment entered on January 25, 2012 for attorneys' fees and
costs incurred during that same time period. Accordingly, an additional judgment for
attorneys' fees and cost should be entered against Petitioner in favor of Respondent in
the amount of $225,701.54 ($309,074.72 • $83,373.18).

14.

Respondent was also previously awarded attorneys' fees and costs in the

amount of $6,251.26 in the Court's Order entered April 12, 2013 with respect to the
disparaging comments issue, and that Order stands.

{00382841-1}
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15.

Judgment interest and costs of collection are awarded as permitted under

Utah law on the two judgments for attorneys' fees and costs awarded to Respondent
above. These two judgments are not included in the Updated Judgment section below
because they accrue interest at a different rate than the Updated Judgment.
16.

Respondent shall be responsible for her attorneys• fees and costs incurred

prior to January 1, 2008 and after May 31, 2012, with the exception of the $6,251.26
no~ed in item 14 above. Any additional request for attorneys' fees and costs during
those time periods is denied.
Respondent's Accounting and Reconciliation Issues

17.

General Observations. The Court finds with respect to the accounting

issue that the parties had a history of combining all of their income, including income
from investment properties, and all of their expenses into a single or series of accounts.
The Respondent provided an accounting that was consistent with the way the
accounting had been done historically. The accounting the Respondent has provided is
numerically accurate. It is also complete, with the exception of the categorization of
expenses. This was not in any way intentional. She did the best job she could and she
did it the way she historically had done it. There are some uncertainties and ambiguities
about whether some expenses have been properly accounted for. These uncertainties
and ambiguities have to be resolved

in favor of the Petitioner given that the Respondent

provided the accounting.

{00382~1-1 }

6

6879

The Court declines to retain an accountant because the cost would exceed the
benefit and would invite more disputes. Both parties should have utilized the last year to
complete their accounting through discovery, including revealing documents. records,
witnesses, and retaining experts. The Court is not going to prolong this any further and
is simply going to rule on all these issues.
The Court has serious concerns about the fact that some of the items it had ruled
on, and that Mr. Jayne's relied upon, were not disclosed in a report. However, the Court
is not going to prolong this action any further and is simply going to rule on all these
issues.
-.d

Animating this, to a certain degree, is the equity principle concerning how this
case has ultimately come down. Without commenting on why it has ultimately come
down the way it has, the reality is that the Respondent has received a tremendous
financial advantage compared to the Petitioner. That animates in part what the Court
thinks is appropriate with respect to the accounting issue.
· 18.

Mr. Jayne's List of Disputed Items. The Court makes the following

findings with respect to the list of items Mr. Jayne's disagrees with, or disputes, in the
Respondent's accounting reconciliation.
a.

Clark Roofing. The Phoenix Plaza was sold shortly after these

expenses were incurred so these expenses should be split 50/ 50, rather than
treating them as the Petitioner's capital expenses.

{00382841-1 }
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b.

Steve Hard. These expenses are attributed to Petitioner, as his

personal expenses.
c.

Steve Shields. These expenses are attributed to Petitioner, as his

personal expenses.
d.

Software. These expenses are attributed to Respondent, as her

personal expenses.
e.

Appraisals. The costs of the appraisals are attributed to Petitioner,

as his personal expenses.
f.

POS/ATM Withdrawals. These expenses are attributed to

Respondent, as her personal expenses. The proof on all these issues is thin at
best, but in the interest of overall equity the Court includes these withdrawals as
an item on which the Petitioner prevails.
g.

Respondent's Tax Deduction for Withdrawing 401 k Monies.

Petitioner is given a credit for the amount of the tax deduction listed by
Respondent on her reconciliation statement with respect to taxes incurred for
withdrawing 401 k funds. The Court makes this ruling based on equity.
h.

Credit Card Issue. The Court finds that with respect to the credit

card issue, it was an issue that should have been addressed by Respondent's
expert but it was not. Therefore, the Petitioner should be given a credit for the
recalculated charges. However, Petitioner is not entitled to any credit for the
American Express charges made in 2012.

(00382841-1 }
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19.

Equalization of Distributions. The Court finds with respect to the

equalization of distributions that under Respondent's updated accounting, Petitioner
owes Respondent $19,319.96. This amount should be adjusted in the Petitioner's favor
by $81,617.63, which represents one-half of the total adjustments (a) thru (h) listed
above. Accordingly, Respondent owes Petitioner the amount of $62,297.67
($81,617.63 - $19,319.96) and such amount shall be used as an adjustment in the final
judgment accounting.
20.

Tax Liability on the Phoenix Plaza. The Court is modifying its prior order

with respect to the tax liability on the Phoenix Plaza. In paragraph 8 of the Order
entered January 24, 2012, the Court ordered "Petitioner is the owner of the Phoenix
Plaza and the only person subject to IRS Form 1099 reporting pursuant to paragraph 11
of the Decree." Although the Court affirms that ruling, it further orders that Petitioner is
entitled to a credit for one half of the income tax assessed directly attributable to the
sale of the Phoenix Plaza, as reported on Petitioner's 2012 federal income tax return.
Petitioner is ordered to provide Respondent a complete copy of his 2012 federal income
tax return, any amendment thereto, and any supplemental information from Petitioner's
accountant necessary to verify the amount of the tax. In the event the sale of the
Phoenix Plaza results in a capital loss (i.e. a tax savings), the amount of the judgment
shall be increased by one half of the income tax savings directly attributable to the sale
of the Phoenix Plaza, as reported on Petitioner's 2012 federal income tax return.

{00382841-1 }
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21.

Sale of Sandy Property. The Court finds with respect to the sale of the

Sandy Retail Center that the Respondent sold the property for an amount not
authorized by the Court's Order, and that Respondent has unclean hands. Therefore,
the Petitioner is entitled to a $9,000 credit representing 100% of the amount by which
the sales price was unilaterally reduced by Respondent.
22.

Equalization of the distributions from the UESP Accounts. The Court

finds with respect to the equalization of distributions from the UESP accounts that the
parties are to provide each other with documentation verifying the account balance for
any account they had with the Utah Educational Savings Plan as of November 2, 2007,
the date of the parties' settlement. This information shall be provided within fourteen
days of the hearing date of April 19, 2013. The balances in all the accounts for the
parties are to be added together and divided by two, with each party receiving one-half
of the total amounts as of November 2, 2007. If one party fails to disclose this
information to the other within the 14 day period, they will receive nothing from these
accounts.
Update of Judgment Initially Entered March 1. 2012
23.

The Court hereby finds that the Judgment entered March 1, 2012, should

be updated with offsets and adjustments as set forth above and calculated as follows:
Judgment dated 03/01/12

$1,912,696.00

A.

Interest only - Judgment 02/25/11

B.

Interest only- Judgment 03/01/12

$438,924.43
$81 .748.1 O

{0038284M)
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C.

\.!ii)

Interest only - Accrual of interest

$126,185.22

(Interest calculated at 8% interest
from July 27, 2011 to May 23,
2012 or 301 days at per diem of
$419.22 on principal amount of

$1,912,696.00)

.,6)

D.

,.J

E.

F.

.,4)

G.

"'
I.ii)

Attorneys' Fees/Costs - Judgment 01/25/12
Principal amount
Interest amount
Sandy Retail Center payment relative to
Benchmark and sales price of
$590,000 and net sales proceeds of
$523,507.33; and $9,000 credit
Amount Petitioner ordered to pay
Respondent under ,I 3.b. of Order
(Hearing 01/22) entered 02/13/13
Charge for $130.00 and payment by
Petitioner of $130.00 for
Respondent's service fees

H.

Adjustment as described above
relative to Respondent's accounting

I.

Accounting adjustment as described above
for UESP accounts

J. Net sales proceeds from sale of

$83,373.18
$2,342.56
$113,152.33
-$9,000.00

$3,402.09

$0.00
-$62,297 .67
-$4,286.67

-$1,557,290.95

Phoenix Plaza
Unpaid principal as of May 23, 2012, relative to
Judgment dated 03/01 /12

$1,128,948.62

Accordingly, the Court finds that a judgment updating the initial Judgment
entered on March 1, 2012, should be entered against Petitioner in favor of Respondent

{00382841-1 }
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in the amount of $1,128,948.62 as of May 23, 2012, with interest at the rate of eight
percent (8%) accruing on the unpaid principal balance until paid in full. Costs of
collection are awarded as permitted under Utah law on this judgment.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Based on the above Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following Conclusions
of Law:

1.

That a Final Order and Judgment should be entered with terms consistent

with the terms of the Findings of Fact above.
DATED this

_m_~ay

of

yV\. A:tq

, 2013.

BY THE COURT:

{0038284M}
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 20th day of May, 2013, I hereby caused the foregoing [RESPONDENT'S

PROPOSED] FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW to bee-filed which
in turned caused notification of such filing to be sent to the following counsel who are
identified as e-filers with this Court:
F. Kevin Bond, Esq.
Budge W. Call, Esq.
BOND & CALL, LC.
8 East Broadway, Suite 720
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 ·

Isl Marilyn Ghristensen
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 074900501 by the method and on the date
specified.
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

ANDREASEN
F KEVIN BOND

DEAN C

05/29/2013

Date:

/s/

AMANDA O L S E N ~

Deputy Court Clerk

Printed: 05/29/13 14:08:43
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DEAN C. ANDREASEN (#3981)
DIANA L. TELFER (#10654)
CLYOE SNOW & SESSIONS
201 South Main Street, Suite 1300
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2216
Telephone (801) 322-2516
Fax (801) 521-6280
dca@clydesnow.com
dlt@clydesnow.com

IFILil B13I~C1' COURT
Third Judicial District

MAY 2 9 2013

Attorneys for Respondent
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR

SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAELS. ROBINSON,

.,-(RESPONBENT'S PROPOSED~ t)_
FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT

Petitioner,
Civil No. 074900501
V.

Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy
DEBRA J. ROBINSON,
Comm. Joanna Sagers
Respondent.

On April 17-19, 2013, the hearing on the remaining issues in this action was
conducted before the Court, Judge Todd M. Shaughnessy presiding. Petitioner Michael
S. Robinson was present and represented by F. Kevin Bond and Budge W. Call.
Respondent Debra J. Robinson was present and represented by Dean C. Andreasen
and Diana L. Telfer. The Court considered the admitted evidence and the proffers and
arguments of counsel. Based thereon, the Court ORDERS, ADJUDGES and
DECREES as follows:

(00382642-1 }
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1.

The Court affirms all previous rulings, orders and judgments entered in

this action except as provided for herein.
Lis Pendens
2.

The Court declines to impose statutory damages relative to the six lis

pendens recorded by Petitioner.
Contempt
3.

The Court declines to hold Petitioner in contempt for:
a.

having recorded the six lis pendens;

b.

having interfered with the sale of the Sandy Retail Center and the

Phoenix Plaza;
c.

having diverted assets;

d.

having diverted rents from the Phoenix Plaza;

e.

having failed to comply with the orders of the Bankruptcy Court

although Respondent may pursue such with the Bankruptcy Court; and
f.

having failed to sign documents relative to the sale and closing of

the sale of the Sandy Retail Center and the Phoenix Plaza;
4.

The previous Findings and Order entered November 19, 2012, relative to

Petitioner's contempt for having made disparaging comments about Respondent,
remains in effect including the ordered sanctions.
5.

The previous Findings, Order, and Judgment entered March 1, 2012,

relative to Petitioner's contempt for having failed to refinance the mortgage
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encumbering the Phoenix Plaza, remains in effect but the Court declines to impose
sanctions because the issue is moot in that the Phoenix Plaza property has been sold.
6.

With respect to the St. George condominium issues, as far as those

concern discovery issues governed by Rule 37, and to the extent relief is requested
under Rule 37, the same is denied.
7.

Insofar as any other contempt issue presented, the Court declines in the

interest of justice to impose any further contempt finding or any further sanction.
Attorneys' Fees and Costs
8.

Respondent is awarded her attorneys' fees and costs incurred from

January.1, 2008 through May 31, 2012, in the total amount of $309,074.72. However,
the $309,074.72 amount is reduced by the amount of $83,373.18 because the
$83,373.18 amount constitutes a Judgment entered on January 25, 2012 for attorneys'
fees and costs, which were incurred during the January 1, 2008 through May 31, 2012
time period. The Judgment entered on January 25, 2012 is being satisfied in total as
described below. Accordingly, judgment is hereby entered against Petitioner in favor of
Respondent in the amount of $225,701.54 ($309,074.72 - $83,373.18) for attorneys'
fees and costs.
9.

Respondent was also previously awarded attorneys' fees and costs in the

amount of $6,251.26 relative to the Order Awarding Attorneys' Fees and Costs entered
April 12, 2013, as awarded in the Findings and Order entered November 19, 2012.
Accordingly, a judgment is hereby entered against Petitioner in favor of Respondent in
the amount of $6,251.26.
{00382842·1 }
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10.

Judgment interest and costs of collection are awarded as permitted under

Utah law on the two judgments for attorneys' fees and costs awarded to Respondent
above. These two judgments are not included in the Update of Judgment section below
because of the different interest rates involved.
11.

Respondent shall be responsible for her attorneys' fees and costs incurred

prior to January 1, 2008 and after May 31, 2012, and any request for attorneys' fees
and costs during those time periods is denied.
12.

Petitioner shall be responsible for his attorneys' fees and costs for all time

periods, and any request for such is denied.
Respondent's Accounting
13.

Petitioner stipulated that under Respondent's updated accounting,

Petitioner owe·s Respondent $19,319.96 to equalize the division of the funds between
the parties.

14.

As detailed in the Court's Findings of Fact, the Court orders certain

adjustments to Respondent's accounting. The amount found by the Court is that
Respondent owes Petitioner a total of $81,617.63 to equalize the division of the funds
between the parties.
15.

Accordingly, Respondent owes Petitioner the amount of $62,297.67

($81,617.63- $19,319.96) and such amount shall be used as an adjustment in the final
judgment amount as described below.

{00382842-1 }
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Utah Education Savings Plan Accounts
16.

Under the terms of the Decree of Divorce, the parties were to equalize the

division of certain Utah Educational Savings Plan accounts held as of November 2,

2007. On November 2, 2007, Petitioner held accounts totaling $6,441.39 and
Respondent held accounts totaling $15,014.72 resulting in Respondent owing Petitioner
the amount of $4,286.67 which amount shall be used as an adjustment in the final
judgment amount as described below.
Update of Judgment Initially Entered March 1. 2012

17.

The updated amount of the Judgment entered on March 1, 2012, with

offsets and adjustments as ordered by the Court, is calculated as follows:
Judgment dated 03/01 /12

$1,912,696.00

A.

Interest only - Judgment 02/25/11

$438,924.43

B.

Interest only - Judgment 03/01 /12

$81,748.10

C.

Interest only- Accrual of interest

$126, 185.22

(Interest calculated at 8% interest
from July 27, 2011 to May 23,
2012 or 301 days at per diem of
$419.22 on principal amount of

$1,912,696.00}

D.

E.

Attorneys' Fees/Costs - Judgment 01/25/12
Principal amount
Interest amount
Sandy Retail Center payment relative to
Benchmark and sales price of
$590,000 and net sales proceeds of
$523,507.33; and credit of $9,000.00

$83,373.18
$2,342.56
$113,152.33
-$9,000.00

{00382842-1 }
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F.

G.

$3,402.09

Charge for $130.00 and payment by
Petitioner of $130.00 for
Respondent's service fees

H.

Adjustment as described above
relative to Respondent's accounting

I.

Accounting adjustment as described above
for UESP accounts

J.

Net sales proceeds from sale of
Phoenix Plaza

Unpaid principal as of May 23, 2012, relative to
Judgment dated 03/01/12
18.

w

Amount Petitioner ordered to pay
Respondent under ,J 3.b. of Order
{Hearing 01/22) entered 02/13/13

$0.00

G

-$62,297.67

-$4,286.67
~

-i11557.290.95

$1,128,948.62

Accordingly, judgment is entered against Petitioner in favor of Respondent

in the amount of $1,128,948.62 as of May 23, 2012, with interest at the rate of eight
percent (8%) accruing on the unpaid principal balance until paid in full. Costs of
collection are awarded as permitted under Utah law on this judgment.
Tax Liability on Sale of Phoenix Plaza
19.

In paragraph 8 of the Order entered January 24, 2012, the Court ordered

that "Petitioner is the owner of the Phoenix Plaza and the only person subject to IRS
Form 1099 reporting pursuant to paragraph 11 of the Decree." Although the Court
affirms that ruling, it further orders that Petitioner is entitled to a credit against the
judgment referred to in the prior section for one half of the income tax assessed directly
attributable to the sale of the Phoenix Plaza, as reported on Petitioner's 2012 federal
income tax return. Petitioner is ordered to provide Respondent a complete copy of his
{00382842-1 }
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2012 federal income tax return, any amendment thereto, and any supplemental
information from Petitioner's accountant necessary to verify the amount of the tax. In
the event the sale of the Phoenix Plaza results in a capital loss (i.e. a tax savings), the
amount of the judgment shall be increased by one half of the income tax savings
directly attributable to the sale of the Phoenix Plaza, as reported on Petitioner's 2012
federal income tax return.
DATED this

__.2tl t'a'y of May, 2013.
BY THE COURT:

TO D M. SHAUGHNESSY
District Court Judge
APPROVED this
day of May, 2013:

~~~ ~ J - e ~
~~G-Oll\..~~~
C(,V\ ~
c:it-M- 6 } ~ "'1A-L(_.d_.,

1·

F. KEVIN BOND
BUDGE W. CALL
Attorneys for Petitioner

~
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
On this 20th day of May, 2013, I hereby caused the foregoing [RESPONDENT'S
PROPOSED] FINAL ORDER AND JUDGMENT to bee-filed which in turned caused
notification of such filing to be sent to the following counsel who are identified as e-filers
with this Court:
F. Kevin Bond, Esq.
Budge W. Call, Esq.
BOND & CALL, LC.
8 East Broadway, Suite 720
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

Isl Marilyn Christensen
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the .
following people for case 074900501 by the methoq and on.~he ~ate
specified.
EMAIL:
EMAIL:·

DEAN C ANDREASEN
F KEVIN BOND

~05/29/2013

Date:

/s/

AMANDA OLSEN~~

Deputy Court Clerk

·-tJ

Printed: 05/29/13 14:08:43
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FILO IHihfo,;i ~brdi"f"'
Third Judiciaf District ,

JUL 12. 2013
SALT LAKE COUN 1

r)eoutv

Cl~r ►

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL S. ROBINSON,
MINUTE ENTRY
Petitioner,
Case No. 07 4900501

vs.
DEBRA J. ROBINSON,

Judge Todd Shaughnessy

Respondent.

Pending before the court are (i) petitioner's Rule 59 Motion for New Trial to Amend
the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Final Judgment, and (ii) petitioner's Rule
62(b) Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment.

The court has reviewed the moving 1

opposition, and reply papers filed In connection with both motions. Oral argument has not
been requested and would not materially assist the court in resolving the motions.
Motion to Amend.

Petitioner's Rule 59 motion challenges the $1.9 million judgment originally entered
on or about March 1, 2012, and the court's award of attorneys' fees following the final
hearings in April 2013.

The March 1, 2012 1 judgment was incorporated into and

consolidated with the final judgment of the court, entered on or about May 29, 2013. With
respect to petitioner's challenges to the $1.9 million judgment, the arguments raised by
petitioner are all arguments that were or could have been raised in his Motion to Amend
Judgment, Vacate Judgment. or Relief from Judgment Pursuant to Rules 52 1 59 1 and/or
60{b)(6), filed by petitioner on or about March 14, 2012. That motion was fully briefed,

7131

MICHAEL S. ROBINSON vs DEBRA J. ROBINSON
074900501

Page 2 of 2

argued, and the court stands by its ruling and declines to revisit again the March 1, 2012,
judgment. That portion of the motion is therefore denied for all of the reasons previously
given in connection with the prior challenge to that judgment, and the additional reasons
set forth in respondent's opposition papers. With respect to the petitioner's challenge to
the court'~ award of attorneys' fees, the court notes that it did not award respondent all of
the fees she sought and did not award her fees she incurred in connection with matters on
which she was not successful at the hearing held in April 2013. The court stands by its
attorney fee ruling for the reasons stated on the record and as set forth in petitioner's
opposition papers. In sum, petitioner's Rule 59 motion is DENIED.
Motion to Stay.

Petitioner requests a stay pursuant to Rule 62(b ). The basis for the stay is his
pending Rule 59 motion, and he requests a stay "until after a decision has been rendered
on Petitioner's Rule 59 Motion .... " The court has now ruled on the Rule 59 motion, and
the Rule 62(b) motion is therefore DENIED as moot.

ORDER
Based on the foregoing, and for good cause appearing, petitioner's Rule 59 Motion
for New Trial to Amend the Findings of Fact, Conclusions <;>f Law, and Final Judgment, and
petitioner's Rule 62(b) Motion to Stay Execution of Judgment are both DENIED. This is
the order of the court, and no additional order is required to be prepared in this matter.
DATED this 11th day of July, 2013.
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE
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CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 074900501 by the method and on the date
specified.
EMAIL:
EMAIL:
EMAIL:

DEAN C ANDREASEN
F KEVIN BOND
BUDGE W CALL
07/12/2013

Date:

/s/

AMANDA O L S ' E N - ~

Deputy Court Clerk

Printed: 07/12/13 09:23:37
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1

P R O C E E D I N G S

2
3

THE COURT:

4

{Good mornings from counsel.)

5

THE COURT:

6

~:

we're on the record, right, Ma~dy?

8

THE COURT:

We're on the record in
And for

10

purposes of the record, can we have folks who are on

11

the line identify themselves?

12

MR. CALL:

15

Yeah.

Budge Call, Your Honor, on

behalf of the Petitioner, Michael Robinson.
MR. ANDREASEN:

Dean Andrea.sen and Sarah

Campbell on behalf of the Respondent, Debra Robinson.
THE COURT:

16

l

Okay.

the Robinson v. Robinson matter, 074900501.

14

l
v)

We are on the record--

{No audible response.)

13

I

Okay.

7

9

--0

Good morning, Counsel.

Okay.

I appreciate your doing

17

this.

18

unusual way dealing with ruling on the--on the pending

19

motions, but I--I wanted to--first of all, wanted--as

20

I said yesterday, the purpose of my--of the call today

21

is really just to announce to you what my ruling is on

22

the three pending motions that we've got before us.

23

I know it's a little--a little bit of an

And I decided during the hearing yesterday

24

that--that I wanted to--although I had a good idea of

25

what I wanted to do, I decided that I wanted to go

~1

I

3
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1

back and take another look at the file.

2

go back and sort of go through everything once again

3

and make sure that I had satisfied myself that I was

4

familiar with the issues.

5

I wanted to

You know, I'm not--I'm sympathetic to the

6

issue that's been raised about this case potentially

7

going up on appeal and it resulting in a lot more

8

delay and a lot more expense in a case that has been

9

subject t~, as you all know better than I, a lot of

10

delay and a lot of expense already.

11

felt like I needed to go back once again, look through

12

everything very carefully.

13

And so I really

So I did that for the bett~r part of the

14

night last night, went back sort of once again through

15

the file, reviewed everything carefully, reviewed

16

again the briefs that were filed on the pending

17

motions, and am going to just sort of announce to you

18

what I'm--what I'm going to do with respect to the

19

pending motions, and then we'll talk sort of briefly

20

about where we go from there.

21

Let me take up, first, the--the motion to

22

amend the preliminary injunction that the Court

23

entered with respect to the Lis Pendens and the

24

nullification of the Lis Pendens.

25

to deny that motion.

The Court's going

I believe that the Court had the

4
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78B-6-1304, or the Court's inherent

1

authority, under

2

authority to issue orders effectively in aid of its

3

jurisdiction and to nullify the Lis Pendens in this

4

case.
Basically what I said in my March 1, 2012

5

'4·

TRANSCRIPT OF RULING

2012

6

Minute Entry, and I'm going to stand by that ruling.

7

You know, there are some practical considerations that

8

were at issue here that I don't know were ever really

9

spelled out very clearly.

The reality is that we were

10

on the eve of a court-ordered sale of one parcel of

11

property and ultimately a second parcel of property;

12

that these Lis Pendens had been recorded not simply

13

once, but twice; that this was obviously done--and I

14

think the Petitioner has been fairly candid that this

15

was done in an effort to prevent that sale from

16

closing.

17

The reality is that going to Judge Stone and

18

--out in West Jordan in that case, you would have been

19

presenting to him, you know, all of these issues with

20

none of the background regarding the--the issues in

21

the divorce case.

22

unfair to him and he would have been, frankly, very

23

ill-equipped to deal with the issues that had been

24

ordered either by me--the orders that had been entered

25

either by me or by predecessor judges in this case.

i

I

I
~,

j

~j

And I think it would have been

5

J
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And I think just as a practical matter, there

1
2

was no way to deal with that other than by having--by

3

having me handle it.

4

other reasons that were advanced, I'm going to deny

5

the--the motion to amend the preliminary injunction

6

and the nullification order.

7

to ask you to please prepare a short order on that,

8

okay?

9

10

So for these reasons and the

MR. ANDREASEN:

Mr. Andreasen, I'm going

Certainly.

Are you issuing

any type of additional minute entry on that or not?

11

THE COURT:

I'm not.

12

MR. ANDREASEN:

13

THE COURT:

Okay.

Well, what--what I will do, when

14

we get done, is I'm going to give--and Mandy's not

15

even in here, but I'm going to have Mandy just do a

16

docket entry of this phone call with, you know,

17

basically a three-sentence summary of what the rulings

18

were and who's been directed to prepare what.

19

MR. ANDREASEN:

Okay.

20

THE COURT:

21

(No audible response.)

22

THE COURT:

Okay?

So next is the--what I call,

23

perhaps inaptly, the omnibus motion, if you will.

24

This is the Rule 52, 59 and 60(b) motion to amend the

25

judgment, to vacate the judgment or for other relief.

6
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'

I

1

''
'-;;JI.

1

And this, as I said, is what I spent the bulk of my

2

time, you know, last night and again this morning

3

going back again through the file and making sure that

4

I was comfortable with what had happened up to this

5

point in the case.

6

And I'm going--and I don't know that it's

7

necessary to do this, but I'm going to sort of walk

8

back through a little bit the--the notes that I have

9

from going back through the file so at least it's

10

clear as to how I

11

to.

12

l'

I
j

j
..,d,

j

There was, on November 2nd of 2007, a

13

Stipulation and Property Settlement Agreement,

14

pursuant to which Debra was to receive $1.7 million,

15

Michael was to receive--at least in connection with

16

the property that we're talking about here, that

17

Michael was to receive the property and this refinance

18

was basically a mechanism that had been agreed to by

19

the parties in order to fund a property distribution,

20

of which the Phoenix Plaza was--was one part, among

21

many.

22

I
J

get to the conclusions that I get

Not long thereafter, there was a sort of a

23

protracted period of litigation in the case, and that

24

ultimately resulted in a motion being filed by Michael

25

to set aside the stipulation.

That was heard on

7
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1

October 6, 2008 by the Commissioner.

The Commissioner

2

denied that motion.

3

like, on November 14, 2008 by the Commissioner, and

4

then on November 17, 2008 by Judge Iwasaki.

The order was signed, it looks

That's the order--that, along with the

5
6

Divorce Decree that is entered on December 31st of

7

2008, are the issues that go up on appeal to the Utah

8

Court of Appeals.

9

is issued on April 20th of 2010.

And the Court of Appeals' decision

I've taken another look at the Court of

10
11

Appeals opinion and the Court of Appeals pretty--and I

12

agreed with the--with the point that was made at

13

yesterday's hearing that the Court of Appeals

14

obviously did not have the contempt issue in front of

15

it.

16

of setting aside the agreement that had been entered

17

into by the parties and the decree that was premised

18

on that agreement.

19

The Court of Appeals had in front of it the issue

But in that context, the Court of Appeals pretty squarely

held that

20

the doctrines of mutual mistake and impossibility were

21

not grounds upon which Michael could set aside the

22

stipulation and decree.

23

The issue of fraud is an issue that, while

24

not directly raised as a defense, is an issue that

25

could have been raised and was not raised and is

!

J

j
I

l
J

I

J
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1

therefore barred by res judicata, as I found in

2

confirming the ruling from the July 26th hearing.

3

It's important to me, at least from sort of my

4

analysis of--of how we look at this case, is that as

5

of April 22nd of 2010, when the Court of Appeals

6

issued its opinion, the lay of the land was basically

7

this:

8

Court of Appeals had determined were valid and

9

enforceable.

We had a stipulation and a decree that the

That stipulation and decree and the Court of

10

._,j 1

11

Appeals opinion represent law of the case.

Under the

12

terms of that stipulation and decree, Debra was

13

entitled to the $1.784 million in property distri-

14

bution.

15

the Court of Appeals and the doctrine of law of the

16

case, that I have the authority to change any of that,

17

even if I were inclined to do so.

t

i

!--there's simply no way that I can properly

18

I

.J

I

j
..i:J

I don't believe, in light of the ruling from

19

undo decisions that have been made by the Court of

20

Appeals, and I can't do that either directly or

21

indirectly.

22

authority that I have.

23

in the case from and after that time has to be viewed

24

in light of the reality of the Court of Appeals

25

decision.

It's simply outside the scope of
And everything that happened

l

I

J

9

J

j
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1

You know, there's some significant attention

2

paid in the briefs to what the Commissioner did or did

3

not consider, what Judge Iwasaki did or did not

4

consider, and what the Court of Appeals did or did not

5

consider in the course of making that opinion--in the

6

course of the events prior to April 22nd of 2010.

7

And my response to that is that--that this

8

Court is not the proper forum in which to raise any of

9

those issues.

I simply don't have the authority to go

10

back and unwind it.

11

it indirectly.

12

authority to do indirectly what I am prohibited by law

13

of the case and by the binding precedent from the

14

Court of Appeals indirectly.

15

I-

TRANSCRIPT OF RULING

I

And I don't believe that I can do

don't believe that--that I have the

So the events following the issuance of the

16

opinion are really the ones that are most important

17

for purposes of this motion.

18

January 13th of 2011, a hearing before the

19

Commissioner, at which the Commissioner did a few

20

things, one is which--one of which was struck

21

affidavits or declarations that the Commissioner

22

determined had been untimely filed.

23

And so we have, on

The Commissioner declined to continue the

24

hearing and at that January 13, 2011, Michael

25

stipulated to the sale of the property for $3 million.

10
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1

There is a suggestion that that stipulation was

2

somehow not voluntary and I just can't find any

3

evidence to suggest that--that his agreement as of

4

January 13th to sell the property for $3 million was

5

anything other than a voluntary agreement that he'd

6

entered into at that time.

i
I

i

.l

Now, the Commissioner also concluded that--

7

v;):

8

that he could not award the principal amount of the

9

$1.7 million, and that the--that those amounts would

10

have to be--because they were not yet due--and I--

11

whatever the language of the Commissioner from the--

12

from the hearing is what it is, but essentially that

13

those were not yet due and they would have to be dealt

14

with as a sanction following a finding of contempt.

15

And that's what, it appears to me, kind of led us down

16

the road of the contempt proceedings that followed.

17

-..d _,·I

18

recommendation that was filed in late January.

19

was addressed and ruled upon by Judge Iwasaki in

20

February.

21

January 13 hearing.

22

l

_I

j

There was an objection to the Commissioner's

And he also entered his order from the

We then sort of move--we then move to the

23

April 2011 time frame.

And at that point in time

24

Michael filed a relief--again, a--basically a 59 or

25

60(b) motion for relief, in which he raised, again,

11
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1

the fraud issues.

2

withdrawn, as we all know from the Minute Entry that I

3

entered and from the docket in the case.

4

June, Debra moved to enforce the stipulation and to

5

sell the property for $3 million.

And in early

7

before Judge Iwasaki, at which Judge Iwasaki orders a

8

couple of things.

9

The other is the sale of the Phoenix Plaza for $3

10
11

One is a sale of the Sandy Center.

million.
We then--that then gets us to the point of

12

the July 26, 2011 hearing.

13

last night and reread the transcript of the hearing.

14

And I've gone back again and looked at the Minute

15

Entry that I entered and the Findings of Fact that I

16

entered on March 1st with respect to that issue.

17

J

That motion was subsequently

There is, on June 21st of 2011, a hearing

6

l
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I have gone back again

And I am, I will tell you candidly, not 100

18

percent comfortable, as I indicated to you at the

19

hearing yesterday, that contempt and a contempt

20

proceeding was the correct vehicle to use to enforce

21

the sale of the property.

22

and Rule 52, as well, it's not my role and my job to

23

go back and re-review and second-guess each decision.

24
25

However, under Rules 59, 60

Now, if there is an obvious or egregious
error that's been made, then I

think that I need to go

12
ANN M. LOVE, RPR, CCR

801.538.2333

ROBINSON v. ROBINSON

TRANSCRIPT OF RULING

May 23, 2012

1

back and look at it and try and fix it.

2

I'm not entirely comfortable with the idea that a

3

contempt proceeding was the proper way to enforce the

4

terms of the decree.
However, in that regard, I can say a few

5

.,4)1

And as I say,

6

things.

One is in going back and looking at the

7

transcript again, there is a certain sense in which

8

that error, if it was an error, was invited by

9

Michael's counsel at the time.

Because what happened

10

was there were certain proffers that were made at the

11

hearing with respect to testimony that would be

12

offered.

13

There was a discussion between Judge Iwasaki

I

14

and--and Michael's counsel about the Court of Appeals

15

opinion and the issues that had been addressed by the

16

Court of Appeals.

17

time what's being said now, which is, Wait a minute.

18

There was not a contempt issue that was before the

19

Court of Appeals at the time.

20

consider this issue.

And essentially, no one said at the

l

_.a)

l

21
I

I

'~ J
j
I

j

You still need to

Basically, what happened is--is counsel said,

22

Well, if you're not going to consider impossibility

23

and you're not going to consider mistake, and you're

24

not going to consider res judicata because it's

25

something that could have been raised but was not and

13
j
...,;;
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1

therefore barred by res judicata, then there's really

2

nothing on which--there's really nothing to present in

3

terms of evidence.

4

sense in which the finding of--the finding of contempt

5

that resulted from that was a foregone conclusion.

6

And it would--there's a certain

The other thing I will say is that even if

7

the contempt vehicle was not the proper vehicle to

8

raise the issue, and if it were addressed in some

9

other way, I'm not sure that the result at the end of

10

the day would be any different.

11

issue I was trying to get at, inartfully I'm sure, in

12

my questions of Mr. Bond yesterday about whether we

13

wouldn't be in the same place we are now if it had

14

been enforced by, for example, a motion for summary

15

judgment or, frankly, even a--a trial on the issue of

16

the contract--the contract being enforceable and no

17

defense to the contract being enforceable on the

18

grounds of impossibility, mutual mistake or fraud.

19

And that was the

And so I guess the bottom line for me is that

20

unless there was some mechanism by which the Court

21

could go back and undo the Utah Court of Appeals

22

opinion, which this Court can't do and isn't inclined

23

to do, in any event, the deal that was reached by the

24

parties would still have to be enforced.

25

mechanism of contempt was a mechanism that was chosen

And the

1

J

14
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i
j

1

to do that.

2

that that was the right choice, but what I am sure of

3

is that at the end of the day, if it was not the right

4

choice, I think the result and where we would be if a

5

different path had been followed is exactly where we

6

are today.

7

I

The other thing I want to make clear is that

8

to the extent there was any confusion about the

9

interlineations that I made to the propo~ed form of

10

order from the July 26 hearing, my purpose in making

11

those interlineations was--was not to do anything

12

other than make sure that the findings and the order

13

conformed with the issues that were before Judge

14

Iwasaki on July 26th so that the order would correctly

15

reflect what he ruled at the hearing.

16

anything more or anything less than that.

17

.~

As I said, I'm not a hundred percent sure

I didn't intend

That's sort of a long explanation, I think,

18

of getting to the point that I've looked at these

19

issues carefully, I've thought about them carefully,

20

and I just don't see that there is grounds or,

21

frankly, the ability, given the Court of Appeals

22

opinion, to go back and unwind what's happened in the

23

case since July of 2011, or since April, frankly, of

24

2011, when the Court of Appeals opinion came down.

l

I

J

25

j
~j
J

So on that basis, I'm going to deny the--what

15
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1

I've called the omnibus motion.

2

very short Minute Entry following our telephone

3

conference today documenting that.

Mr. Andreasen,

4

I'll ask you to prepare the order.

Okay?·

5

MR. ANDREASEN:

6

THE COURT:

No, I don't think--I think the

record speaks for itself.

9

to be recorded somewhere in how I got to the point

I just wanted my rationale

that I got to.

11

MR. ANDREASEN:

12

THE COURT:

Okay.

Thank you.

Now, that brings up the last

13

motion, which is the motion dealing with the temporary

14

restraining order that I issued.

15

that issue, I will enter an order, when we finish the

16

phone call today, dissolving my TRO effective

17

immediately.

18

order other than dissolve the TRO, because I don't

19

have any other issue, frankly, before me in that

20

regard.

21

!

Did you want-all-of this

8

10

!

And again, we'll do a

background in the order or not?

7

I
J
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And with respect to

I'm not going to do anything in that

The TRO, as I explained yesterday, was

22

entered for purpose--purposes of--and I went back and

23

looked at it again today and I think it was pretty

24

clear--for purposes of preserving the status quo

25

pending a ruling on the motion that I have now just

j

I

J

16

I
I

I

J

l
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1

ruled on.

2

motion, I'm going to dissolve the TRO.

3

need anybody to prepare anything for me on that.

4

just enter a short order when we get done here.
MR. ANDREASEN:

5

7

immediately after that is entered?
THE COURT:

!

That, I don't know.

I mean, I'm

10

case dealing with the sale of the property address in

11

some fashion how that's to occur.

12

back and look at those again.

13

I, frankly, view that I have in front of me is

14

dissolving the TRO.

16
I

Okay?

assuming that your prior orders that you had in the

15
..J

I'll

Would that result in the

funds being disbursable, if there is such a word,

9

i
i

And so I don't

6

8

-4 l

And in light of the fact that I denied the

MR. ANDREASEN:

But I didn't go

And the only issue that

Okay.

Certainly {inaudible)

--I think you've answered my question.

17

THE COURT:

18

MR. ANDREASEN:

Okay.

.1

May I ask one question for

l

.I

·...:J'

j

19
20

THE COURT:

21

MR. ANDREASEN:

Sure.
You have the request for

22

attorney fees in responding to their two motions, to

23

(inaudible) motions.

24

also?

25

j

clarification?

THE COURT:

Is the Court ruling on that,

Why don't we do this?

17
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1

motion for attorney's fees, indicate in the order that

2

the Court will take up that request for attorney's

3

fees in connection with these motions in resolving--in

4

sort of fully and finally resolving all of the

5

outstanding issues in the case.

6

MR. ANDREASEN:

7

THE COURT:

8

9
10

Certainly.

So that--I'd prefer not to do it

piecemeal.
MR. ANDREASEN:
THE COURT:

(Inaudible.)

Okay.

The other thing that I

11

suggested yesterday we be prepared to talk about is

12

scheduling.

13

your all's clients on the line and we don't have

14

Mr. Bond here, what we ought perhaps to do instead is

15

to simply set a date for a scheduling conference at

16

which you all could come in with your proposals as to

17

how I proceed from--from there.

18

And I wonder if, given that we don't have

And I guess, perhaps --and I say this, hoping

19

against odds, that the two of you have an opportunity

20

to speak with one another and present me some agreed-

21

upon proposal for how we proceed from here to fully

22

and finally resolving the case.

23

MR. ANDREASEN:

And certainly I think that

24

makes sense, and we'd be happy to make a proposal and

25

get something over to Mr. Call and Mr. Bond here in

j
j
j
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1

the near future.

2

we're following now, one being the contempt issue that

3

we've started.

4

l
l

~I

J

And I see kind of two practices

And then number two, a motion dealing with

5

all of the, I'll call, wrap-up issues.

6

attorney fees; for example, accrual of interest;

7

things--additional items that were in the Decree of

8

Divorce that just need to be finalized and either

9

brought to judgment or ruled upon in some fashion.

10

~

TRANSCRIPT OF RULING

THE COURT:

Right.

For example,

And I think there may be

11

--based on the comments that were made yesterday, I

12

think there may be issues that--that the Petitioner

13

will want to bring up with respect to that sort of

14

final accounting and wrapping up.

15

MR. ANDREASEN:

16

THE COURT:

Certainly.

And it would--and I guess it

17

would be my hope that we figure out a way to tee up

18

all of those issues and get them--and get them

19

resolved as efficiently as we can.

20

MR. ANDREASEN:

We still have, I guess from

21

my perspective, a major issue of are Mr. Call and

22

Mr. Bond going to be involved in the case, given this

23

advice of counsel defense that has been raised.

24
25

THE COURT:

Well, that's put that on the list

of things to talk about--

19
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1

MR. ANDREASEN:

2

THE COURT:

3

MR. CALL:

I

.!

(Inaudible) that in our proposal

5

date to come over for a scheduling conference?
THE COURT:

But do we want to get a

Yeah, that's what I'm look--

7

that's what--I'm just looking at my calendar here.

8

Let me--let me get Mandy.

9

anything without her knowing what I'm doing, so ...

I hesitate to schedule

Do you guys want to come over here and do it

11

or do we want to do it--do we want to do it on-the

12

phone?

13

J

So--

to get this thing resolved.

10

I

--I guess.

4

6

J

Okay.

MR. ANDREASEN:

I might suggest, Your Honor,

14

that maybe we just--give us a ten-day period or

15

something at least to see if we can put something down

16

on paper as to all the remaining issues, get it to you

17

and then maybe come--I'm happy either way, a phone

18

call or in person, whichever is most convenient.

19

THE COURT:

20

MR. CALL:

Okay.

Well, let's--

Yeah, that's fine.

If we can get

21

a written proposal to you, then may be easier to_ do it

22

by phone.

23

THE COURT:

Yeah.

If you all have an

24

agreement as to how you want to do it, then there's--

25

what I don't want to do is have all of you take the

J

J
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1

time and effort and traipsing down here when we really

2

don't need to.

3

let's figure out what a date is.

4

being a--sort of a telephone scheduling conference.

5

And if either of you feels like we need--that we need

6

to have everybody down here and we need more time to

7

do it, then just include that in whatever you file

8

with me.

~:

~

I

We'll plan on this

We're looking at--I mean, ~hey want at least

9
~-

So why don't we do--why don't we--

10

ten days to sort of sort through the issues, so we're

11

looking at probably two weeks.

12

I'm in Summit.

13

did it that week, we'd have to--it would have to be on

14

the phone.

The first week in June

We've got a trial (inaudible).

If we

15

(One of the attorneys talking, inaudible.}

16

THE COURT:

17

How about Wednesday, June 13th at

4:00?

18

MR. ANDREASEN:

19

THE COURT:

We're fine.

•I

j

20
21
22
23

Does that work for you guys?

Do

you have--do you have Kevin's calendar or not?
MR. CALL:

I do.

He's not available on the

13th, but he is available on the 12th.
THE COURT:

Yeah, I can't do it on the 12th.

I

i

J

24

If we--I'm out of town on the 14th.

25

Wednesday, the 20th, at 8:30.

We could do the--

~1

J

j

l
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1

MR. ANDREASEN:

2

MR. CALL:

3

(Judge talking to clerk, inaudible.)

4

MR. CALL:

We're fine.

(Inaudible.)

I'm sorry, I had to run into

5

Kevin's office real quick.

6

any conflict on the 20th, so that should work.

7

THE COURT:

He doesn't seem to have

All right.

Let's plan on the

8

20th at 8:30.

9

some kind of a consolidated statement, if you will, of

Can you all make an effort to get to me

10

the issues that we need to kind of resolve and talk

11

about?

12

MR. ANDREASEN:

13

THE COURT:

14

I

TRANSCRIPT OF RULING

Sure.

And do that by the--Wednesday,

the 13th.

15

MR. ANDREASEN:

16

MR. CALL:

17

THE COURT:

Certainly.

Okay.
And if you--and if--I guess what

18

I envision is if--if--you know, one section of that

19

that says, Here are the issues we all agree need to be

I
J

20

resolved and our proposal for how to resolve them.

21

And hopefully that's the end of it.

j

22

another section saying, you know, These are the other

23

issues that we think we need to address and how we

24

want to address them.

25

kind of has each party's position on that.

j

j

But if not,

Just so I've got something that
Okay?

1
22

I

J
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1

MR. CALL:

2

MR. ANDREASEN:

3

THE COURT:

4

~,
Vi)

l

I

I

~l

All right.
Okay.

Thanks very much, Counsel.

I

appreciate it.

5

MR. ANDREASEN:

Thank you.

6

MR. CALL:

7

THE COURT:

8

(The ruling was concluded.}

9

* * *

10

* * *

11

* * *

12

* * *

13

* * *

14

* * *

15

* * *

16

* * *

17

* * *

18

* * *

19

* * *

20

* * *

21

*

*

22

*

* *

23

* * *

24

* * *

25

* * *

Thank you.
Bye.

*
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CHAPTER9
WRONGFUL LIENS AND WRONGFUL
JUDGMENT LIENS
SecUon
38-S.1.

38..S.2.
38-9-8.

38-9-4.
38-9.fi.

Suction
DeftniUWlS.

38-9--6,

Petition. to file lioa - Notice to
rooord intc-rest holders - Sum-

38-8-7.

Petition to nulliJy lien -

Scope.

mary relief - Contested petition.

County TUCOrder may reject wrongful
lion within sa>po otemployment.Oocd faith roqui.remenL
Civil liability for recording WNngful
lien - Damages.
Repealed.

Notice to

lien claimant - Summary reUof Finding of wroosful lien - Wrongful lien is void.

38..9-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter.
(1) "Interest holder" means a person who holds or possesses a present,
lawful property interest in certain real property. including an owner, title
holder, mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial owner.
(2) "Lien claimant'' means a person claiming an interest in real property
who offers a document for recording ·or filing with any county recorder in
the state asserting a lien, or notice of interest. or other claim of interest in
certain real property.
(3) "Owner" means a person who has a vested ownership interest in
certain real property.
(4) {a) "Record interest ·holder means a person who holds or possesses
a present_· lawful property interest in certain real property, including
an owner, titleholdert mortgagee, trustee, or beneficial QWller, and
whose name ·antt ittterest in that real property appears in the county
recorder's records for the county in which the property is located.
(b) "Record interest bolder" includes any grantor in the chain of the
title in certain real property.
(5) ~cord owner"' means an owner whose name and ownership interest in cei·tain real property is i:ecorded or filed in tbe:_ county recorder's
records for the county in which the prope1-ty is locat.ed.
(6) "Wrongful lien,•~- any doeu~ent that purports to create a lien,
notice.of-interest, or encmnhrance on an owner's interest in certain real
property and at the time it is recorded is not:
·
(a) expressly authorized by this chapt.er or another state or federal
statute;
(b) authorized by or contained in an order or judgment of a court of
competent jurisdiction in the state; or
(c) signed by or authorized pursuant to a document signed by the
owner of the real property.
11

History: C. 1963. 38-9-t, enacted by L.
189'1, eh. 126, t Si 2008, ch. 123, § 1; 2009,
ell. 69, f 1; iOlO, cb. 381, § 2G.

ment, effective May 6, 2008, added •OT notice of
1nwest• in CZ) and added -Ootice of interest'" in
(6).

Repeals and ~ t a . - Laws
1997, ch. 125, § 2. repeals former§ 38-9-1, as
enacted by Laws 19.85, ch. 182. § 1. \"elating t.o
the liability of a petsan llllng-a wrongtul lion.
and eoacw t.he present section. See f 38-9-4 for

{41(b).

pre,ent. liability provision&.
Aanendmon& Notes. - The 2008 amend-

the introdumry language of (8).

Tho 2009 amendment, offed;ive May 12.
2009, added the (4}{a) desigo4tion and added
The ·2010 amendment, etrective May 11,
2010, delot.ed •or filed• fallowing -recorded" in

3~9-2. Scope.
(1) (a) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1. 38-9-3, 38-9-4, and 38..9-6 apply to

any recording or filing or any rejected recording or filing of a lien_ pursuant
to this chapter on or after May 6, 1997.
(b) The provisions of Sections 38-9-1 and 38·9-7 apply to all liens of
record regardless of the date the lien was recorded or- filed.
(c) Notwithstanding Subsections (l)(a) and (b), the provisions of this
chapter applicable to the filing of a notice of interest do not apply to a
notice of interest filed before May 5; 2008.
(2) The provisions of this cbap~r shall not pnW8Jlt a person from filing a lis
pendens in accordance with Section 788-6-1308 or seeking any other relief
permitted by law.
(3) This chapter does not apply to a person entitled to a lien under Section
38-1-3 who files a lien pursuant to Title 38, Chapter 1, Mechanics' Liens.
History: C. 1968, 88-9-2. enacted by L.
19971 ch. 125, t S; 1999, ch. I.!9, I 1; 2005,
ch. 93, § l; 2008, ch. S, § 88; 2008, ob. 223,
§

z.

Repeals and Reenactments. - Laws
1997, ch. 125, t S ropcnla funner I SS-9-2. as
onacted by Laws 1985. ch. 1B2. § 2, relating to
en urmuthorized_licn as invulid, and enacts the
µres.cnt s~ction. For prt."5ent comparable provision,~§ 38·9-7.

38-9-3. County recorder may reject wrongful lien within
scope of employment - Good faith requirement.
{a) A county recorder may reject recording of a lien if the county recorder
determines the lien is a wrongful lien as defined in Section 38-9-1.
(h} If the county recorder rejects a document to record a lien in
accordance with Subsection (lXa). the county recorder shall immediat:ely
return the original document together with a notice that the document
was rejected pursuant to this section to the person attempting to record
the document or to the address provided on the document.
(2) A county recorder who, within the scope of the eounty retarder's
employment. rejects or accepts a document for recording in good faith under
this section is not liable for damages.
(3) If a rejected document is later found to be recordable pursuant to a court
order, it shall have no retroactive recording priority.
(4) Nothing in this chapter shall preclude any person from pursuing any
remedy pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 65A, htjunctions.
( 1)

Hlatory: C~ 1963, 38-9-3, enacted by L
199'7, ch. 1~ f 4J 9010, ch. 381, § 11.
Repeals and Roenaotments. - Laws
1997, ch.. 126, f 4 repeals former§ 38-9-8, as

enacted by Lawa 1985. ch. 182, f 3, relating to
liability for refusing to corred P document
containing a wrongful lien. and enDcts the
present section..

38-9-4. Civil liability for recording- wroµ.g.ful lien - Damages.
{11 A lien claimant who ~ or. causes. a wrongful lien as defined in
Section 38-9-1 to be recorded in the office of the county recOI'der against real
property i.s liable to a record interest holder for any actual damages proximately caused by the wron.gful lien.
(2) If the person in violation of Subsection (1) refuses to. release qr correct
the wrongful lien within 10 days from the date of written reqQest from a .record
in~& holder of t~ ·real p~perty delive~d personally or mail~d tio the
last-known address of the lien claimant~ ·the ·person is -liab1e to that r ~
Jnterest h~lder for $.;3;000 or for treble actual damages;·whichever.is greater.
and
reasonable attorney fees nnd OQSts.
·
(3). A person is Jiabl~ to the .re.cord awner of real property for $10,000 or for
treble actt$1 damages. whichever· is greater., and for reasonable attm,ley: fees·
and costs, who records or cuuaes to bo recorded wrongful.lien as defined in
Section 38-9-1 fn the office of the county recorder against: the real property.
knowing or having reesQn to know that the document: ·
(a) is a wrongful lien;
(b) is groundless; or
{c) contains a material mi~tatcrnent or false claim.

for

a

·\JJi)

History: C. 1953, 38-9-4, enacted by L
1997, clL 125, § .. o; 2008, e,h. 297, § ill 208'
ch. 223, i 3; 2010~-ch. 381, i 22.
Repeals· and -~nc:tments. Lawa
1997; ch. 125, § 5 repeal&- former f. 38-9-4, aa
Qnaeted. by Laws 1985; ch. UI~, §. 4, rel:3tmg to.
·V'Qnue; ~.bJ. and attorn~y fct-s, ~uid 9~acts the
present. section. For p~ont provision~. s~ §

SS.9-6.

.

~

38-9--5. Repealed.
Repeals. - Laws 2006. ch. 93. t 12 repeals

f 38-9-6,

ae enacted by L. 1997. ch.. 125, § 6,
portnining to criminal liability and penalties
for filing a wrongful lien. oftective May 2. 20015.

For present com.parable provisiona, see § 76-6503.5; 80u also TiUe 38, Chapte?' 9a, regarding
iajunctions against wrongful liens.

88-9-6. Petition to file lien - Notice to record interest
holders - Summary relief - Contested petition.
(l) A lien claimant whose document is rejected pursuant to Section 88-9-3
may petition the district court in the county in which the document was
rejected for an expedited determination that the lien may be recorded or filed.
(2) (a) The petition ahall be filed with the district coort within 10 days of the
date notice is received of the rejection and shall state with specificity the
grounds why the document should lawfully be recorded or filed.
(b) The petition shall be supported by a sworn affidavit. of the lien
claimant.
(c) If the court finds the petition is insufficient, it may dismiss the
petition without a hearing.
(d} If the court grants a hearing, the petitioner shall serve a copy of the
petition, notice of hearing, and a copy of the court's order granting an
expedited hearing on all record interest holders of the property sufficiently
in advance of the hearing to enable any record interest holder to attend the
hearing and service shall be accomplished by certified or registered mail
(e) Any record interest holder of the property has the right to attend
and contest the petition.
(3) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court finds that the document
may lawfully be recorded, it shall issue an order directing the county recorder
to accept the document for recording. Jf the petition is contested, the court may
award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party.
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether
or not a. contested document, on its face, shall be recorded by the county
recorder. The proceeding may not determine the truth of the content of the
document nor the property or legal rights of the parties beyond th~ necessary
determination of whether or not the doaiment shall be recorded. The court's
grant or denial of the petition under this section may not restrict any other
legal remedies of any party, including any right to injunctive relief pursuant to
Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 66A, Injunctions.
(5) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings
may not be expedited under this section..
Bl~tocy: C. 1933. 38-9--6, enacted by L.
199'1. ch. 12&, I 7.

38-9-7. Petition to nullify lien - Notice to lien claim.ant Summary relief - Finding of wrongful lien Wrongful lien is void.
(1) Any record interest holder ofreal property against which a wrongful lien

as: defined in Section 38-9-1 has been reoo:tded may petition the district court

L,.

"'"'

in the county in which the document was recorded for summary relief to nullify
the lien.
(2) The petition shall state with specificity the claim that the lien is a
wrongful lien and shall be supported by a sworn affidavit of the record interest
holder.
(3) (a) If the court finds the petition .insufficient, .it may dismiss the petition
withuut a hearing.
(b) If the court finds the petition is sufficientt the court shall schedule a
hearing within 10 days to determine whether the document is a wrongful
lien.
(c) The record interest holder shall serve a copy of the petition on the
lien claimant and a notice of the hearing pursuant to Rules of Civil

Procedure, Rule 4; Process.
(d) The lien claimant is entitled to attend and contest the petition.
(4) A summary proceeding under this section is only to determine whether
or not a document is a wrongful lien. The proceeding shall not dete.rrnine any
other property or legal rights of the parties nor restrict other legal remedies of
any party.
(5) (a) Following a hearing on the matter, if the court determines that the
document is a wrongful lien, the court shall issue an order declaring the
wrongful lien void ab initio, releasing the property from the lien. and
awarding costs and reasonable attorney's fees to tbe petitioner.
(b) (i) The record interest bolder may record a certified copy of the
order with the county recorder.
(ii) The order shall contain a legal description of the real property.
(c) If the oourt determines that the claim of lien is valid, the court shall
dismiss th& petition and may award costs and reasonable attorney's fees to
the lien claimant. The dismissal order shall contain a legal description of
the real property. The ptevailing lien claimant may record a certified copy
of the dismissal order.
(6) If the district court determines that the lien is a wrongful lien as defined
in Section 3S.9- l, the wrongful lien is ·void ab initio and provides no notice of
claim or interest.
(7) If the petition contains a claim for damages, the damage proceedings
may not be expedited under this section.
History: C. 19ff3, 88-9-'1, enacted by L
1997, ch. 125, § 8.

-,4}
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788-6-1304. Motions related to a notice of the pendency of an action.
(1) Any time after a notice has been recorded pursuant to Section 788,.;6-1303,
any of the following may make a motion to the court in which the action is pending to
release the notice:
(a} a party to the action; or
(b) a person with an interest in the real property affected by the notice.
(2) A court shall order a notice released if:
(a) the court receives a motion to release under Subsection (1); and
(b) the court finds that the claimant has not established by a preponderance of
the evidence the probable validity of the real property claim that is the subject of the
notice.
(3) If a court releases a notice pursuant to this section, the claimant may not
record another notice with respect to the same property without approval of the court in
which the action is pending.
(4) Upon a motion by any person with an interest in the real property that is the
subject of a notice, a court may require the claimant to give the moving party a
guarantee as· a condition of maintaining the notice:
(a) any time after a notice has been recorded; and
(b) regardless of whether the court has received an application to release under
Subsection (1 ).
(5) A person who receives a guarantee under Subsection (4) may recover an
amount not to exceed the amount of the guarantee upon a showing that:
(a) the claimant did not prevail on the real property claim; and
(b) the person seeking the guarantee suffered damages as a result of the
maintenance of the notice.
(6) A court shall award costs and attorney fees to a prevailing party on any
motion under this section unless the court finds that:
(a) the nonprevailing party acted with substantial justification; or
(b) other circumstances make the imposition of attorney fees and costs unjust.
Enacted by Chapter 3, 2008 General Session

